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MONDAY MORNING SESSION
May 15, 1972
A Public Hearing before the Accounting Objectives Study
Group of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
convened at fifteen minutes past nine o'clock in the Imperial
Ballroom "B" at the Americana Hotel, New York City, New York,
Mr. Robert M. Trueblood of Touche Ross & Co., past President of
the Institute and Chairman of the Study Group, presiding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

We have just a few preliminaries.

I think all of you who are here know about the history of the two
Study Groups - the Wheat Report, or the Wheat Commission on the
structure of the Accounting Principles Board - and you should all
be aware that that report has been approved in its entirety by
Council of the American Institute and endorsed, I feel quite
strongly, by FEI, FAF, AAA, FGAA, NAA and the Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Board is under way;

So, the restructuring

the schedule is that the trustees should

be established, hopefully, by July 1 , with an organization meet
ing at or about that time, and with appointment of the members
of the new Standards Board to be operational, hopefully, by
January 1 of next year.
Meanwhile, the Accounting Principles Board continues
with its ongoing work.

You know that our Group is a rather dif

ferent kind of organization.
cal;

Our work is conceptual, philosophi

it will, in effect, become input to the Standards Board.

We do not have any present plans about how to handle our ultimate
output.

Our schedule is for a preliminary report no later than
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the fall of this year.
I want, first, to remind those of you who are partici
pating in our work, if only because some of the input to this
Group has raised some question about the composition of our Group-I would remind those who have raised that question that, statistic
ally, no sample, less than thirty, can possibly, mathematically,
be representative -- so, no matter how we work the Group, we
couldn't pass that test.
We have name cards here at the table, but I would like
to tell you that Sid Davidson is, as most of you know, Dean of
the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago;

he

is an economist and an accountant.
Dean Don Edwards, Dean of the School of Business at the
University of Minnesota.
Reed Parker, Duff, Anderson & Clark, recent past Presi
dent of the National Financial Analysts group, and with us as a
full-time member.

Howie Wagner is Executive Vice President,

Finance, of the Jewel Companies, Inc., in Chicago.

Oscar Gellein,

at my immediate right, is a Partner in the firm of Haskins & Sells.
I am going to ask Oscar, during the day, or during the next three
days, to spell me at the chairing role.
On my left is George Sorter, also of the University of
Chicago, essentially full-time Research Director for the Group.
Next to him is Dave Herwitz, from the Harvard Law School, who is
Counsel for the Group.

He meets with us regularly and is doing

some independent research on various subjects that we have to
deal with.
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Frank Weston, Partner in Arthur Young & Company, and
member of the basic Group.
Our initial witnesses are to the left and will intro
duce themselves later.
I would like to tell you that as Dean Cyert of Carnegie
Graduate School of Business is unable to be here today--he is a
member of the Group--beeause of a commencement at his institution.
I would also like to announce that Dean Cyert has become President
of Carnegie-Mellon University very recently, and will take office
midsummer.
Also absent this morning, but he will be here this after
noon, is Andy Reinhart, who is a Group Vice President for North
American Operations of The Singer Company.

He is, I believe, at

a stockholders’ meeting this morning.
Now, also working on an ongoing basis with our Group are
a number of people in various capacities who are here with us to
day, and I am going to ask these men to rise just for identifica
tion as I call their names, because if you need anything or have
any questions they are on the floor and will be able to help you.
First, Marty Gans, from Chicago--Touche Ross;
Arthur Andersen, Chicago;

then, Mike Shannon-

and Bob Streit, Ernst & Ernst, Chicago;

in the back of the room, Paul Rosenfield, from the Institute--has
been working with us, full time.

I do not see him here yet--I

understand, we are having continuing subway trouble.

Yuji Ijiri,

of Carnegie-Mellon is here; he acts as President Cyert's observer.
Gordon Johns--he is here this morning, Oscar?

And James Goble,

of Peat, Marwick, Chicago, observed the Group’s activity on a
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full-time basis.
Now as for where we are and where we stand, you all
know that we have three days of public hearings scheduled, and
the agenda is chock full.

It's very tight, and we are going to

have to hold to this schedule very tightly, but I think it might
be well to indicate to you just where we stand.
the final piece of formal input to the Group.

This is probably
One of our opera

tions, so far, has been to interview in depth, some fifty users
of financial reports from a variety of disciplines.

Each of

these persons has been interviewed by a member of the Study Group
and a staff member of the Study Group, and their input has been
made available to all of our Group.

In that interview process

we have also picked up in depth conversations with all of those
people who have recently written on the subject of objectives -people like Sprouse, Moonitz, Paton, Storey, Grady, and so forth.
As a Study Group, we have met informally with some
twenty-five major user groups and professional groups.

Our only

disappointment here is that, generally speaking, we have been
unable to make arrangements to work with consumer groups as such-I think, particularly, of the labor unions, who have shown no
interest or desire to work with us on a formal input basis.
haven't given up on that;

We

since Arnie Weber is back from

Washington we are hoping to use him to try to get with some labor
groups -- but, generally speaking, we have had a lack of success
in working with consumer groups, as such.

Nonetheless, considering

these group meetings and personal interviews, we have talked with
as many as two hundred and fifty people;

we have some twenty to
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thirty presentations scheduled for the next three days -- and,
after that, we have only five formal meetings to go through -one with the Securities Exchange Commission, one with the General
Accounting Office, with emphasis on the UCA's side, and three
major media in New York have agreed to make available a group of
financial writers to meet with us.

We have corresponded, sporad

ically perhaps, but systematically with some five to six thousand
individual corporations and professional groups in the United
States and overseas, and this has been very helpful.
We have come across papers, research being done by other
groups.

This has all been very helpful to us, and all the profes

sional groups in this country, of course, are presubmitting to us
their presently ongoing research.
Now in tandem with these peripheral investigations, we
have been conducting inquiries on a conceptual-theoretical level.
I didn’t name them for you, but we have four or five people on
contract doing particular things such as experimenting with fair
value proposals;

we have another man analyzing the literature on

social responsibility, and all of that work will come together.
So whatever accounting objectives might ultimately be, it is our
view that these should follow from a logical approach, from a
rationale that can be conceptually supported and from an intel
lectual framework which stands on more than the shaky footing of
hearsay or personal opinion.
Now as for today's proceedings, I said previously that
we have so many presentations to work into

three days that we

are going to have to have you adhere very tightly to the time
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schedule.

Now the procedure will he that the witness will make a

very short presentation -- hopefully, ten to fifteen minutes, no
more than twenty -- and I will use the gavel harshly, because we
want to give each of them an opportunity to be questioned by
members of the Study Group.

I think I should tell you that

members of the Group may well play the devil’s advocate as well
as ask questions for purposes of clarification.

Each of the

participants on the "witness stand" without exception has pre
submitted a full paper, which they will probably summarize or
expand upon in their presentation.
Day by day, a complete set of papers being talked about
during the day will be available at the back of the room.
We are going to start out trying not to use direct
questioning from the floor, because of its awkwardness; however,
each of you, if you have a question of the witness, should write
it out, give it to one of our representatives on the floor, and
we will work it into the proceedings as we go along.

If that

procedure proves to be too awkward, we will try to amend it -but, because of the time schedule, we think we are going to stick
to the requirement for written questions for the time being.
You will note that we have a court reporter with us;
everything said by everybody will go into the formal record.

A

complete, formal transcript will be available shortly at a price.
Some of you have already indicated that you want such a complete
transcript when it is available.
Any other input which we have received is not being dis
tributed today, but will become a part of the formal, public
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record when our work is done.
volume output.

We presently contemplate a three-

Volume One will be the objectives as such, and

whether that will take one page or a hundred pages, we don't yet
know.

Volume Two is going to be the formal exposition of all of

the very helpful inputs which have been received from people all
over the world.

Volume Three will involve a scenario of the

project from its inception to completion for archival purposes.
Just two or three other things.
invited;

The press has been

the major media may be here from time to time.

They

have been supplied with all the papers which are being discussed
today, with the admonition that they are not to be used until the
presenter has presented it, but there may be some press coverage
of these particular proceedings.
I would also tell you that we have a room, 4802, for
the Study Group;
where we will be.

if we aren’t at the table here, that is perhaps
And the press room is 4301.

There are also

copies of the papers there, and from time to time some of us here
at the table may have to go to one or the other of these rooms
to take care of some of our homework and our paperwork, and
possibly some of our visitors.
I want to take this chance, lest I forget, to thank all
professional groups, many major corporations, may academicians
and universities and many interested persons for supplying to us
over the past ten months a really large and excellent file of
material on the general subject of objectives.

Over this past

week-end, I reread, again— for, I suppose, about the third time-the papers that are going to be discussed here during the next
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three days.

I think the quality of those papers is superb and

unusually good for this kind of thing.

The man-months or work

that went into preparing some of them, I am sure, is a staggering
contribution, and the entire profession should be grateful to
those of you who have participated so sincerely and so well.
We are going to proceed immediately to the first pre
sentation by the Financial Analyst Federation.
in place, to my immediate left.

They are already

May I ask you, Bill Norby, to

introduce your group?
MR. WILLIAM NORBY (The Financial Analysts Federation):
Thank you, Mr. Trueblood.

We are pleased to have an opportunity

to participate in this proceeding.
myself.

First, I ’d like to introduce

I am William C. Norby, Executive Director of The

Financial Analysts Federation;

next to me is Dr. Frances Stone,

Chairman of our Financial Accounting Policy Committee and Manager
of the Special Products Unit and Research Department of Merrill
Lynch;

next to her is Frank E. Block, a member of our Financial

Accounting Policy Committee, past Chairman of that Committee and
a past President of the Federation.

He is a Senior Vice President

of the Girard Bank of Philadelphia.

I notice also in our audience,

we have Mr. Arthur Carlson, who is a member of this Committee and
also Chairman of our Corporate Information Committee.

In the back

of the room, another member of our Financial Accounting Policy
Committee--Marilyn Brown--down front, here, Gerald White of
Sterling, Grace & Company.
First of all, I would like to state that since our paper,
which was prepared by the Committee, was submitted to the Study
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Group, it has circulated among the Directors of the Federation,
and I have here a letter from our President, presented to Mr.
Trueblood, which I will submit for the record, stating that all
of the Directors of the Federation have approved the statement
of the Committee.

They believe it reflects faithfully the fin

ancial analysts' requirements for accounting information in
making investment decisions.
I should note, parenthetically, that Mr. Parker, who
is a Director of the Federation, did not participate in the vote
since he is a member of the Objectives Study Group.

Secondly, I

notice in the back of the room that you have made a distribution
of our recent statement to the Securities and Exchange Commission
hearings on the hot-issues securities market.

Our submission was

entitled, "Disclosure Requirements for First Offerings of New and
Emerging Enterprises.”

Since that statement was made in early

March, the Commission has asked us for our further views on
budget forecasts and first-offering prospectuses, and we have
earlier this month made a short addition to that statement, out
lining more specifically our views on budget forecasts and firstoffering prospectuses—

and if I may I will submit that for the

record also.
Now I ’d like to ask Dr. Stone to make a brief summary
of our position paper, and then Mr. Block’s got further remarks
he ’d like to make in collaboration with that statement, and then
we will be available for questions.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you, Bill.
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DR. FRANCES STONE (Financial Analysts Federation):
Both Bill and I obviously have written this statement, and we
hopefully did it so that it would be endorsed by all of the
Directors of the FAF.
I would like to emphasize the desirability, really, of
full disclosure, so that we could have comparability in the re
ports which are turned out by companies.

I would also like to

emphasize our points on materiality, segments of the business,
and interim reports equally as much.

I think that perhaps we

could have some help in the future on the whole business of
social accounting and forecasts.
And in addition to my endorsement of our report— which
is, as I said before, in part my own work--I would like to go a
little further than that, and on my own personal behalf ask that
perhaps the Study Group recommend that some experimentation be
made in the future with current cost accounting, or fair value
accounting, or however you would like to call it, but at any
rate to stop this complete dependence on historical costs.

The

thing that cheered me very much in readying the paper was that
there are a few other people around the accounting profession
that feel the same way, and I do want to add my endorsement to
their suggestion on this particular point.
That just about completes my own statement.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Mr. Block?

MR. FRANK E. BLOCK (Financial Analysts Federation):
I ’d like to comment briefly on one of the areas on which financial
analysts spend a great deal of time.

I don’t think financial
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analysts have really expressed, what they do in this area, in a
formal way, nor have I seen it expressed very well in textbooks.
However, there is an article in the April issue of The Journal of
Accountancy that does touch on it;

the title of it is, "Statement

of Funds: A Glimpse of the Future?"
I think basically what the analysts are trying to do in
getting at the concept of earning power is the careful analysis
of cash flows.

Now the cash flows that I am speaking of are not

the sources and uses of funds, but rather the generation of moneys
and whether those moneys have to be spent in a mandatory sort of
way, to maintain the value of the corporation, or whether they are
available for discretionary spending or distribution by the manage
ment of the corporation.
An example of this might be a company which needed to
spend a million dollars a year on advertising merely in order to
maintain the value of the corporation.

If it spends any less

than that, it is overstating the earnings of the company;

if it

spends more than that, presumably it is adding to the value of
the company.
The same thing would be true in terms of research and
development;

the same sort of thing would be true in the re

lationship between depreciation and capital expenditures.

De

preciation can overstate or understate earnings, simply because
the necessary capital expenditures to maintain value may be more
or less than the figure shown by depreciation.
So I think this type of analysis suggests that account
ing might want to move in a new direction, with a new type of
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sources of funds and uses of funds, breaking them down as to those
which are mandatory to maintain value and those which are dis
cretionary.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you, Mr. Block.

I noted in

reading the papers generally that it was only your paper--well,
not only your paper, but mostly your paper--which really hit upon
this cash-flow situation.

The Study Group, particularly because

of Mr. Parker, has been very conscious of your position.

It seems

to me now that you are raising a quick question, however, which
you are combining with cash flow which kind of relates as much to
the classification of expenditures, present and prospective, as
it does to the cash-flow issue, itself.

Is that your intention,

Mr. Block?
MR. BLOCK:

Yes.

I think perhaps this is an area in

which study should be done and new ideas and new concepts, new
formats and presentations, and so forth, would be most useful-for example, on the advertising question, how much advertising
was spent merely to maintain position on old products and how
much advertising was spent on new products— the same thing on
research and development.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Would the Federation wish to extend

its point of view on that issue, to include a different position
than the profession, than the accountants have taken in the past
about capitalization of such expenditures, or is it only a matter
of classification that you are talking about?
MR. BLOCK:

I think it’s classification and information

that we are looking for.

I suspect, we would be very much opposed
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to capitalization of these expense items.

Now the traditional

capitalization of items such as plant and equipment, of course,
we would probably favor doing unless somebody comes up with a
bright new idea of some better way to handle it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So your desire for that kind of

information is unrelated to capitalization, or you are indisposed
to encourage further capitalization of intangibles as compared
with past practices?
MR. BLOCK:

Yes.

I think the basic attitude of most

analysts is that we automatically wipe out goodwill and capital
ization of normally expensed items when we analyze companies.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

All right, now, I have to alert

the Study Group to guide me, and signal when they are ready.
Mr. Gellein?
MR. OSCAR S. GELLEIN (Haskins & Sells;

Member, Account

ing Objectives Study Group, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants):
earning power.

Your paper puts a lot of stress on the notion of
I wonder if I could ask you a few questions in

that regard.
You make the point that it encompasses many things,
starting with reported earnings, and you say that in most in
stances analysts will make adjustments to get "actual" earnings;
then you talk about normality, stability, and the like, all
wrapped up under the notion of "earning power."
Now, with that background, I ’ve got a few questions.
I think we all know some of the adjustments that you make.

Could

you comment on the conceptual nature of the adjustments that the
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analysts make in going from reported to actual earnings, as you
use the terms?
DR. STONE:

I will start off, but I think this is the

kind of question that should be open to everybody, because this
is very crucial.

The concept of earning

power--and, we use the

term rather inclusively, as you well realize--is an attempt,
really, to find what is the real base for the corporation--how
does it actually earn its money, in effect, and what kind of
stability does that base have?
Did the fact that it just changed its accounting change
its reported earnings?

Now that is obviously not a stable base

for what we are trying to find, and what most adjustments are
designed to do is to lay bare, really, the real capacity as we
can see it obviously from the outside of the corporation to con
tinue to be a viable entity, to continue to earn profits, and at
what kind of level can we foresee. The whole objective, really, is
to have a base from which to project future income power.
MR. GELLEIN:

Well then, actual earnings, having re

flected some adjustments, reflect just a better measure of histor
ical cost earnings?
DR. STONE:
MR. GELLEIN:
DR. STONE:

Yes, yes, that would be one way of...
A perfected measure of historical cost?
A measure, really, of the historical--but,

only as really, a means for moving forward, and the only way you
can use past data is in this adjusted form; otherwise, I think
you are badly hurt by the number of changes which have occurred
over time and the additions and deletions.

1.15
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think Frank would like to add to

that question.
MR. BLOCK:

I think my answer would come out just a

little differently than Frances'.

I thinks when you idealize

normal earning power as being--it is the stability and sustaina
bility of the discretionary cash flows--as I have described them
before--available to managements either for paying out as divi
dends, liquidating or otherwise to shareholders, or reinvestment
to increase the value of the corporation.
Now, this is the way I view it and I think there would
be a substantial number of analysts who would hold that viewpoint.
This does not in any way relate to historical costs.
MR. GELLEIN:

I just have one final points here.

I

noticed that, in Appendix "B" of your paper, the statement is
made that what is really needed is the development of a notion
of earnings related more to economic earnings on which both the
analyst and the accountant will agree.
much the way it's put.

I believe that’s pretty

And then, later in the paper the question

is raised as to whether historical-cost earnings mean anything.
Well now, the question I want to ask is this--you don't
really like price-level adjustments too much, according to the
paper.

Fair value--well, you left the door open a little bit,

but not too wide, for fair-value accounting.

What in your view

does it take to develop this better notion of income, whatever
it is?
MR. BLOCK:

There was an article by Jack Treynor, in

which he was trying to emphasize that earnings, or earning power
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had to have a viable economic concept behind them and that if you
started with any system that required an estimation of the base
at a beginning of a period and then subtract that from an estimate
made, based at the end of the year, and called this "earnings,"
that you were involved in the process of circular reasoning and
that you were unlikely to come up with anything that approached
economic earnings and that some basic thinking should be done on
just what "earnings” are.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
cation

May I ask for a point of clarifi

there, because your paper does talk about economic earn

ings, but the statement is made in your paper that, in general,
you are opposed to the concept that financial accounting should
report or should explicitly deal with such items as taxes, which
may be deliberately imposed to affect the national economy, and
so forth.
I have some difficulty, in your reaching for economic
earnings and yet saying at the same time you do not think finan
cial accounting should be used to adjust or report or influence
the economy, as such.

Is that not somewhat inconsistent, as a

position?
MR. NORBY:
your question.

I am not sure that I still get the drift of

It seems to me that our point with regard to the

use of accounting to influence the economy is essentially a polit
ical issue.

In other words, what we are doing in that instance,

it seems to us is that we are calling "earnings" something other
than what they really are according to economic terms, in order
to make people feel good or induce certain political actions.
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So I think, fundamentally, we do feel that that would mislead in
vestors, that that kind of politically-adjusted earnings...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: The distinction you are making is
that financial accounting should not he used to affect the economy.
But when you say you want a better presentation of economic earn
ings, you are really talking in terms of micro-economics, the macro..
.

MR. NORBY:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. NORBY:

Is that correct?

Well, I think that what we are saying is

that we don't want the standard of measurement changed, to induce-purely for political purposes--change in the economy;

if the

earnings are correctly measured and they have some effect on the
national economy, why, so be it.

But we are saying, we don't

want the standard of measurement changed to induce political
results.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think Howie Wagner has a question.

MR. HOWARD 0. WAGNER (Jewel Companies, Inc., Member,
Accounting Objectives Study Group, American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants):

Yes.

In your paper, you also mentioned--

again going back to the development of a purification of earnings
power--the fact that segregation of income or disaggregation,
whichever you call it, would be also very useful.

Could you

amplify at all your ideas with respect to disaggregation of
earnings?

This is a subject that means different things to

different people.

Since one of the purposes of our getting

together today is to put all of these things out in the open,
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I personally welcome any comment you might have to offer in con
nection with this.
MR. NORBY: Well I think that the concept stems from
the fact that, today, we have companies which are in many different
fields of endeavor, and since the objective of the analyst is to
relate the company to its environment in order to make some esti
mate of the future potential, when you have a widely diversified
company it becomes very difficult to do.

So it is necessary,

therefore, to break it down into its separate

elements that

respond to different economic environments.
Now how any particular company would be disaggregated
depends pretty much on the judgment of the situation, since there
is no uniform pattern of diversification, and this apparently is
one of the difficulties of coming up with an Accounting Principles
Board Opinion, because it's hard to write a definition which will
cover all circumstances.

Sometimes we are dependent upon the

market in which a company sells, sometimes dependent upon geo
graphic locations;

sometimes we are dependent upon different

manufacturing processes and different enterprises--so, it's the
different parts of the company that are affected by wholly
different cause effect factors, different marketing factors,
and so forth.
Now the extent to which one allocates joint costs to
these separate segments is another thorny issue.
sist that all costs be allocated.

We do not in

This becomes sometimes an

artifical process, when you get down to certain broad overhead
costs;

however, we think the process can go fairly far--at least
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far enough so that analysts can measure the relative impact on
total earnings of an activity in different segments.
Actually, I think a good deal of progress has been made
and in the reports this year at least in the annual reports so
far published--a good many companies seem to be making some pretty
good representations in this field.
need for more explicit

We think there is probably

accounting definitions of how they arrived

at the figures--a better explanation of the segments--but a fair
amount of progress seems to have been made.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Are you, then, in general support

of the current Securities Exchange Commission requirements on
segmented reports?
MR. NORBY:

Yes, when we think it’s absolutely essential

for our work.
MR. BLOCK:

I will carry it one step further, saying we

need just as much information about a segment as we do about a
corporation making precisely the same products, because we cannot
compare the two unless we have comparable information all the way
up and down the line— which says, for the segment, we need a
balance sheet statements of sources of funds, income statements,
footnotes and the whole thing.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Are you familiar by any chance

with the NAA’s position paper on reporting for diversified compan
ies, in which they use the phrase, "traceable costs," in order to
make the allocations between lines?
MR. BLOCK:

I am not familiar with it, but I am familiar

with running a department for a long period of time, and while I
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know managements very often say there is no possible way to trace
costs

allocate them, and so forth, I have always been told that

if I didn't make a profit on a total income statement from my
department I was going to get fired.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Do you have any further questions

on this subject, Howie?
MR. WAGNER:

No.

MR. NORBY: Bob, w e ’d like to make a further comment on
it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
DR. STONE:

Yes--Frances?

I do want to say that the whole area of

segmented or diversified-corporation problems is one we have been
involved with for now a number of years, and I think the Securities
Exchange Commission has made a large step forward for us by requir
ing this kind of reporting, and it is vital for doing the sort of
forecasting which I talked about before and which we were looking
for--earning power.
And may I also say something about the differences that
seem to arise in our paper?

We interviewed a number of securities

analysts and found that there wasn’t much support for price-level
or fair-value accounting.

I think that we have a group within

the analysts’ profession who are conservative, just as you have
them among the accounting profession, and I think that we were
expressing in that set of statements, their opinion, at that point.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD : Well...
MR. NORBY:

Bob, on the question of the NAA traceable

costs, Frances Stone and I did participate in a couple of hearings;
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we heard that:

the idea sounds interesting, in theory.

We didn’t

feel we had enough definition of it to know just what was actually
involved, how far down the line it should go toward net income.
It seemed that it could be quite variable from one company to an
other in its application and therefore was a little uncertain.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I agree, Bill, that the definition

in the paper is not very explicit to this point.

I understand,

however, it is a discussion paper, as distinguished from a position
paper.

Don Edwards?
DEAN JAMES DON EDWARDS (University of Minnesota; Member,

Accounting Objectives Study Group, American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants):

Bill, under your section "Objectives and

Financial Statements" in your paper, Item 22, you state that fin
ancial statements should be keyed to the interest of the profession
al investor.

Would you like to comment about that as it relates to

the current published information on the objectives of financial
statements, and the audience to which they are addressed?
MR. NORBY: Well I think our point was that, one, there
is a lot of glib talk about "thirty million shareholders," and so
forth.

We don’t feel that the understanding of financial and econ

omic processes is sufficiently broad, wide-spread, that one should
gear financial accounting objectives to that group.

We think that

you have to gear it to a somewhat more sophisticated audience--an
audience, not of accountants, essentially, but of people who under
stand economic and financial matters.

And because business is

simply too complex today to boil it down to a few simplistic state
ments, we believe that it's the function of the financial analysts,
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among others, to reinterpret this data for the broad investing
public.

We think that the corporation itself, of course, can

have two-level-type reports;

it can have some summary figures

which perhaps meet the basic need of the average investor, and
then its actual report should be to a more sophisticated audience.
DR. STONE:

I think that if you ever ask a small sample

of thirty or more investors whether they have read annual reports,
I think that you would find that a large percentage of them have
never even taken them out of the envelope to look at them, so that
in effect I think your real audience for the statements are the
analysts, portfolio managers, the professional group that we feel
we represent in the FAF.
MR. GELLEIN:

I had a similar question, also.

In

Section 3.6 you in effect say that the corporation is too complex
to reduce its financial statement to any simple analysis--and then
you go on to say that the report might show the simple first and
then parallel that with that which it is required to expand.
My question is that if you cannot reduce the complex to
the simple, then is the simplified statement meaningless or is it
even misleading in your view?
MR. BLOCK:

It well may be both meaningless and dis

torted, but I am sure that the stockholders who are not sophisti
cated still want to hear something from the managers.
MR. GELLEIN:
MR. BLOCK:

Even though they don’t open the envelope?
Well some of them do open the envelope I

am sure, and some of them do fly over the first few pages.

My

wife opens the envelope, turns to the first page and looks and
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sees whether it says earnings were up or down;
she is happy;

if they are up,

if they are down, she asks me about it, which is

the extent of her interest in the matter.

I think she might be

quite typical of most individual stockholders.
I think the management could do a better job of com
municating those simple things, but here I think it's a question
of how management is going to communicate with that particular
group.

I think that's a managerial problem.

We realize that in

their simplification they are going to create distortions, and
there is nothing we can do about that, but we think it very im
portant that adequate information be provided for professional
investors. And of course there are many individuals who are quite
professional in their approach to investing, and they may want
the same information.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

We have a question from the floor,

about whether you would elaborate on your position about publica
tion of corporate forecasts, which gets into an area on which I
think we should have some statement from you on the legal side.
These days, the trend of court opinions is distinctly, "informa
tion to one must be information to all."

In some of our group

interviews, very responsible parties have suggested that informa
tion to the public might be in separable pieces--one, the simpli
fied;
letter;

one, the equivalent of a 10-K;
and one, supplemental data.

one, the puffing president’s
But you, in your role as

analysts, are really the prognosticators these days;

you give to

the public your judgmental and sophisticated conclusions about
earnings prospects. And yet you have historically come by this data
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by a kind of contact not available to me, as an investor, or to
even the institutional investor.
Would you care to comment about forecasts, generally,
as well as this legal-privy problem?
MR. NORBY: Well on the subject of forecasts generally,
we cannot give it as much attention in this paper because we re
gard this as a problem in corporate disclosure rather than a
problem of accounting objectives.

We see the study of accounting

objectives as trying to determine the best way of measuring earn
ings and other financial aspects of the business.

The forecasts

of those elements in the future doesn’t impose any new standard
of accounting, it seems to us, but does involve a question of the
proper means of disclosure.
The whole subject of formal corporate forecasts is now
an issue in the public sector; the Securities and Exchange Commission
has announced that it is studying the issue, and recently the
Chairman indicated he was going to try and have a decision by
November.

A number of organizations are providing input, or hope

to, to the Securities Exchange Commission, and the Financial
Analysts Federation does want to provide its input.
I would say that at the present time the views of
analysts on the utility of corporate forecasts is quite mixed.
Some may be surprised, but the analysts are not the ones who
have been pushing the subject of corporate forecasts.

So,

pending a progress study of the Federation opinion, I am not at
liberty to say how the analysts feel about this.
Now as to the particular issues of the legal means of
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disclosure, I think that there is much to be done in this area.
However, our position is certainly that information should be
available to the general public.

We don't seek any special

privilege in securing information by the forecasts.

It is true

that in particular cases analysts do discuss forecasts with
management.

However, management is responsible for making full

disclosure, and In the recent celebrated Bausch & Lomb case, we
did have an issue which does get at this.

A suit has been filed

claiming Bausch & Lomb revealed its forecast to a particular
analyst who acted on it, and therefore was in the category of
"insider."

This forecast was in substantial variance with the

previous expectations in the Street.
I don't want to prejudge the conclusion of that, but,
if the facts as stated are true, I think there is no question
that the analyst was privy to inside information, and I don't
think other analysts or the Federation would support that point
of view.
Incidentally, in our new Financial Analysts Journal,
which I just got a copy of this morning, we have an extensive
interview with Commissioner Loomis of the Securities Exchange
Commission clarifying a lot of these things on a current basis.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Now, if an objective of financial

statements were to be— and, we have no conclusions at present—
that they should be useful for predictive purposes, in the
accounting sense or in the economic sense, as you look at it,
do you feel that the bulk of your members would be satisfied with
purely historical information?
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MR. BLOCK:

I think that the analysts would be quite

satisfied if the historical data would provide us a basis for
forecasting the future.

However, I would go a bit further by

saying that if the financial statements do not provide a basis
for predicting the future, then they are of interest not to
analysts but to historians.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So, there must be some forecasting

or data useful for forecasting, in order to satisfy the purpose
of your group?
MR. BLOCK:

Yes, sir.

MR. NORBY:

I think that’s an important distinction--

that is, not a forecast in itself but its providing useful in
formation.

I think we use the analogy in the report, here, that

if one gets a personnel report on somebody, that has to be ac
curate in order to make a judgment from that source about how
that person might perform in the future.

It’s the same thing

with financial statements.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

A very helpful distinction.

DEAN SIDNEY DAVIDSON (University of Chicago:

Member

Accounting Objectives Study Group, American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants):
use;

Is this anything likely to be more useful to

to make a forecast of management’s view of what’s likely to

happen in the next year?
DR. STONE:

I think that that would be extremely useful

and in fact that is usually the result of an interview with manage
ment, and that is where, obviously, all of the problems have begun
to arise.

The interview between the analyst and the management
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will develop a basis for a forecast and will even in some instances
get an expression of the opinion of the management as to where they
think the results will come, so that what you are saying is that
they would publish the information which is generally developed.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Yes.

Is it appropriate for an individual

analyst to have that information and the rest of the public not
have it?
MR. BLOCK:

No.

MR. NORBY: No.

We don’t claim that it is.

Now a

succession of analysts might interview management, and they will
come up with their estimates which are about the same, and each
one is confirmed in time--which is how you get the phenomenon
known as the "Street estimate."

I think we should point out that

forecasts are made available in many different forms.

One only

has to read the daily papers to see that a half dozen managements
a day are forecasting earnings--there is nothing new about the
idea.

I think there are a lot of people who are afraid of how

management might use it, though.
DR. STONE:

I think publication of the forecasts is not

the problem, because certainly every brokerage firm who turns out
a report on the company will have a forecast in it, and I would
guess, most of the time, that the forecasts have been checked, in
some form, with the management, so it kind of represents manage
ment’s thinking, as well as the analyst’s.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Except, in the case of the Wrigley

affair.
DR. STONE:

There are a couple of items I might cite.
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
go on.

Two more questions.

Then we must

Reed Parker, first, and then Frank Weston.
MR. C. REED PARKER (Duff, Anderson and Clark, Incorpor

ated;

Member, Accounting Objectives Study Group, American In

stitute of Certified Public Accountants):
to the subject of fair-value accounting;
deal of testimony on that.

I ’d like to get back
we will have a good

I wondered if, to set the background

for that, you could repeat for us the two reasons why you felt
numbers of analysts did not find this useful, and also if you’d
say from your personal experience, given the fact that analysts
have ready access to all the price indices that are and have been
available--and, to my personal knowledge, many of them have a
good deal of mathematics background and would understand the
methodology of discounted cash flows— to your knowledge, are there
any or many who have found it useful in their work to use these
procedures?
DR. STONE:

I guess, since I have raised the topic, I

have to answer the question.

I think, number one, the reason why

most analysts have objected to fair value or current cost account
ing is that it would not be comparative with previous data, that
it would open up an entirely new way of looking at the items on
the balance sheet, and, obviously, through the income statement
as well.

That seemed to me to be the biggest objection in the

testimony that I read of the interviews that were conducted.
As far as your suggestion for using indices as a basis
for adjusting the statement, I have tried this myself, and it is
a difficult if not impossible task since, number one, you really
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do not have enough information as to the kind of inventory or when
the value was put on the balance sheet, particularly in LIFO ac
counting for inventory.

As far as the equipment is concerned, and

buildings and all the rest of the fixed assets which a corporation
has, I really defy anybody outside of the corporation to adjust
these for price level or current replacement cost.

I have tried

this in looking at sales of a corporation.
MR. PARKER:

Frances, aside from your work, do you know

of any analysts who have used any of these procedures and found
them helpful?
DR. STONE:

I think I have heard about some of the

analysts attempting to use an index as a way of looking at sales.
Particularly, there, I think you can try to see whether a corpora
tion has had an increase in sales primarily because of price in
creases or because of real growth--and there, perhaps, you can get
some units.
MR. PARKER:

Do you have responses in the questionnaires

of analysts using the fair value procedure?
DR. STONE:

I don’t think we did.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think our experience with the

research that went by ARS No. 6 , in which your company partici
pated, Howie, would be that, for any definitive uses, this kind
of analysis must largely be made internally, because any external
group simply would not have the required data.
We must move on to Frank Weston, and then close this.
MR. FRANK T. WESTON (Arthur Young & Company;

Member,

Accounting Objectives Study Group, American Institute of Certified
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Public Accountants):
general area.

This question happens to be in the same

On page 23 of your paper, you have described or

discussed the fair value accounting notion and observed that it's
appropriate if fair value could be determined;

it would be useful

since it would be closer to economic reality even though it might
require some restructuring of the financial statements.

Many of

the papers submitted to our group observed that there is no great
ground swell for fair value accounting outside of a few academic
circles, and my question therefore is, would the Financial Analysts
Federation recommend to us that we consider seriously the advantages
and disadvantages of fair value reporting, as outlined on page 23,
despite the fact that there is no great expressed need for it among
the analysts or others?
MR. BLOCK:

I think we would give very strong support to

further research in this area;

however, I think the usefulness of

the concept at the moment is somewhat limited.
are two concepts.

Basically, there

One of them is measuring management's accounta

bility for the preservation of constant dollars of assets over
time.

That's one viewpoint.

The other one seems to be very much

more of an appraisal type of viewpoint.

The appraisal viewpoint

means absolutely nothing unless those assets are going to be sold.
In most cases, they are not;

they are going to be used up.

A

rare exception would be land, but the buildings and equipment
generally aren’t sold;

they are used through their economic life

and then disposed of for relatively fractional amounts. So apprais
al values do not mean very much to us because most companies are
not liquidating.
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When you get into inventories, that’s a different
question, and we certainly would like to have more information
on the true value of inventories.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much.

The analysts

have met with us, have cooperated significantly with us.

I think

their paper is superb, and your presentation and your patience in
your presentation have been remarkable.

Thank you.

M R . NORBY: Thank you.
DR. STONE:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I hope you will be able to stay and

feed us some questions from the floor as other witnesses appear.
Next we have J. K. Lasser & Company.

And could I remind

the audience that as questions come to your mind, if you would
write them out and give them either to Mr. Streit, Mr. Shannon or
Mr. Gans;

they will be brought up here very promptly and they

will be taken care of.
Arnold, will you introduce yourself and your position,
please?
MR. ARNOLD I. LEVINE (J. K. Lasser & Company):

I am

Arnold Levine, National Executive Department, Management, of
J. K. Lasser & Company, and I have with me today Dick Nest, who
is with our National Audit Department.

Gentlemen, it is a

pleasure to appear before your Committee and have an opportunity
to expand a bit on our position paper.

As you know, our paper

was previously presented to you in unedited form;

it is now in

the process of revision and will be delivered to you shortly.
do not plan to discuss our paper in detail--you all have copies

I
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of it--but I thought it might be well if I briefly summarized our
firm’s various recommendations.
We believe that the major, overriding objective of fin
ancial statements should be their usefulness to the reader.

Based

on this proposition, we have considered all of the various kinds
of users of financial statements and attempted to analyze their
needs.

This analysis has provided the basis for our recommenda

tions, which we believe in most ways not only meet the need of
these users but are fundamentally practical as well.
Our recommendations do not solve all of the problems of
financial reporting by any means, but we believe they are a step
forward in the evolution of better financial reporting.

We feel

strongly that there is a need for financial statements to present
historical events with presumed identical underlying conditions in
terms representative of the future.

We likewise recognize that no

single financial statement presentation can serve all of the various
user groups and still meet the objective of being useful to each.
Historical-cost-basis financial statements which are presently the
norm for presenting financial data, in our opinion, continue to
have a useful reporting purpose, both from a stewardship approach
and as a foundation for the basic financial record and statement.
However, we believe that current value reporting is also essential
to make the statements useful to a large segment of users.
Current value statements would have the benefit of pre
senting financial data at amounts encompassing present economic
realities, in particular, as well as the ever-changing purchasing
value of the dollar.

1 .33

We have considered the alternative approach of pricelevel reporting, hut believe current value would be more practical.
It is evident that contemporary professional literature and think
ing may also be moving in this direction.
We are aware that deter
m ining current values and the
related questions of auditing will present problems, but we be
lieve they are surmountable.

The presentation of current value

in financial statements, along with historical-cost statements,
in our opinion, would be a proper approach to moving toward the
objective of usefulness.

As a result of our study, we have also

concluded that priority should be given to research in the area
of projections.

Though historical cost and current value state

ments are useful by themselves, we believe they do not provide all
of the necessary information and data required to aid users in the
decisions they wish to make, as investors or credit grantors, and
so forth.
Projections of what may be expected to occur in the near
future, under certain assumptions, are needed by many users.

Again,

we recognize all of the arguments as to why projections should not
be presented but we believe that many of these objections are only
objections to change itself.

In our opinion, the accounting pro

fession has the capability to research this problem and to estab
lish the necessary standards by which projections may be prepared.
The reader will have to make personal judgments on the projections,
but if the assumptions and standards are clearly disclosed, the
financial statements will have performed their function of pre
senting useful information.
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In connection with the portrayal of current values, we
recognize there are certain items which may he very difficult to
reflect, such as goodwill, research and development costs and
certain other deferred costs.

We therefore recommend that con

sideration be given to a separate or supplementary statement for
the purpose of segregating these items from the basic current
value financial statements.

Such an approach would also aid the

reader in comparing companies within the same line of business,
by removing these items of non-comparability.
With regard to product line reporting, we see little
ultimate benefit to be received by users.

As the pressures mount

for more and more refined reporting on distinct product lines,
such tailored reporting may well overshadow the overall entity's
operating performance.

We believe the solution should be one of

using broad business lines to provide this type of information to
readers.

Practicality is a major consideration.
Our last subject deals with multiple year reporting.

We recognize that in many annual reports, multiple year results
of operations and other data have been given;

however, more com

plete comparative financial data should be provided to aid readers
in understanding trends, growth, and so forth.
We do not consider our position paper to be a panacea
for all reporting, but we believe that it contains elements upon
which better financial reporting can be built.

Further, we recog

nize that our suggestions cannot be adopted without extensive con
sideration and research.

But, again, we feel they do point a way

to better financial reporting which will help meet the prime
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objective of all financial statements--usefulness. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

With respect to your position on

fair value--and apart from price-level-adjustment value which has
been researched, I think, more adequately by the Institute to this
time--you should know that we have ongoing investigations— not to
the depth, I think, that would please you, but we do have ongoing
investigations -- which will be input for the Group, on discounted
cash flows, replacement values and exit values, just as three of
the most talked about alternatives.

Do you take any particular

position as to preference in these more far-out approaches?
MR. LEVINE:

Well, we are aware, of course, that you are

undertaking this type of research, at least to some extent.

I

think that we did indicate in our paper that we did not take a
particular position with regard to any one of those particular
methods.

We do feel that there is merit probably in each of them.

Obviously, the considerations that will have to be given are
practicality and the ability to be objective in solving them.
I think if there is any one justifiable argument against
fair value accounting it’s the ability to achieve it.

And, ob

viously, if we can find a way to achieve it I think many of us
would immediately rise up and find that we would be in support
of it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But could you please link this with

your distinction among the interests and desires of users?

You

might come to the conclusion, for example, that exit values were
more appropriate in an accountant’s situation, whereas replacement
values might be more appropriate for the purposes of other users.
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MR. RICHARD A. NEST (J. K. Lasser & Company):
think we'd find that, Bob .

I don't

I think our position would he that at

the present time current value would he the thing, hut if research
does show areas where one would he better than the other we would
not be opposed to it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

You are talking about price-level,

adjusted?
MR. NEST:

No--basically, more toward the appraisal

approach.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Sid Davidson has a question.

If your move toward current value could

not he accomplished in one quick step, would you prefer to have
certain items placed on a current value basis where that can be
done in a satisfactory manner, leaving others at historical cost,
or would you prefer to do nothing until you can make your complete
adjustment?
MR. NEST:

I think our position definitely would be a

step-by-step approach, given recognition that to go directly to
a current value basis as a separate statement may not be able to
be done in one fell swoop.
tions and problems.

That’s why we said there are limita

We would definitely be in favor of a step-

by-step approach if that were the only practical approach to it.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

So that you would wind up with a state

ment that was part historical-cost base and part current value?
MR. NEST:

I think at least my personal opinion would

be that to go to something that's better than what we have is a
better approach than to just stay where we are.
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MR. LEVINE:

I think, actually, we have suggested that

in the event that consideration is given to fair value--and we
certainly hope that it will be--that it would he of significant
value to the informed public.
combination presentation.

It has experienced in the past a

To move immediately in toto, to fair

value I think would present a different kind of a problem, based
upon past knowledge of the user.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But that is to say that the step-

by-step approach you would regard as transitional— that is, you
do concede that, ultimately, it would be a restatement of the
whole...
MR. LEVINE:

We concede that that is a possibility.

think that time would be the best judge of that.

I

We recognize

that it very well could be.
MR. WESTON:

On page 26 of your memo, you talk about

property, plant and equipment, and discuss the various methods of
valuation

and end up by saying that an appraisal would be the

best method to use.
Now, I just observe that an appraisal must be based on
some approach to the assets, and we might like to hear you des
cribe that.

But how will you respond to the comment from the

previous group that carrying property, plant and equipment at
fair value, since it will not be sold, is not useful?
MR. LEVINE:

Well, I 'd like to respond in the extreme.

Two companies with exactly the same businesses and same plants
but one fully depreciated and the other just previously acquired
would reflect totally different operating results, as we reflect
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them today, as we are now portraying.

Yet, as a practical matter

we recognize there would he a significant difference in the under
lying business itself.
I think the problem that relates to the analysts as I
see it is that this approach does not have much meaning in the
atmosphere that we live in, today.

To use this information and

then have it portrayed, in the final analysis, on a historical
basis and have earnings per share related to historical costs, is
going to dictate that the public is going to measure it in that
form, and therefore it won't have any value today.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

All right, you have a question?

Go ahead.
MR. PARKER:

I am just going to ask— on page 18, you

have introduced your discussion of current value accounting by
saying that the most common complaint of users about financial
statements is that they do not state current value.

We had some

indication from at least one group of users— the analysts— that
this would not appear to be their most common complaint.

What

kinds of users were you thinking of, and what kind of evidence
suggested that you make that statement?
MR. NEST:

I think this often comes up just from our

own clients, when we get into problems of accounting.
MR. PARKER:
MR. NEST:
MR. PARKER:
MR. NEST:

Your clients would be managements?
Managements, shareholders.
Shareholders?
Shareholders, definitely.

We get into the

question of buy-sell agreements, where we go into the question of

1 .3 9
values.
with.

It's very nice to say that cost is a fine figure to work
But as soon as you get into questions where the company

has any financial problems, it's amazing how quick current values
come to the fore in any technical discussion.

So we just believe

that a problem is that the cost statements don’t give the inform
ation.

And this is a problem.
MR. LEVINE:

I would also say, Reed, that the cash flow

statement has been an attempt to solve that particular problem on
the part of the analysts;
matter.

we all recognize that as a factual

The income statements, themselves may not be in some

cases--maybe, many cases--as meaningful as the cash flow state
ment, and the cash flow statement I think is really an effort to
overcome the problem related to historical costs.
MR. PARKER:

Right, Arnold but I would gather the cash

flow statements are based on a transaction basis, are they not,
whereas I would gather the current value adjustment would state
things that did not occur as a transaction.
MR. LEVINE:

I agree.

I am only saying that for the

problem that relates to this particular situation the analysts
today are using the information that is available.
we are married to certain conditions.

Obviously,

In a free society, start

ing from scratch, it’s very difficult to evaluate what is the
best, and I am a firm believer that moving to this particular
approach would help solve that now.
MR. PARKER:

How do you feel this would be helpful in

making an investment decision, for example;
prove, or how would it help?

what would it im
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MR. LEVINE:

Well, I believe that there is a difference

between the economic earnings and the earnings as portrayed.

And

I think that in the final analysis, not on a short-range basis—
a part of the problem in investment analysis relates to the short
term— but on a long-range basis, I think it would have significant
value;

it would better portray economic earnings.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

May I, Reed?

A number of papers--

and, yours is not the only one— have indicated some preference for
some kind of value adjustments.

I remember particularly, in a

couple of papers that confined themselves to price-level adjust
ments, that, given our relatively stable inflation in this country-and, I use the word "relative” deliberately— perhaps an adjustment
for price-level changes every ten years would be indicated.

But

we do have precedents overseas, in different kinds of economies,
for a current value approach fairly close to yours, going beyond
price-level.
Do you think it conceivable then that an objective might
ultimately be to do the research and make the adjustments transi
tionally that will ultimately bring us to a current value state
ment of balance sheet items, whatever that means, or however we
resolve it;

do you think of that in the objective context, as

distinguished from the approval context?
MR. LEVINE:
form.

Well, Bob, we haven't thought of it in that

Obviously, we couldn't quarrel with it.

I think that we

would be very happy to see such an approach being given consider
ation.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have one question from the floor
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which I want to get in before our time has gone.

The question

from the floor has to do with the analysts' rather strong
position that a company must hold individual departments res
ponsible for profit and that in terms of usefulness for their
purposes, product line reporting is not only significant but
almost required, whereas the writer indicates that the tenor of
your paper seems to be that product line reporting may be good
but not very practical or possible.
Would you care to respond on the matter?
MR. LEVINE:
about it.
reporting.

Well,

Dick might want to say something

We are not simply in disagreement with product line
I think it’s a matter of degree.

We are in favor

of a broader business line because we think it is an important
practical approach.

Our concern with product line reporting is

that it might become refined to a point that it will be impracti
cal, that it will be uneconomical to provide for it;

wherever it

is provided automatically within the business it would probably
relate to business lines and, as such, would be a segment we
would find compatible with the analysts' viewpoint.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Dick?
MR. NEST:

We also believe that as long as you have a

conglomerate or group of companies working together as components,
that to bring it down to a net earnings figure, an individual one,
is an impractical idea because there are things that aren't done
between companies and there are things that are done between
companies that make it impossible to really review them as to
their realistic values to the group.
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Well, given the impracticality and
the difficulty, would you object to an objective which was to say
something like "to the extent practicable, divisional or segmented
reporting should be made available to the public?"

Does your

concern run that far?
MR. NEST:
Bob.

I don’t believe our concern does run that far,

I don't think we would object to it, but I think we would

find it questionable that the general public needs that fine a
breakdown.
MR. GELLEIN:

Let me say first, I thought your paper was

very well organized and put together.
MR. NEST:

Thank you.

MR. GELLEIN:

And, on page 31, I 'd like to ask a question

about this third statement, that middle paragraph, Dick, on that
page.

It in fact comes to the conclusion that those assets for

which current value is not readily determinable would be shown in
a separate statement and not included in the balance sheet or in
the income statement.

I don’t quite see how this works.

In other

words, let’s say we incur a cost to acquire a patent right and
that is its current value when purchased.

Let’s say that a year

later its value is not readily determinable.

How does it get over

into this other statement?
MR. NEST:

Basically, Oscar, I believe the focus was

there on the current value statement.

The way it reads it led you

to the conclusion that it’s the cost statement.

We didn’t mean

to imply that.
MR. GELLEIN:

Right.

Do you conceive, in that regard,
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Dick, that intangible assets generally would be there?
MR. NEST:

That's right, definitely.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Another question from the floor:

"Why must current value accounting and general price-level ac
counting be considered as mutually exclusive alternatives?

Both

have separate objectives and both can be reflected in the same
financial statement simultaneously, in the writer’s view."
I think I contributed to that confusion myself, by say
ing we were not proceeding with research, in our Group, on pricelevel adjustments because we thought that had been previously done
Now, do I gather, or will you answer the question for me--do I
gather that you did not intend, in your presentation, to separate
them, exclusively?
MR. LEVINE:
accounting as such.

Well, we aren’t enamored with price-level
We don’t feel from a practical viewpoint

that it has significant value compared with the costs of obtaining
the information.

We don’t feel that, as we have indicated, unless

there is a more significant adjustment in the price-level from
year to year and over a period of years, that in essence this
would be meaningful.

That's our position.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But, in terms of the question, I

rightly interpret your comment not to treat price-levels, general
ly, as a mutually exclusive alternative?
MR. LEVINE:

That is correct.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Sidney.

In talking about the usefulness of state

ments, the second major change that you recommend is the one
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concerning

projections.

clear on two items there.

As I read your materials, I wasn't quite
It seemed to imply that such projec

tions should he covered by an accountant’s opinion.

And if that

is correct, I was not clear on whether you felt the opinion should
relate to the basic assumptions underlying the projections as well
as the method of compiling the data upon those assumptions, or
whether you preferred to have them relate only to the compilation
of the data.
MR. NEST:

We recognized at the time we were writing

this that we were working into an area where it’s a never-never
land today.

But we see as an ultimate that we would cover both

the projection and the assumptions as our goals in the future,
yes.

We would like to go all the way on this.

We recognize that

standards don’t exist, today— the standards of deciding what those
assumptions should be--nor do the standards exist as far as the
auditor’s opinion on it.

But it’s our belief that this is where

we should be headed, and where we believe we probably will end up.
MR. LEVTNE:
gard.

Let me add just one statement in that re

We attempted, in presenting a paper in connection with the

objectives of financial statements to divorce to some degree--at
least, the degree that we possibly could— the auditor’s responsi
bility.

Nevertheless, we also recognize, as we have indicated in

our paper, that one of the important attributes of financial re
porting would be verifiability.
We feel that the profession is able to find a proper
ground on which an opinion can be rendered regarding projections.
It may require assumptions but we feel it can be done.
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DEAN DAVIDSON:

Earlier you suggested a sort of step-by-

step approach with regard to fair value.

With regard to projec

tions, would you be willing to accept that step-by-step approach,
to initially have only the compilations covered by the accountant's
opinion?
MR. LEVINE:

Well, I would like to say this— that, as far

as our firm is concerned, we would accept anything that moves in
the right direction.

We do not expect that these are things that

are going to be done overnight.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

May I ask you on that, just as a

clarification, in your research did you happen to determine the
practice in England?

Am I correct that the chartered accountant

takes a position both on the compilation and the assumptions in
the United Kingdom— is that correct?
MR. NEST:

Talking off the top of my head, I just can't

recall it right now but I believe it does.

But I am not sure, Bob.

I don't recall, right now.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Reed has an extension on this

question.
MR. PARKER:

To ask if the accountants are to pass upon

the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the forecast?

I

would assume this gets into various economic factors, politics,
foreign affairs and labor relations.

Is there something special

in the accountant's training that makes him competent to say whether
management's assumptions are reasonable or not In that area?

And

if the accountant does assume that role, some of the other submis
sions that we have raise the question as to the potential conflicts
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of interest that then enter in if the accountants come around and
audit the results based on the forecast.
MR. LEVINE:

Well yes Reed, I think the significant

word there is "reasonableness.”

I don't think that the account

ants are particularly qualified to give an opinion of the assump
tions, per se, except perhaps in the negative form.

But here

again I think that this is a question that can be researched and
determined as to the degree that the accountants' responsibility
can take.
MR. PARKER:

Well, for an example, many forecasts would

be resting on some kind of assumption of the rate of change in
the gross national product— real or before price-level adjustments.
Does the accountant, by his training, have special knowledge...
MR. LEVINE:

I don't think so.

MR. PARKER:

...as to whether it would be large or small?

MR. LEVINE:

I think the answer is "no."

He would have

to rely on other experts' input.
MR. PARKER:

But he would pass a judgment, based on that

other expert input, as to whether or not the management was making
a reasonable assumption?
MR. LEVINE:

Well, perhaps.

I really would prefer not

to answer that in the affirmative because I am not sure that that's
the way it would be coming out--but it's possible.
MR. NEST:

Could I comment a minute there, Bob, on this

question of conflict of interest, or later auditing?

This is a

common ghost that is thrown into all conversations when we move
into new areas.

It seems to me every time we issue a certificate
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on a balance sheet that has an inventory we are making a forecast
that that inventory will be realized, and then we go in next year
and audit.

I haven’t heard anyone yet say I should not audit next

year since I have already passed on a balance sheet.

I think this

is something that does not bother anyone, and I think we should be
able to defend ourselves on that very easily.
MR. GELLEIN:

The question I have is a little different.

In your paper, you make reference to the qualitative objectives
set forth in Statement No. 4 of the Accounting Principles Board
such as relevance, comparability, understandability, and the like.
My question is whether you have any views about whether to make
them operational or at least more operational
necessary to rank them.

it’s going to be

Which one takes over if you have two

qualitative objectives that you are trying to meet and they’re
in conflict— let’s say verifiability and relevance, or pick any
two.
MR. LEVINE:

Well, we haven’t thought about it, Oscar,

but I think it has a lot of merit.

I think, in the final analysis,

we may have to face up to what is more important and what is less
important, in coming to the conclusions that are most meaningful.
Again, we used the word "useful” as being the ultimate, in the
final result.
MR. NEST:

I may be able to eliminate one or two of them

for you, Oscar.
MR. GELLEIN:
MR. NEST:
trouble.

Good!

If you want more than one- or two, I ’d be in
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

George Sorter passed to me an item

which I believe is from the accountants in England.

The statement

is made that profit forecasts must he compiled by the directors
with the greatest possible care;

the allocations and the bases

for the forecasts must be examined and reported on by the auditors
or consultants to management.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

But my understanding of the way opinions

in the United Kingdom run is that they speak of the assumptions
for which the directors assume complete responsibility, so that
the assumptions, as I understand it, are not covered by the ac
countant’s opinion in the United Kingdom.

The proposal that is

being made here is a substantial expansion of what is currently
being done there.
MR. LEVINE:

Well, if we have implied that or stated

that, in total, I would hate to get hung up on that because I
don’t think that that is what we consider to be important.

What

we consider to be important is the fact that it be done.
As far as the auditor’s opinion, we recognize the need
for proper research in determining how it should be done.

We

would certainly abide and welcome management assumptions, if we
were able, in the final analysis, to have that presented.

Never

theless, we feel that the accountant should at least bear a nega
tive responsibility in regard to those assumptions.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

All right, thank you very much.

And I should remind the audience that Arnold is very conscious of
many of your problems because of his excellent and deep preparation
in the Wheat Committee report.

Again, your paper is fine, and
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thank you very much.
MR. LEVINE:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Alexander Grant?

Will you intro

duce yourself please.
MR. CHARLES WERNER (Alexander Grant & Company):

Mr.

Chairman, I am here to present testimony on behalf of the partners
of Alexander Grant & Company and in particular I am here to testify
on behalf of our Executive Partner, Wallace Olson, who is a member
of the Wheat Committee and who deeply regrets that he can’t be with
us this morning.

Unfortunately, our international executive com

mittee is meeting in Montreal today and tomorrow, so I am here in
his stead, and I hope I will be acceptable to you.
My name is Chuck Werner, and I am our firm’s Director
of Technical Services.

We will confine our remarks this morning

to two issues on which we believe our firm’s views differ sub
stantially from many of our professional colleagues.

These two

issues are whether general purpose financial statements can and
should be designed to serve as an adequate means of communication
with the untrained user and, secondly, whether the present form
of attestation, the standard short form report, should be revised.
In our written testimony previously filed with the Study
Group we said that we believed that it is not feasible to design
either general or special purpose financial statements that will
serve as an adequate means of communication with the untrained
user.

It is our view that no attempt should be made to achieve

this objective but that general purpose financial statements should
be so designed that the trained financial analyst or investment
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advisor has sufficient information to properly advise the untrained
user.

We can easily picture the confusion of a Maori tribesman

suddenly confronted with a population concentration of cities like
New York, Chicago and Los Angeles.

We believe that the untrained

user is faced with a similar "cultural shock" when he attempts to
read and understand financial statements.
It has become fashionable to cry out against accountants
for their failure to make financial statements more understandable.
In the attempt to respond to this outcry, the accounting profession
has allowed itself to be trapped by the delusion that the perform
ance of a complex business enterprise can be reduced to one statis
tic--earnings per share.
A recent study by Georgeson & Co. reveals some interest
ing facts about untrained user's attitudes toward financial state
ments.

Fifty-three percent of the individual stockholders do not

believe that the annual report can be written so as to be under
standable to the average stockholder.
So, Mr. Chairman, this one user group itself is dismayed.
Fifty-eight percent of the shareholders did not consider the annual
report important when they make a decision to buy or sell stock.
Finally, the average shareholder spends approximately
fifteen minutes reading an annual report.

This is according to

their study.
Can a financial report be made understandable to anyone
who will only spend fifteen minutes reading it?

We think not.

Why is the average shareholder frustrated with the annual
report to the point that he is willing to devote only fifteen
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minutes to reading one?

We believe part of the answer lies in

the pace of his life, its accelerating transience and his need
to spend most of his energies to cope with day-to-day occurrences.
Alvin Toffler, in his book Future Shock, says, "The
acceleration of change radically alters the balance between novel
and familiar situations.

Rising rates of change, with a faster

flow, compel us not merely to cope with that faster flow but with
more and more situations to which previous personal experience
does not apply."
Well,
statements.

Toffler is not addressing himself to financial

Think about the rate of change in accounting.

In

one twelve-month period, August, 1970 to August, 1971, that
supposedly inactive body, the Accounting Principles Board, issued
five new opinions on such complex subjects as business combina
tions, intangible assets, equity method of accounting, accounting
changes, and interest on receivables and payables.

And, I might

add, our Committee on Auditing Procedures is still struggling
with SAP’s to implement most of those.
Can any untrained user be expected to keep up with such
a rate of change?

We do not mean to suggest that improvements in

general-purpose financial statements are impossible.

To the con

trary, we believe that general-purpose financial statements can
be and must be improved.

However, we firmly believe that improve

ments can be implemented only if the audience for the statements
is defined to exclude the untrained user from the area of primary
concern.
I might add that in connection with APB Opinion 21 which
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has just been released, I think it would be very interesting if
the first note in the accounting policy statement said "Beware-seek the advice of a trained counsellor."
In our written testimony we have suggested numerous
improvements in general-purpose financial statements for the
Study Group's consideration.

Let me briefly summarize them.

First, require all financial statements to be presented in
comparative form.

Second, include a five-year summary in all

general-purpose financial statements, not just those for public
consumption or filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Third, find a way to present forecasted information in published
annual reports.
We have suggested that a starting point might be for
the enterprise to submit a forecast to its independent auditors
at the beginning of the fiscal year.

Such controlled forecasted

information could then be included in the annual report at the
end of the year.

I 'd suggest that we are only talking about a

starting point, a way to get started, of putting forecasts in
annual reports.
Fourth, present information on business segments.
We suggested, as a partial solution to the present controversy
surrounding the definitional aspects of this problem, that
consideration be given to presenting the information according
to the managerial units in which the enterprise conducts its
business--for example for a manufacturing enterprise, information
could be presented according to the major factory locations; for
a national retail operation the information might be summarized
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according to the major geographical units in which the enterprise
is arranged for top management purposes.
Fifth, in general, the accounting profession and manage
ment should move toward financial statements which present account
ing information on the basis of fair values or price-level indexes
In answer to a question I am sure I am going to be asked, "either,
or both."

A good first step in this direction might be to begin

presenting selected values or price-index information in supple
mentary statements or schedules accompanied by the label, "not
auditable."
What we are suggesting here is, let’s get started trying
this out so that we get some empirical information on how it works
Sixth, general-purpose financial statements could be
made more useful if comparative industry statistics and ratios
were included.

Management should be required to provide appropri

ate commentary relating to the statistics and ratios.

We think

it would be likely that at least some of this information would
be labeled "unaudited."
Seventh, in our written testimony we suggested a number
of additional disclosures relating to specific accounts, such as
inventories, fixed assets, allowances for doubtful accounts, and
long-term debt.

We also believe that general-purpose financial

statements should include disclosure of certain non-financial in
formation such as the expiration date of union contracts and the
date on which such contracts can be reopened, the marketing
expectations and related marketing budget for the next fiscal
year and information about new products.
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We recognize that a number of problems will have to be
solved before the expanded information which we have suggested
can be included in general-purpose financial statements.
foresee two principal problems.

We

First, the expanded information

may impose an unwarranted burden on small companies.

Accordingly,

various levels of required information should probably be estab
lished— for example, statements for companies with less than fifty
thousand shareholders and maybe unaudited statements might omit
some of the information.

Second, some of the information could

be detrimental, in some circumstances, to the company and its
shareholders.

Accordingly, standards would have to be established

for the omission of such information.

There is some suggestion

along that line in the current literature, in paragraph 5 , Chapter
9 of SAP 33.
I 'd like to turn now to the second issue which we would
like to discuss, and that is whether the present form of the at
testation, the standard short-form report, should be revised.

The

present short-form report is essentially a compliance certificate.
The operative language in the opinion paragraphs says, "...presents
fairly in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles,"
and this can be interpreted as saying that if the statements con
form to generally accepted accounting principles, they are presented
fairly.
We believe that there is a higher standard.

In analyzing

the charge to the jury by the trial court in the Continental Vend
ing case, the United States Court of Appeals said, in part, "The
critical test was whether the financial statements, as a whole*
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fairly presented the financial position of Continental and whether
they accurately reported the operations.

If they do not, the basic

issue becomes whether defendant acted in good faith.”
Proof of compliance with generally accepted standards
was evidenced, which may be very persuasive but not necessarily
conclusive that he acted in good faith and that the facts as certi
fied were not materially false or misleading.

In short, the court

is saying that statements may comply with generally accepted ac
counting principles but may nevertheless be false and misleading.
How can this be?
We believe that the key to this question is set forth in
a research study to the Financial Executives Research Foundation,
prepared by Robert Mautz.

I am interested to see that he is on

the program this afternoon;
his paper better than I.

perhaps he will be able to explain

The study is entitled, "Effect of Circum

stances on the Application of Accounting Principles.”

After a

library study and examination of actual cases and seminar discus
sions with experienced people, Mr. Mautz says, "A strong conclusion
emerges that there is no inherent rightness in any given accounting
method, apart from the circumstances in which it is to be applied."
If we examine other life situations, Mautz' conclusion
should not be a surprise.

For example, a federal government anti

poverty program may be excellent conceptually but disastrous in
the application.

Advice on child-rearing may be sound conceptually

and effective in the application to most children, but for one
child in a thousand the advice may prove to be a disaster.
say, that must be my child.

I might
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In summary, we believe that accounting principles are
only as right as the way in which they are applied and the result
which they produce in each situation.
Do we suggest that there should be no rule and that the
transactions which are substantially the same should not be treated
in substantially the same manner?

We do not suggest this at all.

We suggest instead that if we set as our goal the fair reflection
of transactions and events, then like transactions and events will
be reported alike.

At the same time— and we think more importantly--

different transactions and events will be reported differently.
Things should look different in financial statements if they are
different.

Comparablility is a concept we hear frequently discussed

in this context.

Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4 de

fines "comparability" as follows.

"Comparability means the ability

to bring together for the purpose of noting points of likeness and
difference.

Comparability of financial information generally de

pends on like events being accounted for in the same manner."
We agree wholeheartedly with this definition.

Compara

bility does not require absolute uniformity but it likewise does
not permit unrestrained flexibility.

On the other hand, we deplore

the tendency of some accountants to equate uniformity with fair
presentation.

Detailed accounting rules manditorily applied, may

lead to conformity.

But, given the complexity of life, they will

frequently lead also to lack of fair presentation.
In an exchange of correspondence in the February 1972
Journal of Accountancy on the subject of the opinion paragraph's
"...presents fairly" language, Douglas Carmichael of the Institute
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Staff makes the following comment:
The committee on auditing procedure has
for some time had the question of shortform report revision on its agenda.

One

of the proposed revisions is to change
the phrase in question to read "presents
in all material respects...in conformity
with GAAP."
Now, you all understand that what’s happening,

here,

is that the word "fairly" is omitted, and it just says, "presents,
in all material respects.”

Mr. Carmichael goes on:

In my view, this change coupled with the
position in APB Statement No. 4 that the
introductory phrase should never he
separated from "conformity with GAAP”
would go a long way toward achieving
communication with report users.
In short, what Mr. Carmichael is suggesting and what
many people have suggested is that the words "presents fairly”
should never he read except in conjunction with "generally
accepted accounting principles.”

We disagree with this.

We view the elimination of the

word "fairly” and substitution of the phrase "in all material
respects” as a step backwards.

Such an approach will he even

more in the direction of a compliance opinion than the present
standard short-form report.

The profession must recognize that

it cannot hide behind "conforms to generally accepted accounting
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principles" when we know a client's financial statements are misleading or even false.

This is the clear teaching of the Continen

tal Vending case.
Moreover, we believe that more is expected of us as pro
fessionals than simply compliance with a rulebook.

On the other

hand, we know that if auditors' reports were presented without
reference to a framework of standards and rules, the result would
he chaos.

Absent standards and rules, many companies would argue

for accounting practices which have long since been rejected as
not leading to fair presentation.

Moveover, the accounting pro

fession would have to fight all over again many of the dramatic
battles it has won in recent years.
For these reasons, we suggest a new short-form report
which adopts a middle ground and meets two criteria.

First, we

should have a short-form report which encourages continued im
provement of accounting standards.

Second, we should have a

short-form report which enables the accounting profession to deal
with the fast-changing life and business conditions of the future.
Such a report will need to encompass both fairness in presentation
and compliance with the profession’s standards.
We suggest an auditors report along the following lines,
"in our opinion, the financial statements of XYZ Industries, Inc.
(which do not necessarily reflect economic values) (and we’d be
happy to strike that language, if the time ever arrives) "in all
material respects:
(a)

fairly reflect (underlined) transactions
and events;
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(b)

are based on the application of
accounting and reporting standards
which conform to published stand
ards of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants...
(I guess we will have to say
"Financial Accounting Standards
Board," next week.)

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WERNER:
(c)

Thank you!

...and

properly disclose the accounting
standards applied and any changes
therein from the prior year."

This approach contemplates that there be a separate
statement on scope of audit, and it does integrate with the
Accounting Principles Board Opinion on disclosure of accounting
policies.

We know that many of our professional colleagues will

object to this approach on the ground that an opinion on financial
statements can be rendered only in the framework of specific
standards and rules.

In response to this objection we pose the

following questions. How specific are the present standards and
rules of the profession?

Second, given the complexity of life,

how much more specific can we make the standards and rules with
out becoming arbitrary and capricious?

Third, isn’t the concept

of fairness in presentation as clear to the professional account
ant as honesty and decency are to the public?

Fourth, short of

federal legislation, how can we avoid responsibility for fairness
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of presentation in addition to compliance with generally accepted
accounting principles, and, more importantly, should we avoid such
responsibility?
In summary, we make two recommendations to the Study
Group today.

First, the trained user should be the primary focus

of general-purpose financial statements.

Second, we should have

a new short-form report which relates not only to compliance with
rules but also to fairness of presentation.
fession is now at the beginning of a new era.

The accounting pro
We are confident

that historians will view the work of the Study Group as a land
mark.

We are pleased to assist you.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you, Chuck, very much.

Interestingly enough, in one of our group meetings with one of
the exchanges--I believe it was AMEX--they classified investors
into three categories:

the professional, sophisticated investor--

I think that would include the analysts;

the second group would

be that body of people, such as the trained business person, who
should understand financial statements and, thirdly, all others.
Now, I presume your presentation would be consistent
with that;

your use of the term "untrained” would be consistent

with this third category of "all o t h e r s ," that right?
MR. WERNER:

That's correct, and I think that's helpful--

that includes my wife and my daughter and all those people.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WERNER:

And the casual investor?

Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Carrying that further, then, the

general-purpose financial statement that you would contemplate

.
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for that group would be significantly simplified?

Is that the

thrust?
MR. WERNER:

No, that's incorrect.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WERNER:

That is incorrect?

No, I think, if we started trying to simpli

fy what essentially is not simple— namely, business life— you are
going to end up with some very distorted numbers.

Look what

happens to everything when we simplify earnings per share.
say we simplify it to five figures.
will become the focus.

Let's

Then those five figures will

I suggest we not do this.

I think things

should not be boiled down to be simple when they are not simple.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Then your position is that we can

do nothing for the untrained investor, and we should not try?
MR. WERNER:

That's exactly correct, other than to per

haps warn him that in using these statements he needs the advice
of someone capable of analyzing them.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So, there are some overriding

caveats, as you have indicated in the case of APB Opinion 21*
"Don't read this or try to understand it— go to somebody and have
them tell you what to do"?
MR. WERNER:

That's right.

from your wife or out of the handbook.

Don't seek medical advice
Seek it from somebody who

knows.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

A problem Dr. Spock found himself

in, too! Don?
DEAN EDWARDS:

Do you think the reporting standards you

have recommended can be accomplished within the framework of the

1.62

current financial reporting process?
MR. WERNER:

Yes, I believe they can.

DEAN EDWARDS:

That is, do you see a need for additional

financial statements?
MR. WERNER:
question correctly.

I am sorry, I didn’t understand your
Yes, we believe that there should be various

additional statements.

I might digress and say to you that I hope

that all this additional information won't take the traditional
form.

Every time the profession has suggested additional inform

ation, that information has gone into a footnote.

We hope that

there will be arrays, for example, schedules, sophisticated
analyses, bar graphs, charts, what-have-you.
Yes, we contemplate that the package would include a
variety of additional schedules and information.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But, by the very form and nature

and presentation, then, you might be getting some knowledge into
that large, untrained group that they cannot presently extract-or, do you choose not to be concerned about that?
MR. WERNER:

Let’s get the position precisely accurate—

we said, they should not be the primary concern.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WERNER:

Primary?

I think, if we can help them a little

that's fine, but I hope we don’t get bollixed up and prevent real
progress by being overly concerned about it.
MR. GELLEIN:

Chuck, as to both forecasts and fair-value

statements, it’s your position that the auditor should not attest
to them.

Is that because he is not competent to do so or because

1.63
of legal problems, or both?
MR. WERNER:

Well, I have a legal background, and a

legal implication is strongly in my personal thinking.

However,

many of my partners feel that is important, also.
MR. GELLEIN:

Well, if that is the reason— the legal

implcations--doesn't the management have the same legal problem?
MR. WERNER:

Yes, I suppose they do, but I am positive

that they have more information than I do as an auditor.
Let me say one other thing.

Let's clarify this situa

tion in the United Kingdom, with the United Kingdom forecasting.
In the United Kingdom I think the position is quite succinctly
put in the code to the effect that the accountant is not qualified
on commercial transactions (and the commercial-transactions part
of the forecast includes the assumptions).

Their standard audit

attestation that they give in connection with the takeover bid,
which is where they usually give these things, is that the fore
cast was footed from the assumptions.

I am not sure I understand

"English" English, but I think that means, "derived from the as
sumptions," so they essentially don't give an opinion on the
assumptions themselves.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Extending Oscar's question a little

bit, on the supplemental data, what was your phrase— that some
tabulations might be headed "non-auditable" or "not audited"?
MR. WERNER:

Sure, I think that's a good way to start.

Let's have some experimentation.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
audit them?

Does that really mean you can't

Let's say it’s selling floor space in a retail outfit,
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something like that;

does it really mean that they are not audit

able, or that they are not auditable in the sense of the precision
one normally expects from an auditor?

Maybe my example isn't very

good— but, is my point clear?
MR. WERNER:

Yes, the point is very clear.

think precision is a part of what I am saying.

Well, I

What I am really

saying is, I don’t think we really have the information, the
facts, the knowledge, at this point, to make these things auditable.

So I am giving a much broader answer than what you are

thinking about.

I must say that I think it depends upon the

expertise of the auditor in a given field.

Your firm, for example,

has great expertise on a specific subject you have mentioned;
ours might not, and might have it in some other fields, so I
think that has a bearing on it.
It seems quite clear to me that fair-value accounting
or even price-index accounting, thinking about going down, for
example, to an index on real estate for a given country, that
kind of material really isn’t auditable right now and I think
it’s correct to say "not auditable."

Now maybe five years, ten

years, twenty years from now that information will be auditable
because it will be based upon things that are sound, that we can
look at and can audit and that have some credibility to them.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But, playing the devil's advocate,

let us say any one of our firms represented in the room is dealing
with a complicated work-in-progress inventory in, let’s say, the
electronics industry.

It seems to me, your analogy makes the

inventory determination nonauditable, in such circumstances,
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because we aren’t engineers;
MR. WERNER:

we do not understand electronics.

Well, with your indulgence, Mr. Chairman,

let me give you a sixty-second anecdote on the subject.

A young

accountant at our firm was taken to our Chicago office to do a
very sophisticated audit on an electronics manufacturer located
in Grand Rapids, Michigan, making something called "blip scopes"
for submarines.

And, quite frankly, looking at these as an

auditor he couldn’t even tell what the things were, much less
whether they were obsolete or valued properly, and so forth.
Now, I think we can do some things in connection with
that kind of an item.

I think we can look at the accounting

records and see that costs were accumulated on it.

I think it

does present some significant difficulties for us.

In this parti

cular case I encouraged the account administrator on that parti
cular engagement to hire an engineer to assist us, and he did so.
So I think we should not feel that we have all the answers.

We

should bring in others.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WESTON:

Frank, first, and then Sid.

In terms of the objectives of financial

accounting, you have basically set up a two-part attestation
formula on page 11.

One, "fairness" and the other, "whatever

standard might be established."

But in trying to establish an

objective "fairness," I suppose, is not quite operational enough.
Would you believe that it should be detailed along the lines of
economic status?

In other words, at the bottom of page 11 your

report says the statement "fairly reflects the transactions."
That really doesn’t cover the point at issue.

Do they, in fact,

1.66
fairly represent the economic status of the company?

Is that what

you have in mind, in terms of fairness of the presentation?
MR. WERNER:

Well, if you will read the paper which I

delivered today, that point is amplified.

I know that concerns

many of our colleagues about this attestation which we have been
suggesting for some months now.

I think initially we probably do

have to put a parenthetic in the lead-in...
MR. WESTON:

That disturbs me, about your reading the

insert, "which do not reflect economic value,” and then you turn
around and say they "fairly present,” which is a contradiction.
MR. WERNER:

Which ”do not necessarily,” is what I said.

MR. WESTON:

Yes, but that's a contradiction in terms,

in the use of the statement, it seems to me.
MR. WERNER:

In other words, something can't be "fair,”

in a sense other than economic.
MR. WESTON:

Okay, right, I understand.

The thrust of my question is, do you believe

that "fairness," per se, requires an evaluation of economic circum
stances, as an objective, you see?
MR. WERNER:

Maybe, ultimately, yes.

MR. WESTON:

Can we move quickly to the "fairness” report

which you recommend, before we've done our fairness-of-principle
determination?
MR. WERNER:

Yes, I think we can.

I think we can write

an SAP, for example, defining what we mean by those words and that
kind of a breakdown in the opinion paragraph, and maybe we define
it differently now than we might redefine it fifteen years from
now.
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MR. WESTON:

So, is your firm willing to be measured by

that, starting January first?
MR. WERNER:

Yes sir, we would.

As a matter of fact, I

think, legally, we are all measured by it right now, regrettable
though some may feel that is.
MR. WESTON:

I don't think many people would agree with

you, but I understand the point.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

May I ask whether we could have,

in advance of the transcript, a copy of the paper?
MR. WERNER:

Yes, I have delivered a hundred copies,

today.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
we must move on, Chuck.
ful paper, indeed.

That will be very good.

Thank you very much.

I think

It was a very use

And we will hear next from the National Asso

ciation of Accountants.

Mr. Kelley, are you ready?

It's all

yours.
MR. E. W. KELLEY (National Association of Accountants):
Thank you, Mr. Trueblood.

My name is Ed Kelley.

I appreciate

your Committee giving the National Association of Accountants an
opportunity to express their views here today.

I represent the

MAC Committee--that's the "Management Accounting Committee" of
NAA, and normally our Chairman, Wayne Keller, whom many of you
know, would be here.

I am subbing in his place.

The MAC Com

mittee is composed of ten members, two of whom are educators, two
of whom are CPAs --they happen to be partners of the Big Eight—
and six executives from industry, some of whom are chief financial
officers, and others, such as myself, who are in other fields
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presently.

We represent the 65, 000 members in our organization.

We have 275 domestic chapters and 11 international chapters.
You have in front of you, I believe, and hopefully have
read the short report we have prepared.

Even though this report

is quite short, it represents many hours and days of discussion
of this general subject by the Committee and some subcommittees
that worked with it.

I might say that all decisions and pro

nouncements of our Committee require a positive vote of eight of
the ten members on each point.

So, what we have given you here

are a few key things we feel are important to the subject we are
discussing today.
I suffer slightly from not having heard the prior com
ments because I came in as my immediate predecessor in this chair
finished, but I shall be happy after briefly commenting on this
paper to answer any questions that you may have of our Committee
as to why it feels the way it does.
If you refer to our brief but, I feel, very important
document, it makes four or five key points.

I might, before

going into these, comment that this document is prepared based
on financial statements for external users, not internal manage
ment.
The first point which we feel is very important— and,
we have details and data behind these statements we have made in
this paper— is that we should deal with qualitative information
as well as quantitative information.

In other words, information

should be given external users that aren't necessarily possible
of being in the books of account.

Once you have taken this
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position, you have to almost immediately, we feel, accept these
premises or assumptions:

first, that the type of information has

to vary by the nature of the business and the nature of the com
pany;

of necessity, this information has to be furnished by

management;

it has to be backed by management— it is not neces

sarily certified, probably not, and is not even within the judg
ment power of the certified public accountant;

second, that the

main purpose of this qualitative information is to reflect and
tell the external user— and this external user is all categories
of user, from the innocent little non-sophisticated analyst, such
as myself, but who might not want outside advice from one of the
large Wall Street firms, to the very sophisticated young college
graduate working for the Wall Street firm--it should reflect the
current status of the business and the progress that is expected
for the business to be taking in normal events.
The second point we make in our paper is that we are
dealing with one audience of outside people and whatever we give
we should give to all.

This audience is investors, both potential

and actual, as well as creditors and various other users of state
ments, and I suppose one has to include those people interested
just from a public policy point of view.

This information should

deal with all the material available to the public, in general,
or, let's say the important parts of it.

Obviously one can't

include in these reports everything, and what might be important
for one company would not be for another.
The third point we made— and, I am not necessarily
covering these in the order they are in the paper or necessarily
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in order of importance to our group— is that forward estimates
are highly desirable.

It took at least a half day of debate and

many points of view for us to resolve how we felt on this pointy
and we ended up by having a unanimity of opinion.

We say "highly

desired," not "required," for a very valid reason, in that there
are some of us who believe there are a few situations where this
sort of thing could be misleading and could be derogatory to our
overall objective rather than helpful.
cated positioning in some situations.

It got into very compli
However, we feel that

management— be it of a small company or large, be it of a public
company or a semipublic or family business dealing with, let’s
say, just creditors— has a responsibility, certainly to themselves
and to others, to think in terms of the status of the business,
where it’s going, why it’s going, and there to give it a general
position on this.

However, if these forward estimates are given,

it’s necessary that they deal with the critical factors of the
business.

The reason I say that they have to, varies:

the

critical factors for one business may be very much different
from the critical factors of another business.

For example, In

the cigar business, you’d be interested in share of market.

Share

of market might not be important for a government defense contract
or some little complicated technical manufactured item.
The assumptions have to be stated for the information
to be meaningful because if I were to give you a projection with
out the assumptions, it would not be very meaningful.

As I said

before, we do not feel it can be certified because it puts the
public accountant in the shoes of judgment, and if my public
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accountant knows as much about my business as I do, he should be
running it.

W e ’re afraid if it were 100% required it could hurt

credibility, because of the results that would happen in some
cases.
Turning to the next point, we feel accounting has a
future responsibility:

certainly it isn’t prepared, today, to

deal with the value of human resources and the other unrecorded
resources that are important to a business--brand names, fran
chises, patents, capability and all of these things— and we say
these things are very necessary to be studied and talked about,
and before we start talking about them w e ’d better know what we
are talking about.
We recognize there is an area that is badly needed in
a place where the public accounting field as well as the account
ing field in total can render business a great service for the
future.

We are concerned about rushing into price-level account

ing or value accounting or this sort of thing because we feel we
are not ready for it yet.

We don't have the ways of handling it.

I might say that I know of one company that probably
leads in value and price-level accounting, Phillips, and right
now in addition to the problems they have in manufacturing and
slowdown and so forth in Central Europe, they have a problem of
value and price-level accounting, and this has aggrevated the
picture of the Phillips company.

I suggest you might want to

look into that if you haven’t already, if you are considering
this as an important subject.
The final point that we make— and this is just one
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phase in our report--is that we should be very careful to deal in
standard terminology when we can.

By "standard terminology,” we

mean try as a profession to get better terminology, but at least
each individual company and each industry should deal with stand
ard terminology if possible so that what we say is more meaningful.
We should not require in many instances standard terminology, be
cause this puts into a straightjacket those things that should
not be.
I haven't necessarily used up my allotted time, but I
believe I have enumerated the points in our paper.

I shall be

happy to try to answer any questions you have.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much.

up your allotted time, I think, in questioning you.

We will use
Just as a

matter of information, before we start the general questioning,
the MAC work on segmented reporting and interim reporting is, in
my view, excellent.

I think we are going to have to consider both

subjects from the standpoint of objectives.

And I know that you

did, in I believe four regional seminar presentations of both
subjects, did you not?
MR. KELLEY:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Is there going to be any available

output from those seminar sessions, or was that for the information
only of the MAC group in refining their presentations?
MR. KELLEY:

Well I do not speak officially for the

Committee, but personally I would see no reason why that data
couldn’t be made available.

I reviewed some of the questions

and answers in preparing for this morning’s presentation.

We
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were disappointed in a sense with those.

Yet I told the Committee

I thought we should not he disappointed.

We had in, I think, one

a good attendance, and in a second quite acceptable attendance,
and in two of them what many thought was unacceptable attendance.
However, as you know, one of the main purposes was to be sure our
65,000 members had a chance to be heard, and I told Wayne Keller
I thought for that reason alone that it was worthwhile.
A lot of the comments dealt with a person’s own point
of view and company situation with respect to these questions.
We did get several letters from some top financial officers of
some very important companies and other people throughout the
country that stated what they agreed with and what they disagreed
with.

They were very positive, even though they made the point

that they made an exception to it.
might be of equal importance to you.

I would think those perhaps
When you get letters from

the chief financial officers of two of the large oil companies
saying what they think in respect to these questions, two of,
let's say, the top six or eight of the world, I think it’s mean
ingful to the guy who went to the meeting.
I would suggest you take it up with our staff and see
if there is any reason we should not give it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. KELLEY:

We have a transcript of those meetings, yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. KELLEY:

The results have been transcripted?

So, we should be in touch with...

...with Jack Gibson, who is at the back of

the room here.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well, I think they would be very

.
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helpful to us, if they are available.
MR. KELLEY:

You might also be interested in a trans

cript of our discussions, which I think might be more meaningful
to you.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
could use those.

Maybe even more meaningful— we

I am really quite fascinated, personally, with

your first point, which is covered by the sentence on page 5,
”A financial statement which does not contain qualitative inform
ation, and quantative information from sources other than the
accounts, will not meet the objectives stated in the first para
graph.”
Did you or did you not take the position that there
should be a standardization of such qualitative information, for
example, by industry?
MR. KELLEY:

We suggest there be no standardization.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

There should be no standardization

by industry?
MR. KELLEY:

Yes.

I would personally say this.

this at the Committee meeting.

I said

I think there could be a checklist

or some sort of thing, where management should be required to take
a position that this isn’t pertinent or is not meaningful.

I

would go that far.

I don't think some of our Committee members

would go that far.

Then this would assure you of, let's say,

getting more quality at the point of quantity.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But, you would make the presentation

of such information...
MR. KELLEY:

If you want to spend two more hours with me
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some day, I can take the businesses I am responsible for and ex
plain to you point by point where a requirement of certain stand
ardized information is either too generalized to be meaningful or
is in conflict and not right for that business.

I assume you

aren’t going to try to put tons of information into these reports.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But what might be specific of

Macy’s and Gimbels, for example, you would think might run in
parallel, but, as between Sears and Federated, for example, there
might be a significant difference in the qualitative information?
MR. KELLEY:

Well without being considered argumentative,

I have only spent five years in this industry and I don’t feel
qualified to answer your question.

Now, I am responsible for a

cigar business, a lighter business, a food business and a cosmetics
business, and I can tell you that even though those sound closely
related I would deal with them I assume differently.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I can well understand that, and you

used much better examples than I.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Okay, Sid?

I know you weren’t here for the earlier

presentations, but when we were talking with the financial analysts
about 5.5 of their presentation, they say that the concept of
measuring social costs or a report on those costs "would be quite
outside the scope of accounting and financial statements.”
I take it that your last paragraph on the other dis
closures would suggest that you feel that reports on social costs
are in fact not only not outside the scope of accounting and
financial statements but, as you say, are essential if financial
statements are to meet their objectives.
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MR. KELLEY:

Do you want a "yes-or-no" answer?

DEAN DAVIDSON:
MR. KELLEY:

Yes.

I have to answer "Yes."

However, I need

to qualify that and say that no one, to my knowledge, is prepared
today to deal with this adequately.

As the world is changing,

these values are becoming of greater importance.
can't be disputed.

I think that

There are certain industries where this is

more important than others, certain companies.

You have some

companies that are quite important in today’s world that deal
quite a lot in this field of value, and we as a profession— now
I am putting on my CPA hat--as accountants and CPAs, and so forth,
have to find a way to deal with this as the world changes.

If

you are talking about financial statements for external uses, to
me this is what you are going to give the outside world to judge
your business, and I am not talking of what is certified and what
is not certified.

I am talking about how you are going to judge

the business.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Could you give some examples of the form

that such a report on social cost would take?
MR. KELLEY:

If we had known the form, we wouldn't have

said it would have to be studied.

All we say is that this is

something that all of us better get at.
have a problem;

Let's not wait until we

let's anticipate the needs and the problems of

the financial world.

That's one reason we have the problem we

have here today, if I may be slightly critical.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well, I think you are very right.

The intensive work, even of your MAC Committee, as distinct from
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our two groups, is evidence of that external demand.

Do you

agree?
MR. KELLEY:

Yes.

And it's not just human resources.

It deals with other things.

Some of the most important companies

in this business world have some of their greatest values un
recorded in the books.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. KELLEY:

I see.

Not just human resources, but other things.

If I may laugh with you one second, that's one reason the con
glomerate movement got started.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Anybody else on the group ready

with something?
MR. WAGNER:

I'd like to ask Mr. Kelley whether he or

the group have given any conceptual thought to more specific
definition of the publication of forward estimates of the material
aspects of the business and exactly what is implied in this.
MR. KELLEY:

No.

We spent more than one meeting arguing

policy, you might say, and we had one or two members who wanted
to go further than we did here.

We had one or two members who

felt this was, say, going too far with a policy statement, and
we argued it out without, I believe, representing the point of
view of our companies who are associated with that.

Most of our

people are independent, you might say, financially and jobwise,
of the companies they are associated with, and I think that should
be important to you.

This is on our agenda, as to how to deal

with it.
I have some personal ideas, but I don't think it would
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be fair to the Committee to sit up here and enumerate them.
MR. GELLEIN:

Could I ask one?

You have a sentence

saying that a major objective should be that of avoiding surprises
in the investing community.

I assume you mean both pleasant ones

and unpleasant ones?
MR. KELLEY:

For sure!

I admire the set of annual re

ports and statements that can talk about the bad as well as the
good things.
MR. WESTON:

You have some general words in pages 5 and

6 , describing the form and content of the main financial state
ments reflecting the "status" of the company and comparison of
actual to relative "financial standing."

We have had some dis

cussion and much presentation before the group on the use of more
current values.

Would you care to give us your views as to

whether those words imply use of more current values than histor
ical costs?
MR. KELLEY:
current values.

I think they imply studying the subject of

I know of no one today who’s been able to deal

with it adequately.

To the best of my knowledge, the Phillips

Company in Europe, as I have mentioned, I believe has done the
most in this field.

I think one of the reasons for some of their

problems now is because they may not have done it correctly.

This

is heresay, but it’s hearsay in the business community in Europe.
We are going much broader than that, however, because we believe
there are many valuable conditions— and, I use the word "condition"
to get away from a word such as "assets" here--of a business that
are very pertinent to its present status and to its future status.
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What's going on in my research laboratory right now is
maybe more important than last year's results.

Now, I frankly

don't know how to put that in a set of financial statements.

I

believe that I should comment on it in my report.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have forgotten what paper it is

in--all the papers were supplied to witnesses, but you may or may
not have run across this one.

There is a statement made in one

of the papers that, for the purpose of internal decisions, it
would be unconscionable not to consider a fair evaluation of all
assets or conditions, but that paper goes on to say that for
external purposes it would be completely inappropriate to convert
general purpose financial statements to fair values.
Can you, in your experience, reconcile those points of
view for me?
MR. KELLEY:
personal?

Will you allow me to be able to be a bit

I will comment on it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. KELLEY:

Yes, surely.

You get into the problem of full-costing

and contribution-costing and all these sorts of things in internal
management, and I am a firm believer that you should know as much
about the situation as you can when making a decision internally.
The problem you are dealing externally with is that no one knows
all the innuendoes, all the little backgrounds, all the qualita
tive things that get you to use a certain set of figures.
becomes impossible.

It

Just like I sit here and tell you something

today and the ten men around you will interpret it slightly differ
ently perhaps than you do.

It's become a problem of communications,
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I guess.
So when you go from dealing with all the things that
your inside group can understand and do and work together after
months and years of teamwork, to say something that could he
taken completely out of context, hut at least could he misunder
stood, you have problems.

And the minute you put it outside,

you have to he sure that more people are going to understand it
correctly than will understand it incorrectly.

Otherwise you are

not going to he doing the external user any service.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So, what you are really suggesting,

as an individual, is that there is less risk in using these alter
nate evaluations internally, because, internally, you understand
them?
MR. KELLEY:

You have all stances, all the background,

all the interrelationship, and so forth.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Whereas, it would be impossible or

impractical to make all of that available?
MR. KELLEY: Look at what happens to a per-share-earnings
figure.

You know, you narrow it down to one figure and deal with

that figure, as if it were God’s...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

The trouble is, we have narrowed

it down to sixty.
MR. KELLEY:

What I am suggesting, personally, is I

think there are a few areas where you can deal with these things,
where the advantages are more than the disadvantages.

But let’s

walk before we run, and let's take those things where there is a
better chance of a good understanding first.

They may not be the
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most valuable, may not be the ones you'd want in the long range,
but let's not be proud of something that confuses rather than helps.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

A very sound approach, I am sure.

I think it's typical of the care that your MAP group has given
many very difficult subjects.
MR. PARKER:

On page 6 of your statement, it is mentioned

that the figures ought to be stated for a given company on a con
sistent basis, to permit users to determine relative financial
standing.

Other of your comments have indicated that you feel

there ought not to be too many restrictions put on what kind of
accounting policies are used.
Could you expand a little bit on what other kinds of
things you think can be done to improve understanding of relative
financial standing of the company?

I presume that means comparing

with other companies.
MR. KELLEY:
can be "to yourself."

Or, with your own, primarily.

"Relative"

I think the external user is probably more

interested in what’s going to happen to my business tomorrow than
what happened yesterday.
ground to that.

He is interested in yesterday as a back

Let me talk about businesses I am familiar with.

I would say that included in this should be share of
market of consumer products, trends of those, the effect of new
products on the present products, labor conditions, and worldwide
competitive conditions, although this can’t always be forecast.
We import almost all of our tobacco for cigars, and when Nixon
decided to do what he did last August it made a whole new ball
game out of it and I couldn’t have forecasted that.
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Now we have recovered rather quickly, so it became only
a three-month problem.

I would include that sort of thing, in our

businesses, what you are doing, and about new products.

These

have to be qualitative things, but I can, say, enumerate the top
ten food companies of the country and I could tell you, almost by
my own judgment, what the product research and development situa
tion is, in each.

To me, that's just as important as the cash

they have in the balance sheet.
I would think a company should find a way of talking to
that point in its reports, to the outside financial users.

First,

what happens is, the companies doing well have better statements
than the ones that aren't.

Let's see if I can think of some other

things.
MR. PARKER:

I guess I was really hoping to lead you to

make a comment on the sometimes emotional uniformity-versus-flexi
bility issue.
MR. KELLEY:

I feel— and again I am speaking personally

now--that those things that we are talking about are qualitative
and should stand the test of reasonableness.

But beyond that, you

can’t go, because anyone has to know more about it than management
does to go further than that.

I like to deal with the critical

issues of business, you might say, whatever they may be, as those
qualitative things that management should address itself to, which
really is what a man like myself tries to do when you go up before
the securities analysts.
Now, I wasn’t purposely trying to evade your question.
Would you want to ask me again, if I haven’t answered?
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MR. PARKER:

I thought the question was posed toward the

types of accounting policies used, and more on the quantitative
side than the qualitative side.

You have made some reference to

leaving a fair amount of flexibility for management to report.
On the other hand, you have made some reference for a desire and
need for users to be able to compare companies, one with another.
Do you have anything to amplify that, or bring the two
together?
MR. KELLEY:

As a Committee, we feel entirely different

about comparisons among companies than we do about monitoring a
track record and future outlook for an existing company.
MR. PARKER:

You feel this would be so for the investor

MR. KELLEY:

It's very desirable from an investor’s

as well?

point of view to try to compare one company to another, as much
as he can.

This can be a trap for him, however.

This presumes,

if you want to do it well, that all companies are run the same.
They are not.

It presumes that even a few companies deal with

the same sorts of problems.

They do not.

The coffee business is

entirely different than the frozen food business, and you’d better
realize that in your annual listing of the financial statement.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
advocate, here;

Mr. Kelley, I am playing the devil’s

I do this for the purpose of clarification, not

in any way for the purpose of embarrassment.
explanation for it which I haven't dug out.

Maybe there is an
On page 6, you say,

"Where pertinent, financial statements should be accompanied by
data relative to such items as market position, order backlogs,
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and revenues, by classes of customers."

Then I read the diversi

fied-companies discussion outline that was used in the seminars
we talked about briefly, and that says, "Disclosure of sales order
backlogs should not be required, either for segments or for the
whole company."
Now, on its face, this would seem to be an inconsistency.
MR. KELLEY:

It's a fundamental issue.

Underline the

word "required."
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

"Required,"

I see.

That is the

distinction you would make?
MR. KELLEY:

And you are aware that "pertinent" may be,

also, another distinction, where "pertinent" assumes that it's
quite important and a critical factor of the business.
saying, there, it doesn't have to be required;
required.

We are

it should not be

However, keep this in mind--that we are more mature in

this statement we have in front of you today than months ago when
we were still arguing about some of the things.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

The rest of your sentence, in the

present report...
MR. KELLEY:

We are saying that if management feels that

this is pertinent and is a critical issue with the business they
should be encouraged to give it.

Now how are you as an auditor,

or myself as an outside investor, going to tell management some
thing is "critical" or is "pertinent" if they say it's not?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But you would still put the decision

on management, as distinguished from Reed Parker's inferences?
MR. KELLEY:

Yes.
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. KELLEY:

Very good.

Are you finished with me, sir?

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Yes, I am finished with you.

unless you have some concluding statement
(No response)
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much.

M R . KELLEY: Thank you very much.
(Whereupon at five minutes past twelve o'clock
the meeting was adjourned for luncheon.)
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MONDAY AFTERNOON SESSION
May 15 , 1972
The meeting reconvened at thirty-four minutes past
one o ’clock, Chairman Trueblood presiding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
the procedure.

I want to again remind you of

We ask you to write out your questions and

submit them to our staff people who are with us.

And, lest

there be any confusion, I will ask them, please, to rise
again, to identify themselves, so you can find them when you
need them--first, my assistant, Mrs. Beattie, over there in
the right-hand corner; then Marty Gans, standing there; Mike
Shannon, in the back of the room; Bob Streit, over here; and
Paul Rosenfield, from the Institute, up here.

If you can’t

find one of them, bring the question up here and we will find
a way to handle that, too.
Okay, Mr. Honig, I think it might be helpful if you
started out by identifying your group and explaining it to
the people.
MR. VICTOR HONIG (Accountants for the Public):

I

am here as the Co-Executive Director of Accountants for the
Public.

Accountants for the Public is a nonprofit corpora

tion organized in San Francisco by a group of certified
public accountants, educators and accountants who felt that
there is another function for accountants, in addition to
that of presenting, preparing and certifying financial state
ments for the business community.

I will go into that as I
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progress, but I did want to say a few things.
First of all, I wanted to thank Marty Gans and Paul
Rosenfield for their help in getting me on the agenda and for
their help in cutting down your lunch hour so that I could
speak.

This morning I heard the representative of J. K.

Lasser say that accountants--the American Institute and mem
bers of the American Institute--do nothing with the untrained
investor's group and should not even try.

I think that this

is where Accountants for the Public differs with the represent
ative of J. K. Lasser.
When he said that, I remembered my having begun in
accounting here in New York working for a regional firm.

I

progressed to the point where I was already writing comments
on reports.

In those days we weren’t that concerned about

short-form certificates; we dealt with long-form reports and
extensive comments were an integral and important part of each
annual report for every one of our clients.

And I had diffi

culty in writing, and the partner with whom I dealt was quite
critical of the way in which I wrote, and I said, "How can I
improve?"
He said to me, "Tell you what you do.

You write

your comments and take them home and read them to your mother.
If she doesn't understand them, you haven't done a good job."
Well, the first time around, after reading some of
the comments, my mother said to me, "What’s a 'reserve for
bad debts'?"
So I explained to her as best I could.

Next time

around she said to me, "What’s a ’reserve for depreciation'?"
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And I explained that to her.

And, as I was doing this, I be

gan to realize that part of the function of the certified pub
lic accountant and the certified public accountant firm is
that of being an interpreter.
After a while I went to the service and came back
and decided to go into practice for myself here in New York,
and I was asked by some representatives of the students of
Columbia University if I would help in interpreting to them
the report on the dormitories and on the mess hall because
there was a request for an increase in fees.

And we had

difficulty in obtaining the financial reports from the Uni
versity but finally did and, as a result of the information
that was given to these students, the University agreed that
an increase was not necessary.

In this case I was not an

advocate, but simply an interpreter of financial reports.
Another thing that I felt, today, was that the re
sponsibilities of the certified public accountant do not end
with the issuance of financial reports, as we all know.

And,

similarly, something which has not been stated is that the
responsibility of management does not end with the payment of
its fee to the certified public accountant firm, so that when
a certified public accountant firm has been identified with a
financial report of a particular company and has been so iden
tified for many years, management does have a responsibility
to the certified public accountant firm not to make statements
which might be attributed to the certified public accountant
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firm without first clearing them.

This is in line with the

statement concerning projections and whether or not the certi
fied public accountant firm does have a responsibility for
projections.
Now I assume because of the lateness of the time at
which I did present my paper, it hasn’t been available for you,
so I will take the liberty of reading it to you.
With change taking place in the social structure
all around us, some members of our profession have begun to
feel uncomfortable with their role.

This discomfort stems

from the recognition that, while our basic role is not changed,
the failure to participate in change has resulted in the loss
of our traditional independence.

In response to the growing

criticism of the certified public accountant from within the
profession and outside, we have begun to question ourselves,
mainly in the areas dealing with the technical aspects of our
work.
During the past twelve months only four articles
appeared in The Journal of Accountancy which dealt with or
alluded to the accountant’s role in social change.

Two dealt

with minority employment and education, one with independence,
and only one with our social responsibilities.

At this point

we are studying the objectives of accounting, and I propose
that no study of this kind can or should ignore the changing
society in which we now live and that we do emphasize social
objectives.
First of all, I ’d like to say that we must study the
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word "public" in "certified public accountant."

For too long

now we have restricted our definition of "the public" to "the
business public," the management and investors, banks, govern
ment agencies such as the Securities Exchange Commission,
which deal with business.

And as a result of such a restricted

definition, financial reports have evolved which are almost
incomprehensible to the otherwise nonbusiness public as well
as much of the business public.

No wonder there is a question

about our independence and our image.
Last week I met in Washington with an economist of
the Treasury Department, a former attorney of the Treasury
Department and a financial journalist.

We were reviewing the

annual reports of several of the largest corporations of the
country, prepared by the largest certified public accounting
firms.

None of us could state that we completely understood

all of the terminology in the financial statements or of the
notes to financial statements, especially to those dealing
with taxes paid and deferred taxes.

As the case was, I was

consulting with some people about tax reform.

There is a

group in Washington trying to give information about tax re
form.

They stated that not one representative of a certified

public accounting firm had been willing to participate with
them in this, and I was surprised and, I think, shocked by it.
L. William Seidman has recognized the need for a
consideration of our public in the article, "The End of the
Great Green Eyeshade," in The Journal of Accountancy, January
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1972.

He said, "The CPA now has a vast public.

It includes

investors, managements, unions, consumers and governments and
all who rely in one way or another on financial statements.
Almost all of our citizens are directly or indirectly involved
with the CPA’s product."
When we begin to recognize the vast audience for
financial reports, then we must see that one of the primary
objectives of the certified public accountant is to make his
reports understandable to that public, in both content and
form.

At first blush, this sounds like a simple task, and I

thought this was so until I heard some of the testimony this
morning.
Let us consider the public to whom we provide ser
vices.

Traditionally, certified public accountants have been

retained by business, individuals, partnerships and corporate
clients, government and private agencies, to provide either
audits, tax or management advisory services.

Almost all of

our concentration has been to educate ourselves in becoming
more proficient in these areas, to attract more clients and
to develop the staff which will permit us to provide services
to our growing practices.

And we perform these services for

fees.
Of course, most of us do provide services to worthy
organizations without fee, or at reduced fees, and one of our
more fortunate brethren does participate in the public-service
function, in the presentation of the Motion Picture Academy
Awards.
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Mr. Honig, I wonder if I might

ask you to summarize, from here on in, in order to give us
some time for questioning.
MR. HONIG:
group.

I will try to explain the accountants

A group of accountants in San Francisco has responded

by organizing "Accounting for the Public," which is a non
profit corporation whose objective is to provide consulting
services to public interest groups by analyzing and interpret
ing data in areas of public concern.

The group operates with

out fee and in a non-advocate capacity for community and con
sumer groups, as well as public interest law firms.

We will

attempt to provide analyses and interpretations of financial
data in a way which will enable such groups to act in a well
informed fashion in areas of broad public interest and concern.
We also seek to convince students that the accounting profes
sion is a unique and relatively untapped vehicle for those
with social awareness.
We have received a modest, one-year grant from the
Stern Fund located in New York.

Although officially in oper

ation for less than one month, the response has been great.
Already, we are involved in matters concerning analysis and
interpretation of the budget and financial statements of the
City and County of San Francisco, the budget and financial
report for the San Francisco Unified School District and the
much debated financial agreement between the city and the
redevelopment agency, and in matters concerning the public
utilities commission.
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Without publicity, the word has spread even outside
the San Francisco Bay Area, and the requests for service are
many.

We have met with consumer groups.

What they want is

information and interpretation, and it's amazing how their
requests in many ways parallel those of the Financial Analysts
Federation.
Now we have dealt with business reports, and yet one
of the things of which I have become aware is the fact that,
in many municipalities, under the term "public service enter
prises," they are really in business, and how important it is
to understand what these terms mean, because the terms, in
municipal reports, in business, are quite different from busi
ness reports.

So we deal with "unappropriated balances,"

rather than "surplus," and things like that.
Now I’d like to summarize by saying that since the
testimony today makes it clear that financial reports are not
understandable to the untrained reader, it becomes increasingly
mandatory for us to become interpreters of financial reports
and to be available to those untrained groups who desire and
need information contained in such statements.

I want to

urge the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
to take the lead in sponsoring and supporting public interest
accounting firms, such as Accountants for the Public.

Addi

tionally, I recommend that it urge all the state societies
and member firms to participate in establishing such public
interest groups.

It is in this direction that we can begin

to restore our credibility, finally putting to rest the image
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of the "Great

Green Eyeshade.”

The testimony today makes it crystal clear that the
need is now.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much.

In your

paper, you make an analogy to similar groups among the law.
Is that effort, so far as you know, sponsored by the American
Bar Association, or is it individually concerned lawyers who
make those services available?
MR. HONIG:

I think it is both.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. HONIG:

It is both?

The Bar Association, at least in San

Francisco, has been actively participating in the public
interest.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

And, the second question:

To

the extent you have been working with these municipalities,
particularly in the California area--is that on a fee arrange
ment of any kind, on the basis of ability to pay, or is it
strictly public service In the true sense of the word?
MR. HONIG:
take no fee.

This is strictly public service.

We

And as I said, we have received a modest grant

which helps us work.

All of the accountants participating

are doing it on a voluntary basis.
MR. GELLEIN:
to be interpreters.

Mr. Honig, you stated that you need

Is it your view that the written word,

our reports and the like, are inadequate in themselves and
it therefore takes the oral analysis to tell the whole story?
MR. HONIG:

Well, I think that, as interpreters, it
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is both the written and the oral word.

I think that we have come

to a point— and I think most of us have recognized it this morning-that one financial statement cannot do all things.

Therefore, if

our reports and our financial statements are directed toward one
group--that is, the trained reader of financial reports— as certi
fied public accountants, we have another responsibility, and this
is to become interpreters of those reports to the untrained group,
who also may want and need information contained in those reports.
MR. GELLEIN:

You mean more than the untrained investor--

you mean the untrained investor as well as other untrained users?
MR. HONIG:
MR. GELLEIN:

Can I give you...
I was going to ask why the analysts wouldn't

do the job for the untrained investor.
MR. HONIG:

May I give you several examples of the work

in which we are involved.

San Francisco City and County operate a

railroad and it is called the "Municipal Railroad."

It's really

our public transportation system, and there was a move to cut back
services.
A group of people from all the neighborhoods affected
by this came to us and asked us if we would interpret to them the
financial reports and audit the financial reports of the City and
County of San Francisco’s Municipal Railroad.

We did, and this

was the extent of our services.
As a result of this, testimony was made in an educated
way at the Public Utilities Commission hearing.

As a result of

some further efforts, using the information that was given to
them, there was a lawsuit filed and the court held that the
Public Utilities Commission did not have the authority
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to cut back service without the approval of the elected group
of Supervisors.
MR. GELLEIN:

Well, do you conclude that we could do

better with the written reports than we are doing now, and, if
so, how?
MR. HONIG:

I referred earlier to the group I met

with in Washington in reading the financial reports of one of
the large steel manufacturers, and we tried to ascertain what
was meant by, first of all, the footnote concerning deferred
taxes, and the statement of operation showing "zero" for the
provision for federal income taxes.
I think that’s become a political football lately.
And none of us could conclusively say what this really meant.
Now we each could interpret it.

But did it mean that the

company paid no taxes or that the certified public accounting
firm made no provision for taxes?

This was not stated, in

the report.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
sue that one just a little bit.

Well, Mr. Honig, if I may pur
This Group has met with the

Treasury, and I know your point is very well made and very
fairly expresses their point of view.

On the other hand, it

does seem to me that it may be asking a little bit too much
for us, as a profession, to explain what is, indeed, a very
complex world in very simple terms.

The Treasury is explicitly

concerned about estimating tax receipts.

Frankly, for the life

of me, given the intelligence that exists at the Secretariat
level, given the complete detail in tax returns, and so forth,
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I cannot share their lack of understanding about the deferred
tax issue.
Sid, you had your hand up.
MR. HONIG:

May I respond to that, please?

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Yes.
MR. HONIG:

I ’d like to say that I think we are

confusing things here.

I did not intend to necessarily make

my statement a criticism of the printed financial report.

I

did intend to make a statement concerning the social respon
sibilities and the responsibilities of the certified public
accountant and of the profession to the public, and I am talk
ing about the general public, and I feel that we are in a po
sition to be interpreters of the written word, of the financial
report.
I want to say one other thing.

I examined two re

ports--one, of the largest banks in the country, and one, of
a very small public utility.

The large bank made no comment

about its deferred credits, and yet the small public utility,
here on the East Coast, had rather extensive explanations of
how the deferred credits were used and how they were arrived
at.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Sid Davidson has been waiting

a while.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

I won’t make my customary speech

about deferred credits...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I would rather you did not.
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DEAN DAVIDSON:

... and how the whole problem could

be solved by the repeal of APB 11.

But instead, we are con

cerned with spelling out of the objectives of accounting-that’s the purpose of this session--and I was wondering if
you had any specific suggestions as to how we might couch the
objectives of accounting so that accounting would be more use
ful in meeting this social purpose that you describe.
MR. HONIG:

Well, I think we should state that the

responsibility of the profession does not end with the issu
ance of the report, that we recognize that we do have a fur
ther responsibility, and the responsibility is to being and
becoming available to those serious people who want informa
tion concerning financial reports which affect their lives,
whether it be a company or a municipality, and help them
understand the meaning of that report.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

But, Mr. Honig, that’s kind of a

personal responsibility, and many of us may share your feelings
that accountants and certified public accountants should assume
a greater portion of that personal responsibility, but that
does not relate to the question of objectives of financial
statements or of the accounting process.

I think those are

two separate kinds of questions.
MR. HONIG:

Well___

DEAN DAVIDSON:

And I must confess that I speak out

of some substantial sympathy for your feeling about the per
sonal responsibilities, but I don’t see how that translates
into objectives.
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MR. HONIG:

Well, first of all, if we call ourselves

"certified public accountants," we are already involved in a
question of terminology.

If this profession does not want to

accept the meaning of "public," then it seems to me we must
change the name.

If we are involved in the accounting process

of providing interpretations for the public--because, realis
tically, a financial statement is an interpretation of trans
actions- -then we have a responsibility beyond those to whom
the report is addressed.

In this day a large corporation has

a great impact on all of us:

There is interresponsibility of

the corporation with the people and with the government.

Then

we must begin to recognize a new era, a new function, or at
least an extension of our function, and this function must be
much more extensive than we have heard here today.

I think

this is why a group of us accountants have attempted to do
something within San Francisco in this area.

This is why I

have urged that the American Institute accept this as one of
its objectives and to sponsor such groups throughout the
country.

I am saying that there are public interest law firms

which function only in this way, and they are supported finan
cially, perhaps not totally, by the Bar Association, but they
are given support.

They are given assistance and they are

getting funding from other sources.
Now our group has gotten some funding from other
sources and at least the American Institute should attempt to
promote this kind of thing for our profession.
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Would it be fair, Mr. Honig, to

say, in an attempt to convert your presentation to what Sid
asks for by way of objective, that, apart from the mechanics
of how you get to the public, that you would urge us to adopt,
as an objective, the simplification or a clarification, or a
simplification of our presentations?

Is that a reasonable

part of your plea?
MR. HONIG:

I am reluctant to say "yes" or "no" to

that because it’s not a question which lends itself to "yes"
or "no."

I think we are all flirting with a particular kind

of function, an idea we do have, and that is we know that in
many ways our financial statements which are used by the pub
lic in any way you want to view the public are not totally
clear.

I think we can apply ourselves to making them more

meaningful, in addition to the other aspects, either by writ
ten word or by verbal means--of a better interpretation of our
financial reports.
MR. PARKER:

Would you have any suggestions as to

specific ways in which they could be made clear or more under
standable, before you get to the point of the first interpre
tation that might be needed?
MR. HONIG:

Well, I referred earlier to the long-form

statement which we used to prepare before the short-form cer
tificate.

It seems to me that this was a wonderful way of

being able to communicate with these small entrepreneurs who
didn’t have a financial understanding and to my mother who
didn’t know what a reserve for bad debt was.
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DEAN EDWARDS:

Sir, are you suggesting that we can

take a complex subject matter like accounting, which we say
is a profession, and interpret it to our constituencies?
Would you make the like comparison, let's say, with professions
of medicine, theology and law that we could make these under
standable to the layman?

I would assume, from what you have

said, that this should be one of our primary objectives.
MR. HONIG:

I would say so.

DEAN EDWARDS:
MR. HONIG:

It would be just that?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Any other questions from the

panel?
(No response)
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much, Mr. Honig.

We appreciate your interest and we share your concerns about
public service, and it’s particularly good of you to come this
very long way from California to be with us.
MR. HONIG:

Glad to be here.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
Thank you.

We appreciate it very much.

We have one question left over from the morning

session, and I believe I saw Jack Gibson come into the room,
didn't I?

The question relates, Jack, to page 5 of Mr. Kelley’s

presentation--just one point.

The statement is made, Jack, on

page 5 , in relation to users, that "Needs of current and po
tential investors and other users should be met by including
regularly and consistently in financial statements all mater
ial information which is available to the public from other

2.17

sources," and the audience participant asks this question, "Does
NAA mean that it feels each issue of financial statements
should include all the information which is included in vari
ous Securities and Exchange Commission reporting, 10-K, S-1, and
so forth?"
Can you answer that, from the floor, Jack?
MR. JACK GIBSON:

Not necessarily.

It would he a

precondition of something, hut they don’t necessarily mean
that.
CHAIRMAN TRUEB LOOD:
MR. GIBSON:

They do not necessarily mean it?

It gets rather extensive.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you.

We will next hear

from Laventhol Krekstein Horwath & Horwath, if they will take
the stand.

First, please introduce yourselves.
MR. STANLEY FERST (Laventhol Krekstein Horwath &

Horwath):

Thank you very much, Bob .

I am Stanley Ferst and

I should like to introduce my two partners next to me-- Charles
Chazen from Los Angeles, and Bob Ferst from Philadelphia.

As

we indicated in our formal paper, we propose to speak on a
very narrow, key section of financial reporting--projections
and forecasts--a subject which has already received much atten
tion this morning and which has very many unresolved problems
today.

Our firm feels strongly on this subject and is willing

to stick its neck out, at least for the purposes of this hear
ing.

We have selected Chuck Chazen to supplement our formal

comments, and since he comes from California he must he re
garded as an expert.
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MR. CHARLES CHAZEN: Yes.
my neck!

As he said, well here goes

We are going to talk about, basically, this very nar

row subject in this overall conception of objectives and finan
cial statements, the subject of forecasts and feasibility studies.
There is no doubt that forecasts of financial information in all
of the forms, projections, feasibility studies, budgets and
similar presentations, are needed by the business community.
have heard that all morning and part of the afternoon.
and usefulness of forecasts has been demonstrated.

We

The use

More often

than not, doesn't the user of the financial statement, the in
vestor, the analyst, the lender, view the historical information
contained in the annual report primarily for the purpose of
estimating and evaluating future results?

To him, it isn't

only important to know where a company has been, but only as a
threshold as to where the company may be going.

If this is the

need which the financial community has, should not they have
done for them on a professional, Independent basis what is
now done, in some cases, on a hit-or-miss or on a puffing
basis?

And who is better qualified than the certified public

accountant to take this responsibility?
The supervision of the gathering and presenting
of financial information into whatever form required is cer
tainly the role of the trained and qualified certified public
accountant, and when we consider the demands of the financial
community for projected financial investment, we cannot over
look the investor, whether sophisticated or unsophisticated,
who is seeking professional guidance and assistance.

Here the
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problem becomes more acute.
Let’s take the group of investors who are considering
the advisability and feasibility of constructing and operating
a business unit, whether it be a hotel, a hospital, a shopping
center or a glue factory.

A feasibility study is generally

conducted, for the specific purpose of determining a specific
project for a specific service, of its suitability as measured
in terms of specific financial success of the planned venture.
Usually there are three aspects to a feasibility study--a mar
ket study, an analysis of the proposed site, and operating
forecasts.
If the proposed investors have had experience in this
business, they might attempt to forecast based on their own
experience.

Perhaps this might suffice for a small project in

which the people putting up the money are willing to accept on
faith the facts and figures gathered by the promotor who has
had some experience in this business.

But this limited infor

mation is similar to an internally prepared financial state
ment, and filled with the same risks of subjectivity.

What

sophisticated investor would rely on it?
As a rule, a well informed businessman will not risk
his money on an idea promoted and developed solely by someone
who lacks objectivity.

Who will he rely on?

The certified

public accountant has demonstrated experience and knowledge,
and with this experience and knowledge in the field covered by
the proposed business is the only logical choice.

As stated

in our memorandum to the Study Group, there is no one better
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constituted to guide the businessman in his preparation of
forecast financial information and no one more acceptable as a
credible reporter to the financial community than the certified
public accountant.

The certified public accountant’s back

ground, training and experience qualify him for this role.
Add to this the certified public accountant’s experience with
and knowledge of a particular business and you can’t beat that
combination.
Unfortunately, some members of our profession, in
judging what the role of the certified public accountant should
be with respect to forecasts, allow their judgment to be clouded
by the accounting problems related to forecasting and by the
added potential liability exposure.

Sure there are problems

to be solved in both accounting and reporting, and liability
exposure is surely a consideration.

But if we are called upon

to meet a basic, fundamental need of the financial community,
we should not allow ourselves to beg off by saying we don’t
know how to do it or we are afraid to do it.
Let’s first recognize that this need exists.

Then

we can cope with the other problems.
Certified public accountants have been associated
with feasibility studies for years.

Projections have also

been products of certified public accountants’ services.
What then is our concern?

We believe that forecast informa

tion prepared under an appropriate set of rules, should take
its place w ith the other financial statements.
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There has been growing evidence that the Securities and
Exchange Commission and others are recognizing the need for
and beginning to encourage the use of projected financial
statements.

The profession should not look at forecasts as

second rate statements, but allow them to take their place
with historical statements.

The sooner this is done, the

sooner forecasts, feasibility studies and budgets and so forth
are recognized as needed tools, as numbers to be placed in the
hands of the financial people and investors, the sooner our
rules and standards will catch up with them.
Forecasts are now being used to a limited extent in
prospectuses and other forms of selling documents.

The Securi

ties and Exchange Commission is making sounds that forecasts will
soon be acceptable if not mandatory--again pointing toward the
growing use of projected financial data.

Like it or not, we

are faced with this.
Turning to some of the more specific issues in fore
casting, one of the difficult questions concerns the degree of
disclosure of assumptions.

Since forecasts are almost entirely

based on assumptions as to the future, obviously a great degree
of disclosure would be required.

We believe that financial

projections should ordinarily be stated in terms of a range of
possible results related to different significant assumptions,
rather than present single amounts.

The use of single amounts

in historical financial statements has, in our opinion, re
sulted in the user ascribing a degree of precision to the
statements which is more than that intended.

This is even

2.22

more dangerous in forecast information.
The use of a range should help to avoid unwarranted
reliance on the forecasts and also provide the user with the
ability to assess the impact of the outcome of various assump
tions.

Many have suggested that probability techniques be

used in expressing the likelihood of forecast results being
attained.

We suggest that additional experimentation and

evaluation of this technique is necessary, particularly con
cerning the use of subjective probability measurements.
We have used the terms "feasibility study" and "fore
cast," and said earlier that "feasibility study" is a broader
term than "forecast," since the feasibility study includes all
the development work leading up to a forecast, as well as the
forecast itself.

Considerable judgment is involved in develop

ing both of these processes, and the process is not wholly
unlike that of an audit.

Generally accepted forecasting

standards are required to insure even a. minimum degree of
reliability.

The field of forecasts and projections must be

acknowledged as a certified public accountant’s function.

Yet

if we hesitate too long to make this acknowledgement official,
there are others standing in the wings ready to step in.
At the Securities and Exchange Commission hot-issues
hearings held earlier this year, representatives of a private
company outlined a procedure where the company would operate
as an objective and unbiased authority to determine that pro
jections, including the prospectuses, are, "reasonably pre
pared," and, "appropriately qualified."

One of the signifi
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cant comments made by this group was the following, and I
quote,
"Serving as intermediaries in the financing process
are legal, accounting and other advisors who counsel issuers,
underwriters and, at times, investors.

And yet none of these

professional groups in the United States has come forward to
voluntarily assume responsibility for evaluating projections
and prospectuses, nor, in our opinion, is any likely to do so."
In summary, one of the objectives of financial state
ments should be to present projections when this information
will be useful to investors, creditors and other users.

The

forecasting situation is clearly one of demand and supply.
Understand

that the business community undeniably

is demanding forecasts of one form or another.

In our opinion,

our profession should be ready, willing and able to serve this
need.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
You did very well.

Thank you, Chuck, very much.

Incidentally, I wonder if I could ask you

to expand just a little bit on this degree of precision which
you have rightly brought into your paper.

I am certain, today,

we all agree with you that the degree of precision is far more
difficult with respect to forecasts even of cash than it is
with respect to income.

But, do I properly infer that this

degree-of-precision problem is sort of pervasive in terms of
all financial reporting?
tion?

Did you intend to make that implica
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MR. CHAZEN:

Well I said that it is even more impor

tant in historical statements where precision is sometimes
taken for granted.

It seems to me that I remember in some

recent testimony, in a case where a young associate college
professor, when asked whether in his opinion financial state
ments, when fairly stated, meant that every single figure in
those financial statements was accurate and exact, he
testified, ”Yes, that, obviously, is something that profes
sional accountants don’t believe and know is not so."

But

unfortunately there is a degree of inference that a reader
sometimes takes when he reads a financial statement.

What’s

even more important in projections is to make sure that the
reader is not misled.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Do you think it appropriate

somehow or other to work into a statement of objectives that
all we can hope for in forecasts, or anything else, is a
reasonable parameter of precision, or a reasonable approxima
tion of results, as distinguished from the preciseness which
our public expects--not only the untrained public?

Would that

be a reasonable inclusion?
MR. CHAZEN:

Yes.

That’s why we suggest that a

range of figures be given, rather than figures in the absolute,
so that the reader cannot do so.
MR. WAGNER:
in terms of this range?

May I ask, what are you referring to,
What are the parameters?

What is an

accepted degree of tolerance in connection with our future
projections?
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MR. CHAZEN:

Well it seems to me this is one of the

things we are advocating--the establishment of these standards
to determine what the degree of tolerance should be.

If you

are asking for my opinion, let me answer it this way.

In a

feasibility study, when we are asked to tell an investor what
we think about a particular investment, we frequently couch
our report in terms of levels of attainment.

In other words,

if it’s a hotel, we say, " At 70% occupancy, you might expect
this result; at 80, this result."

We aren’t telling him he is

going to have 80, 70 or 90; we are saying that, if it were so,
this is what you might expect, based on our survey and market
studies, and so forth.
In terms of a going concern, I am not sure whether
we can really establish parameters or perimeters for determin
ing, or for saying to the accountant or management, "Stay with
in these bounds."

I think that each business has to be

assessed on its own.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well, in terms of your illustra

tion, if you were to tell an investor that, with 70% occupancy,
his earnings should be thus and so, with 80% it should be so
and so, and with a 100% it should be so and so, how will this
help the investor to make up his mind whether to buy or to
sell, in a particular business.
MR. STANLEY FERST (Laventhol Krekstein Horwath and
Horwath:

For the purpose of this illustration, we would give

the investor enough information so that he could draw his own
conclusions as to what the reasonableness would be, in his
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mind, of achieving 80% or 70% or even 9 0 %
,and he would he
armed with enough facts so he could draw his own conclusion
before he made the investment.

This is exactly what takes

place, not only with respect to the investor hut more signifi
cantly with respect to the insurance company that puts up the
money.
MR. PARKER:

I thought I gathered from your comments

that the accountant was going to pass on what level of occu
pancy should he reasonably expected.
MR. CHAZEN:

No, no, no!

We conduct a market survey,

we do many things in a feasibility study.

We know trends and

operational statistics in the industry and therefore would he
able to put together a forecast that is reasonable, as reason
able as it might be, as a forecast projection.

But we don’t

tell the client, "You can anticipate 80% occupancy. "
MR. PARKER:

But when you are asking management to

make a forecast of what its business is going to be next year,
within reasonable limits--I gathered from what you said that
the accounting firm is going to pass on the reasonableness of
those assumptions...
MR. CHAZEN:
jects.

We are talking about two different sub

We think that a going concern with a track record is

in a different position than a brand new venture.

Obviously

a brand new venture has nothing to rely on but the site it
has and surrounding community and the statistics for the in
dustry, while a going concern has a history on which we can
rely.

It has contracts, it has a product, it has management*
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it has a market, and all of these should be taken into account.
Now as far as the reasonableness of the assumptions,
I think that a competent auditor, qualified with this particu
lar client, in this particular industry, can be expected to
have a degree of competency to determine--let the assumptions
be management' s, where they rightfully belong— whether or not
the assumptions are reasonable.
MR. PARKER:

As far as what the economic developments

will be next year, whether the gross national product and car
production will be up this much?
MR. CHAZEN:

That's right, that's part of it.

MR. PARKER:

Accountants have this ability?

MR. CHAZEN:

I believe accountants have it, or have

access to it, yes.
MR. STANLEY FERST:
MR. PARKER:

As to the reasonableness of it.

And suppose some client says, "We are

going to be up 5% next year," and the auditing firms says, "No,
you will be down 5%"?
MR. CHAZEN:
able to resolve it.
MR. PARKER:

How will you resolve this question?
You haven't given me enough facts to be

A tolerance of 5% is relatively narrow.
Yes, but when it begins to be a ques

tion of up or down, "Will hotel occupancy be 85%, up from 78,
or will it be down 4%?" and you feel very strongly that it
might be down.
MR. CHAZEN:

Well, isn't this really the same prob

lem with reference to bad debts?

In other words, management

says to me, "I think this kind of an allowance is sufficient."
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The auditor makes a judgmental decision; he does it all the
time, and says it is or it isn’t.

I think he bases that judg

ment on the very same experience that allows him to make that
judgment you are talking about.
MR. PARKER:

So your judgment wins out over his?

MR. CHAZEN: Well, I don’t know that it wins or
loses.

I think that the auditor is in a position of an ad

visor, like he always is.
MR. PARKER:

I am just wondering if it isn’t a little

more important to the manager than a decision about the reserve
for bad debts.
MR. CHAZEN:

If management can prove or can justify

what management says is so, then, like the financial statement,
it was justifiable and the auditors must accept it.

If he can’t

justify it, or if the auditor can poke holes in it...
MR. PARKER:
fication?

But, what is the criterion for the justi

Who is the arbiter?

Who knows more about the sub

ject?
MR. CHAZEN:

Well the auditor, for example, has

shown that sales are anticipated to increase by 20% next year.
Why?

Because we have developed this product that already has

created this many contracts, and based on our experience,
management says we can anticipate these additional contracts
during the coming year.
Well we look at the history and we either agree or
disagree.

We may say to management, "But, the last five years

have not shown this to be so."

You know there is no right or
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wrong, but this is an area like we always face as auditors,
where we will have to get together with management and somebody
will have to prevail, based on good solid judgmental evaluation.
I don’t think it’s any different from an inventory obsolescence
problem, or similar problems that we face today.
MR. PARKER:

Have you had many managements asking

you to help them in this way, in forecasting their future oper
ations?
MR. CHAZEN:

Our experience has been principally in

feasibility studies.
MR. PARKER:

I gather that they are two quite differ

ent things.
MR. CHAZEN:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Much of the conversation and

presentation, I believe, related to what we might call feasi
bility studies in the management service area, as distinct
from forecasts, more broadly, as we were discussing this morn
ing.

This leads me, however, to a question from the floor on

this basic assumption, which I would like to direct to Stan
Ferst:

"Since the Institute’s Management Advisory Services

Committee has taken the position that we cannot determine
whether assumptions are reasonable, how can we, as professional
accountants, be taking the position that we can get into the
forecasting business?"
MR. STANLEY FERST:

I think it’s a little bit unfair,

because the person who framed the question might have been
eavesdropping at our luncheon session!

We tried to answer

2.30

this question ourselves before it was asked.

To be perfectly

honest with you, I was really amazed with the position of the
Management Advisory Service Committee, having chaired the
special ad hoc committee, I think, on executive recruitment
for a fee.

As you well know I was much involved in it, and the

MAS people were the ones saying that it would not affect our
independence.
I think maybe it was Arnold Levine from Lasser who
said he would be willing to accept one thing at a time and be
willing to progress piecemeal, and I hope w e ’d go along with
this also.

We would hope that in the not-too-distant future

we could find rules so that we could attest to the reasonable
ness, as well as the compliance aspect, as well as the exemp
tion aspect in the preparation of projections.

But if we had

to start with one and then ultimately down the line settle for
the next one, this would be satisfactory too, because we’d be
moving in the right direction.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But, there does seem an incon

sistency. ..
MR. STANLEY FERST:
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Yes, correct.
...between the MAS position of

some years ago and their present position.
MR. STANLEY FERST:
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I just couldn’t believe it, Bob.
And this leads me to another

question, which also comes from the floor— twice, as a matter
of fact.

The question, if I may paraphrase it, making a single

question out of it, is basically this--given that the auditors
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have forecast earnings--however we handle the assumptions and
ranges--can. they then be objective, in the independence sense
of the word, when they get to the formulation of their audit
or's opinion on financial statements?

From the way the ques

tions are written, there is some presumption that even the
auditor would look better if he had given his opinion on
roughly similar results.
MR. ROBERT FERST:
problem.

I don’t think we have much of a

The auditor is constantly giving advice.

Thirty

years ago we recommended one adding machine as against another
one.

If it didn’t work out, then we were in trouble.

I think

the question of independence really doesn’t enter into this
even though it has been raised in a number of instances.

I

think we do projections, we do feasibility studies, and we can
still be independent in our audit.
MR. GELLEIN:

Much of your paper and many of your

comments have concerned feasibility studies.

Just to be sure

we understand your position, I have a series of questions.
Not to lead you down a primrose path, I will state all of them
at the same time.
MR. ROBERT FERST:
MR. GELLEIN:

Ask the last one first!

Question One, is it your view that

forecasts should be included as a basic part of financial
statements or as supplemental information thereto?

Question

Two, if "Yes," would you have this as a requirement for all com
panies-- small, large, public, private?

Question Three, if so

then what would be your views about updating this information?
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You know, we haven’t gotten into this subject, yet.

Would you

prepare forecasts for the budget at the beginning of the year
and update it, say, every thirty days when it has been revised?
Maybe you would need to update it every month.
Now, this is the series of questions, and I wondered
if you’d like to comment.
MR. ROBERT FERST:

The first question, "Should it be

a requirement for all reports..."
MR. GELLEIN:

Basic or supplemental?

MR. ROBERT FERST:

We have a distinction between

companies who report to outside shareholders, or the so-called
publicly owned companies, as against the small, privately
owned companies.

I think that forecasts or projections are an

important factor for the publicly owned companies.

It may not

be required for the small corner grocery.
Your question, I think, Oscar, was in connection
with whether it should be part of the regular financial, or
supplemental...
MR. GELLEIN:

Yes.

MR. ROBERT FERST:
This is "format."

And I really don’t much care.

Your second question was on the updating.

MR. GELLEIN:
answered it, I think.

Well, the second one, you have already
The third one is "updating."

MR. ROBERT FERST:

On the updating, yes, I think

updating is required, the same as you come out with quarterly
statements--and here again I distinguish between the publicly
owned and small, privately owned company— but the publicly
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owned company reports quarterly, some semiannually, some
monthly even, and to the extent that there is information that
belongs to the public and to their shareholders, they should
update this as promptly as possible, and this would include
projections and forecasts as well as financial statements.
D E M DAVIDSON:

As to this requirement, even for

public companies it might not necessarily be required that it
be shown, and it would probably be sufficient, in the accoun
tant’s opinion, to say, "No, the company does not have a fore
cast available for publication,"--that they do not do any ad
vanced planning.
MR. ROBERT FERST:
MR. CHAZEN:

Well...

I wonder if that really is a solution.

Wouldn’t you then find that whenever they have something good
to say they’d say it, and when they didn’t, they wouldn’t?
Allowing them to be selective would probably defeat the entire
purpose of the forecast.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

No, I think this would probably suf

fice to say, in the bad years, that the company is not making
it.
MR. WESTON:

Much of the input to our Group, parti

cularly from the management side, raised serious questions
about forecasting--the management first, and then the certi
fied public accountant reporting on it, second.

Would you

have any views as to how that could be handled and this ob
jective implemented?
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MR. CHAZEN:

I have no opinion but I think number

one, if the profession had rules or standards whereby the
practitioner could be guided it would be more than a plus or
a minus--it wouldn’t be the solution, necessarily, but it
would help him.

Second, the projections should be made in

such a fashion so as to make sure that nobody could misunder
stand them as absolute projections of the future.
is important.

That also

And number three, I think that this updating

process Bob described is extremely important.

I think that

whenever a public-owned company reports to the public, whether
it be quarterly or on any basis, that as a part of the histor
ical figures to date an updating of projections must be made
to indicate its temporary nature.

I don’t know if there is

any absolute solution against liability--I was hoping you
fellows would find it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well, the question Frank has

raised has been also raised from the floor.

I’d like to com

ment first that whether or not it’s presently an objective or
a requirement, it is common practice for quarterly estimates
to be made by certain companies presently, both with respect
to sales and earnings, so this whole bit, except in its dis
aggregation, is not quite as new as we sometimes think it is.
But, we have learned legal counsel with us, who is familiar
with the British practice and has already done some work on
this.

Would you care to make any statement, Dave, about the

liability problem as it exists in present practice and as it
might exist under an extension of present practice?
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PROFESSOR HERWITZ:

Well, we are still in the midst

of collecting the data that is available, and much of it you
have seen in the press, in dribs and drabs.

As the cases have

been developed under the securities laws, I think there is no
reason to quarrel with the traditional view already referred
to, that forecasts cannot be treated as warranties of the
future.

Hence, it would be improper— and one may hope the

law will see it the same way--to impose liability on forecast
ers merely because the events turn out differently.
On the other hand, it certainly must be assumed that
with a requirement of forecasting or even with a development
on a permissible basis, there will be increased scope of po
tential liability for the time being, in the present temper of
the times.

As you are all very well aware, forecasting does

present an inviting target when the events have gone awry, and
the increase of litigation, whether that involves management
or accountants as the defendants, would cause an uncomfortable
period.

It may not be too high a price to pay.
The most recent case in the field, for such interest

as it may be, involved projections made by Monsanto.

For 1965,

there were regular projections which were quite on target.
For 1966, projections were publicly made, again to analysts
and to the press.

As to the first half of 1966, right on

target; as to the seconf half, significantly off.

A modest

business recession, which Reed tells me I must refer to as a
"mini-recession," which hit the chemical companies, including
duPont, threw the projections off.
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In an action brought by complaining stockholders,
the trial court, rather recently, has taken a very strong
view that there is no liability.

In effect, the court indi

cated that there is no liability just because the forecast
turned out to be inaccurate, since the management--these were
management forecasts, in this case--had been careful in assembl
ing the data, sensible and reasonable about their assumptions
and had updated as promptly as the circumstances and changing
events would call for.

That’s a rather favorable omen.

On the other hand, there was litigation, and that
means that some considerable number of Monsanto officers and
directors are having an uncomfortable time.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I see Andy Barr in the room.

It is my recollection, Andy, that the earlier Wheat Report
rejects the inclusion of forecasting, because of the presently
stringent liability requirements of Section Eleven of the 1933
Act...
MR. ANDREW BARR:

That’s correct, yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

...with the feeling that they

would have to be adjusted for the kind of thing Dave was talk
ing about.

Is that right?
MR. BARR:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have another question from

the floor which I am going to toss to Reed. It says, "Don’t
you believe forecasting by the accounting profession encroaches
on the financial analysts’ program?"
MR. PARKER:

Well now, my biases are all going to get
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exposed to the "court"!

I think that professionals talking

about other professionals encroaching in their territory gets
to be silly and I think it’s not a good kind of thing to talk
about.

But I think I would honestly have some feeling, at

root, some question, in a way, as to whether the typical ac
counting firm can bring to bear here what is required, or at
least what financial analysts presently use.
I cannot think of a single analyst in our firm who
would dare to begin to start to make a projection about what
Company "X" might do next or this year, or for the rest of the
year, without a careful study of an enormous number of macroeconomic data, interviews in person with as many of the com
petitors of this company as practicable, whether they were
audited by one firm or another or seven different firms, and
customers and suppliers.

He would also put into the picture

feelings about the strength of the management in various areas
based on personal interviews with them over the years, and
visits with managements in numbers of companies.

All this

would be done before he got down to the company in question.
I wonder whether time and the ability to do this rests in the
accounting profession.

For example, each company in the auto

industry expects to increase its share of the market.

Well,

you have to talk to each one of them before you find this out,
and you know that somebody’s assumption cannot be 0correct.
And is this a degree of existing expertise, or would it have
to be built?

And if it has to be built, how much does this

cost the client company, and is this the right cost-benefit
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ratio for this kind of information?

Indeed, I would be just

the devil’s advocate in asking this last question, but I have
heard it raised--is this offer of accountants to evaluate fore
casts and even to evaluate the assumptions for them, is it not
just a looking-for-more-business kind of a thing?
MR. STANLEY FERST:

Well, first of all, any. compe

tent management is constantly making forecasts.

We believe,

and it’s been said here many times today, that this informa
tion should be shared with the investors, with the owners of
the business, and we further believe that somebody has to add
a little bit more credibility to it so it won’t be one hundred
per cent self-serving.
Now as professionals we are constantly called upon
to give a certain opinion on various things.

We can, as we

have indicated, attest, ultimately, to the reasonableness of
what management must, we believe, share with its investors.
I don’t know who else they should go to.

Just to abdicate

this to somebody else, I think, is foolish.

To abdicate it

to the FAF, I think, would be silly on our part.
MR. CHAZEN:

I am not so sure that the analyst’s

end product is made available to the general public; it may
have been made available to his customers, I don’t know, but
the general public is continually bombarded by management
estimates of the future.
relies on.

That’s what the public sees and

And if our role is truly to be public accountants,

it seems to me that we have an obligation, both to our part
ners and to the public, to sort of censor this information and
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put it in proper perspective based on our experience.
Sure it will add to the cost of the audit--so did
the addition of the statement of changes of the financial po
sition.
possible.

The clients ought to get it from the best source
And, in our opinion, the best source in this case

is a certified public accountant.
DEAN EDWARDS:

In the last paragraph of your paper

you indicate, as a broad objectives category, that we should
recognize the need for projected financial statements and
feasibility studies and that they should be included under the
attest function.

Are you making a distinction first of all,

between projected financial statements and feasibility studies
and, secondly, would you include all feasibility studies,
those that were accepted by management and those that were
rejected by management, as part of the attest function, and
reports rendered on them?
MR. CHAZEN:

Well, these are two separate fields.

The paragraph that you read from--I don't see any reference to
the attest function in that paragraph.
DEAN EDWARDS.
MR. CHAZEN:

Well--yes.

If you look at the...

Well, yes, but, not in the same context.

We are talking about forecasts for going concerns as a part of
annual reports, as a normal, standard thing.

We are talking

about feasibility studies separate and apart, and also being
subject to certain rules and regulations and guidance, so
that all accountants reporting on feasibility studies report
in the same manner and are guided by the same principles.
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Whether or not a feasibility study is circulated to the public
depends upon its purpose.

For example, let’s say right now,

there are land companies subdividing land for the first time,
with no previous history, no previous track record, who want
to sell shares in their company to the public.

They have to

tell the public what they can be expected to do for the next
five years, so they have forecasts prepared.

These forecasts

are prepared, based on I am not quite sure what.

They aren’t

feasibility studies, but they are prepared for companies hav
ing no previous experience.
Whoever is involved with this kind of forecast should
be bound by the same rules and guided by the same guidance
that this Committee is going to present, and all I am suggest
ing is that instead of accountants, qualified and capable and
competent as they are, going their own ways in feasibility
studies or in forecasts, that they should be all in the same
boat with a standard approach to all of these things.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
hit upon today’s hot issue.

It seems to me you guys have
I have more questions from the

floor than I can use, and I am going to restrict myself to
two more, and then let you go.
the attitude of management.

One of these has to do with

Our written input on the subject

of forecasting has about a fifty-fifty split on the reasons
why it should not be used.

Some say that management will al

ways make so conservative a forecast that they can always
better it.

The other objectors say that they will make a

highly-nonconservative forecast in order, hopefully, to improve
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their stock position.

So the question really boils down to

"Is it your position, or in your judgment, would the establish
ment of standards and the requirement, as an objective, of pub
lishing forecasts with some degree of surveillance improve the
circumstances, as we presently find them?"
MR. ROBERT FERST:

Bob, I think your question as to

which way management should go was raised by Professor Davidson
a little while ago.

It’s a question of whether the bottle is

half-full or half-empty.
ways.

You will have management going both

But there is no question in our minds that if you have

standards with someone looking over your shoulder, you will
get a fairer view than either by puffing it up or blowing it
down.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
pieces.

Then the final question, in two

The first has to do with updating, which I think you

have largely answered; you have presumed periodic updates, and,
since even the federal government has come around to a periodic
updating of its budget, I can only presume that this, in his
tory, might be as forward-looking.
MR. ROBERT FERST:
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
"What about cost?"

Would you agree with that?

I agree with that.
The final question is, then,

In all our objectives, we have to concern

ourselves with the cost-benefit ratio.
touched upon this:

I presume you have

that, really, management already have

forecasts internally, and all you are asking for is publica
tion.

But nonetheless, it would be a different kind of use,

and what is your judgment about incremental costs in this
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procedure should it be required?
MR. STANLEY FERST:
costs.

Well there will be incremental

I don’t think for the purpose of this Study Group’s

report that this has to really be a major item for it to con
sider at this time.

I think that this report will ultimately

be long-range, as most of your most recent works have been,
up to date, and I think we will have to grow up to whatever
the costs will be.
MR. CHAZEN:

Well all of us, I am sure, have con

ducted audits from time to time, and if we were to consider
this as merely a part of the cost of the audit functions, the
costs will be not as prohibitively high as the cost of the
end product we expect to arrive at.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

We think the entire group would

be unanimous in saying that anything we come out with by way
of an objective cannot be considered apart from implementation
problems.

And I think I might also say for the Group that we

are constantly concerned about how much cost can be put upon
the business community in order to accomplish objectives, how
ever desirable.
Well, thank you very much for a spirited and lively
discussion.

We are now going to hear from Donald Etra, from

the Corporate Accountability Research Group.

Donald, if you

care to say anything about your group, by way of background
information...
MR. DONALD ETRA (Corporate Accountability Research
Group):

The Corporate Accountability Research Group is a
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public interest research group, working down in Washington,
organized by Ralph Nader.

The Corporate Accountability Re

search Group feels that a primary objective of the accounting
profession should be to serve the public.

By serving the pub

lic, we feel that accountants should be responsive to an audi
ence which is comprised not only of shareholders and creditors,
but also labor, which is interested in knowing whether it’s
getting a fair share of profits; consumers, who want to know
if they are paying an equitable price for goods; the govern
ment; and scholars as well.

And, therefore, we ask the account

ing profession that, when it comes down to a choice of the new
Financial Accounting Standards Board, that the new FASB should
be representative of all the interest groups.

We feel in

order to serve the public the accountant must be independent,
and in order to be independent we do not feel it possible both
to give advice and then to evaluate the results of having fol
lowed that advice.

Therefore we would like to propose that

the major accounting firms and all accounting firms divest
themselves of their management consulting services.

At the

very least we feel that if an accounting firm performs both
consulting services and accounting service for the same cor
poration, that fact should be stated in the accountant’s cer
tification, and the Corporate Accountability Research Group is
prepared to propose that to the Securities and Exchange Com
mission.

If you do both services, at least state it.

In the

best of all possible worlds, the accountant’s function should
be restricted to accounting and not management consulting.
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We feel that accountants can further serve the public
by joining in the fight for greater corporate disclosure.
These types of disclosure should include product-line report
ing:

how well does a large conglomerate do on a department-by

department or company-by-company basis?
longer kid ourselves.
internally.

We think we should no

This information certainly is available

As many of the gentlemen described this morning,

if one person is in charge of a department and he doesn’t know
how profitably that department is doing, he is not going to be
around too long.

We feel that corporate disclosure should also

include items like product-safety data.

This might be the

area of social cost-accounting, but it’s an area of social cost
accounting which is easily quantifiable.

Have the products

which a company produces been successful on the market, or
have these products caused considerable consumer injury?

I

think this is material, not only in the humanitarian sense but
also in a concept of pure profit, because if a Ford Motor Com
pany produces a defective car that causes "X" number of acci
dents per year, I think the shareholders have a right to know
that, and that information properly should be found in a fi
nancial statement in a corporation’s annual report.
We feel that accountants and the accounting profes
sion should recognize some of the newer concerns of your con
stituency, that is, the public.

This includes environmental

concerns, concerns of whether the corporation is being a good
citizen or whether the corporation is embarking on a program
of indiscriminate pollution.

If this type of information
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might be too bulky to be found in an annual report, then at
least state what information is available.
Before the Securities and Exchange Commission this month
is a proposal that the 10-K Form should state what’s in the
10-K that isn’t in the annual report.

We feel that there is

greater necessity for telling the shareholders what’s in the
10-K Form filed with the government that isn’t in the annual
report, and more importantly, why that information isn’t being
given to the shareholder.
We feel that financial statements should be under
standable not only to the trained user.

There are thirty mill

ion investors in this c o u n t r y ,
and I think if we restrict that
group to what was phrased this morning as the "trained user,"
the function of accountants would be limited to maybe a hand
ful of people beyond the people in the room today.
One way to make the statement understandable is to
eliminate unnecessary jargon:
through methods."

words like "pooling" or "flow

Fine, we understand them.

But for a layman

I am not so sure these words convey their real meaning.

If

the jargon is necessary for ease of e x p r e s s i o n ,
at least state
somewhere on the financial statement what these expressions
mean.
In order for financial statements to be understand
able, we feel that there must be a greater degree of compara
bility between the financial statements of various firms,
especially statements of firms in the same industry of compar
able size.

In order for them to be comparable, we recommend
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uniform accounting principles.

By that is meant that there

should not he more than one method to describe the same econo
mic event, without justification.

That is, the burden should

be shifted to corporate management to justify why a method was
chosen rather than the present situation where five or six
alternate accounting methods are available, and management can
choose at will which method it wants to use.
We feel that the accounting profession, the private
profession, should take note of the Cost Accounting Standards
Board which, along with the General Accounting Office, com
pleted a two-year study on the feasibility of uniform cost
accounting standards for one segment of the economy--defense
contractors.

The conclusion of that study was that if uniform

accounting principles were implemented, the private taxpayer
would save two billion dollars because defense contractors
would have to state the accounting methods they used; they’d
have to use uniform principles; and they could not get away
with some of the practices they were indulging in— specifically,
things like double-accounting.

"Double-accounting” means that

if something costs a manufacturer twenty-three cents, charge
the consumer forty-six cents, because, say, twenty-three cents
is the direct cost, twenty-three cents for indirect costs, and
just forget to tell him that those indirect costs refer to the
same thing as the direct costs.
Therefore, we feel that uniform cost accounting and
uniform accounting principles are necessary.

Specifically, in

areas such as inventory valuation and depreciation, we feel it
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is very important for accounting rules to reflect reality.

We

ask that every accounting opinion, every former APB opinion
and every new opinion of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board he subjected to two tests:

firstly, a common-sense test;

does the opinion, does the accounting rule describe an economic
event which happened? Or is it something like what’s known in
the law field as a legal fiction? It didn’t happen, but we’ll
call it that, anyway.
If an accounting rule, an opinion, does not meet a
common-sense test, then we feel that opinion is not valid.

We

further feel that every accounting opinion should be submitted
to a functional test:

will the use of that rule change the

behavior of the firms which use it?

If so, we feel that the

accounting profession must take responsibility for that changed
behavior.
To give an example, let’s subject the APB’s Opinion

16, referring to pooling techniques, to both the common-sense
test and the functional test:

does it describe what happened?

Will the rule change the behavior of those who use it?

Well

as you know, if one uses the pooling technique one can carry
over the historical cost basis of the acquired firm, adding
the historical cost to one’s own balance sheet.

In simple

terms, if a company is carrying its old assets at five million
dollars, although worth ten million dollars, and the new firm
has assets of ten million, we can get a result that "ten plus
ten equal fifteen."
Now if I had a trained mind, I guess I could under-
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stand how ten plus ten equals fifteen.

But when the layman

reading the financial statements comes across something like
pooling, he wonders how ten plus ten equals fifteen, and I
think we ought to respect the man’s opinion that, forever,
ten plus ten equals twenty.
I think when we subject the APB Opinions to the func
tional and common-sense tests, the inadequacies of some of the
underlying rules will be uncovered--specifically, the use of
historical costs.

It was very interesting to read the statement

of Ernst and Ernst stating that historical costs provide satis
factorily current data.

Well, that’s good to hear--I just hope

Ernst and Ernst didn’t try to get on the subway this morning
and pay only fifteen cents for a token now worth thirty five
cents, and I do hope Ernst & Ernst has come this afternoon and
will pass out cigars under the assumption that cigars still
cost five cents.
In short, historical costs should be part of the
accounting profession’s history, and not something which is
still a viable technique in the Twentieth Century.

We feel

that the exciting challenges of the accounting profession lie
in the new areas, not areas of trying to figure out how many
different ways there are to describe the same event, but areas
to develop new interpretive analyses to describe the type of
social concerns that are expressed within the population.
Are these concerns real?

First National City Bank

just completed a study showing that shareholders would sacri
fice 10% of returns if they could see that the moneys were
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invested in companies that were good social citizens, companies
that did not pollute, companies involved in inner-city projects.
Take, for example, Chase Manhattan Bank’s new annual report,
which has a whole section on social cost-accounting, describing
the Bank's involvement in New York City.

According to David

Rockefeller, "Everyone is always going to agree that ’all
banks are bad,’ but at least if we have a social sector in our
annual report, we will be the ’least baddest’."
Are social cost-accounting concepts quantifiable?
Yes, in many cases, such as information on product safety.
That’s quantifiable--how many claims have been brought against
the company in a particular year.
I think if annual reports and if financial statements
dealt with some of these social issues, maybe more people would
open their envelopes when the annual report reaches their homes.
I know that in the Corporate Accountability Research Group we
open every envelope with an annual report.

We are so fed up

because those reports don’t state the amount of deaths caused
because the company wasn’t following occupational health and
safety guidelines.
Just recently we put out our own annual report of a
company putting out its own annual report, itself.

Our annual

report dealt with the type of pollution the company is foisting
on its communities, with the types of health and safety regula
tions the corporation is avoiding, and I think the shareholders
perhaps learned just as much from our annual report as from the
annual report of the company that's actually involved.
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We see as an exciting challenge for the accounting
profession the development of the format of an impact state
ment to he included in every corporation’s financial report,
or every corporation’s annual report.

These impact statements

could deal with the environmental impact of corporations, simi
lar to the requirements in the National Environmental Policy
Act requiring environmental impact statements of federal agen
cies.
So these are some of the new projects of accountants.
I ’d like to close with the suggestion that more accountants
get into the field of public interest accountancy, as the
other professions:

medicine, where doctors serve time in

clinics; law, where there are public interest law firms and
legal aid societies.

Similarly, accountants should take their

place in the professions that do devote time to social interest
and to public concerns.

Certain law firms around the nation

are organized on a public interest basis.

Every student, in

particular states, increases his tuition three dollars.

This

money is pooled and some of these funds have come up to about
two hundred thousand dollars, which can fund a five or six man
public interest law firm.
We suggest that accountants get into the same type
of activity, as we heard earlier this afternoon.
tants for the Public.

Why not?

The Accoun

Each state accounting society

should try to organize a public-interest accounting firm.
These accounting firms could be the renegades of the industry
but could also be the vanguards of the industry, to point new
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directions and serve the public interest.
Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
lucid and good presentation.

Thank you, Mr. Etra--a very
I would like to put into the

record that a significant number of the larger state societies,
as distinct from the American Institute, do now have what might
be called the equivalent of a public interest accounting firm,
especially and particularly designed, however, for assistance,
both in the sense of auditing and management services to minor
ity groups.

I think we did come along late to our misfortune,

but I think we have started this route, and I fully agree with
your position that we have not done enough.
I have two questions for you before we open this up.
Do you happen to be familiar with the recent CED report on the
social responsibility of business corporations?
MR. ETRA:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Does your group take a neutral,

positive or negative position about the general line of this
report?
MR. ETRA:

Could you be specific as to the proposals

in the report?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well, it kind of says we should

be going further, but it doesn’t get very explicit, and I was
just trying to relate it, if you happened to be familiar with
the report, to...
MR. ETRA:
of explicitness.

We feel there should be a definite degree

For instance, a corporation in making a move
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that would affect the environment has to file a report with a
federal agency.

We feel that a summary of that report should

be in the corporation’s annual report.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. ETRA:

Yes?

We also want to emphasize that we are

aware that technologies are present to make these possible.
For instance, pollution data is quantifiable, and with some
degree of interpretation in prose that would be possible.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So what you are saying is that

you do not disagree with the philosophy?
MR. ETRA:

No, we want to go further.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. ETRA:

You want to go further?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So that there is more informa

tion to the public?
MR. ETRA:

Yes, to the public.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

That brings me to my second

question which I think underlays a number of things you have
said, and between you and David Herwitz maybe you can help me
out a little bit here.

Much of what you ask for by way of

information to the public raises the question about what in
formation is a private good and what information is a public
good, in my lay version of the legal sense of those words.
Are you saying that there are really no restrictions
whatsoever on information that a management might be required
to release?
MR. ETRA:

Management should have the burden of show-
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ing why the restriction should he present.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

If you were a manager, what

would be the line you would draw on disclosure of such infor
mation?
MR. ETRA:

That if I had to disclose it I would not

initially develop it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. ETRA:

If you "had to disclose it"?

The so-called trade-secrets doctrine.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. ETRA:

I see.

However, I would like to emphasize we do

feel the trade-secrets doctrine has been abused by private
industry.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

It’s used as a rationalization,

in your view?
MR. ETRA:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

All right, let’s move, then,

for an analogy, over to a hospital.

Typically, hospitals have

an internal "tissue committee," whereby a group of doctors, in
effect, appraise the validity of surgery done by each.

Should

that kind of information be in the public domain, or should
that be proprietary to the hospital and doctors involved?
MR. ETRA:

I am not sure I follow the gist of the

question--what information:

the vote of the doctors?

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

The vote of the doctors.

Let

us say that a particular tissue committee finds that 10% of
the appendectomies performed during the year were inappropriate
and should not have been done.

Is that a matter of public

2.54

information?
MR. ETRA:
think it should he.

Definitely, definitely.

I definitely

If I were considering an appendectomy I

certainly would take that into consideration.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Would you carry that analogy,

which may not he apt, over to business?

Your line of distinc

tion about public information is extreme.
MR. ETRA:

Before I buy a Ford, I want to know if

they are putting on a five-dollar bracket, so I have a hundred
miles before I know my car will collapse before fixing my car.
MR. WESTON:

Will you clarify a position of your re

port on page 11 where you deal with the functional versus
common-sense test in terms of financial reporting.

To return

to pooling in your example you used earlier, supposing it were
decided that poolings, in fact, did not pass the common-sense
test; therefore, they should be outlawed.

Should we then,

under your idea of a functional test, examine the behavior of
industry and determine that mergers would then not take place
and evaluate that from a social-good...
MR. ETRA:

I think an opinion must pass both tests

before it becomes an opinion.

What sometimes happens is that

it might pass the common-sense test, but not enough thought
has been put into the functional test.

For instance, in

Mr. Mautz’ recent article in the Harvard Business Review, he
said that if the pooling opinion went further, imposing a size
test, or eliminating pooling as a viable technique, it would
do more to curb the rampant merger movement of the Sixties
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than anything that Justice or the Federal Trade Commission
could do.
Now considering this from an antitrust point of
view, retaining a society where competition exists, where
people have the opportunity to buy goods at reasonable prices,
where grades are determined by quality, not simply because it’s
only one manufacturer, I think if accountants are to go on to
pass an opinion, that that is going to have to have a behav
ioral effect.

Accountants must take the responsibility for

that behavioral effect, or cop

out to the Federal Trade Com

mission.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

How would accountants decide

which is a proper social goal, in that example?

Should we

decide whether mergers are good or bad— or, who decides?
MR. ETRA:

I think you have to at least take it

into consideration.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But, how do we decide whether

mergers are good or bad?
MR. ETRA:

You would trace the history of mergers

in this country and you would see what would happen when you
have competitive industries as opposed to when you have mono
lithic industries.

Incidentally, there are colleges and uni

versities that have put out studies.

I think these should be

taken under consideration.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

This is probably one of the

few papers urging that an objective of accounting should look
at the results on society, rather than just reflecting what
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we might call the economic realities in terms of several papers,
and I am rather disturbed that you would move the accounting
profession and objectives into that subjective determination.
I think it's fraught with tremendous danger.
MR. ETRA:

It is.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD: Political goals and social goals
change almost monthly.
MR. ETRA:

The responsibility is there whether you

accept it or not.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
say by a court?

But how will that be evaluated,

Suppose the profession decided that mergers

were good, and therefore pooling would pass that test and may
not pass the common-sense test?
somehow, and then go forward.

We would then evaluate it,
I just can’t believe those two

objectives aren’t contradictory, in a way.
MR. ETRA:

Well I think the responsibility is

there, and there is no way of ducking it, in a sense, because
what you do will have an impact.

The question is, "Should you

consider that impact, or ignore it?"

My recommendation is to con

sider the impact and take the impact into account before you
make the opinion.

And as men of integrity and honest men and

intelligent men, I believe the accounting profession, as it
retains its independence, can come up to some valid judgments.
If the population as a whole feels that the accounting profes
sion has made a mistake, there is always the check of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
MR. PARKER:

I think Frank’s question is quite
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important.

You almost touched on it there at the end.

If you

asked the accounting profession to make these judgments, which
heretofore have been made in the halls of Congress or the
courts, where the people can lay hands on the deciders if they
don’t like what they are doing.

If the accounting fraternity

does something you don’t like, how can you lay hands on them?
You don't elect them, you don’t hire them, you don’t have any
thing to do with them.

And you’d let them make decisions affect

ing behavioral aspects affecting you and the general public.
Yet you have no claim on them, no way to reach them, no way to
impeach, elect or fire them?
MR. ETRA:

Things would be certainly helped a great

deal if the rule-making body were more representative.

The

point is, though, what accountants do will have an effect on
the public.

What I am asking is to consider that effect.

Everyone from Carman Blough to William Casey, in his letter,
and including the creation of the FASB last week, everyone has
always said that primarily, responsibility has lain with the
accountant.
MR. PARKER:

For determining accounting principles,

not behavioral results!
MR. ETRA:

They are inextricably tied together.

If

you are going to determine principles, the principles will have
an effect, and I am asking you to consider the effect.

Don't

just make the principle without considering what the principle
is going to do.
MR. PARKER:

I have a question, too, on your common-
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sense test when you apply it to pooling.
sial a subject as there can be.

This is as controver

There have been pretty good

lines of argument advanced on both sides.

Yet, you’d rather

conclude that one of them does pass the common-sense test and
the other one does not.

How can you do this so quickly?

What

tells you that one is "common sense" and one is not?
MR. ETRA:
opinion.

That would have to be my own personal

However, I would subject that opinion to a lay test

with that rather simplified example:

does ten and ten equal

twenty or fifteen?
MR. PARKER:

Well this is where I began to get lost,

because what does the first "ten" apply to, and what does the
other "ten" apply to, and where does the "fifteen" come from?
I hear the numbers, but I don’t know what they apply to.
MR. ETRA:

"Ten" would be the value of the acquired

firm’s assets; "ten" would also be the...
MR. PARKER:
MR. ETRA:
MR. PARKER:
MR. ETRA:
MR. PARKER:
MR. ETRA:
MR. PARKER:
MR. ETRA:
MR. PARKER:
MR. ETRA:
MR. PARKER:

The value measured how?
Current value.
How measured?
Measured?

Market value.

But no cash ever flowed to reflect that.
It’s the value of the stock which flows.
But who ever paid for it?
Excuse me?
Who ever paid for it?
The acquiring firm!
They didn’t pay for it; they just issued
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the paper stock certificates.
MR. ETRA:

Well I think now we are quibbling about

terminology and one specific opinion, but I think that the main
gist of my argument is that all opinions should be subjected to
this test.

Perhaps similar dialogues like we are having now

would perhaps encourage better opinions.
MR. GELLEIN:

Mr. Etra, I've got to return to the

matter of motivation, behavior and the like.

Up to now we

have talked about it in terms of your saying the accountant
ought to consider the impact upon behavior.
it around.

I've got to turn

Should accounting objectives be so stated as to

reflect the accomplishments of a political, economic or social
purpose?

And let me be specific without getting completely

technical.

Let's suppose that a certain accounting method for

most corporations would cause income to be reported at a higher
level than some other method.

Suppose that it should be de

cided that in order to goose up the economy, it being sort of
low now, it would be good to have these companies reporting
this higher income because it would have the psychological
effect of building up confidence of the people in the state of
the economy.
Questions.

Should it be an objective of accounting

to say that, in those circumstances that method should be
adopted which has that result?
opposite side of it.

And, of course, there is the

If you want to dampen things, then you'd

go to another accounting method because reported income would
be lower.
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My question is, "Should this be a part of the ob
jectives of accounting?"
MR. ETRA:

No.

MR. GELLEIN:

I am glad that’s in the record!

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Sid?

I wonder if some of the things that

you seek aren’t already included in what is done and may only
require some disaggregation and perhaps some further reporting.
With regard to reports of pollution, it is my understanding
that the 10-K Form now does require reports of where governmental
bodies have proceeded against a firm on environmental questions.
MR. ETRA:

Yes, if it’s embodied in a lawsuit type

of action.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Well, yes.

So then, certainly

where lawsuit actions or legal proceedings have been instituted
those are already included in the 10-K, and I suppose under the
new Securities and Exchange Commission rule if it were not included
in the financial report, that would have to be disclosed.

So,

effectively, we are accomplishing that goal.
With regard to the reporting of injuries and deaths
and things of that sort, you know determination of causation is not
an easy process, and I suppose there is something to be said
for waiting until there is legal proof before admitting guilt
in such things.

If the financial statement were to be dis

aggregated to have separate volume reporting to the extent of
damages or deaths to users of property, would that meet your
need, or would you like to go beyond that, to cases not yet
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adjudicated?
MR. ETRA:
ways of presentation.

I think there can he several alternate
One might require a corporation to state

how many letters of complaint you have received about a specific
model car, or how many lawsuits you have incurred because of
liability, or how much money has an inadequately tested product
caused to be paid out in settlement claims because of the lia
bility of a product. In terms of the information being avail
able, there is a tremendous lack of information, but I think
this would force certain companies to come clean.

For instance,

before deaths occurred on the highway a lot of the major auto
companies— and we have verification of these figures— received
complaints and were aware of defects in their products and yet
were not willing to be honest enough to tell the public, to
tell their shareholders and to tell the consumers that these
products are causing deaths and severe accidents on the highways.
If you required them to put into their annual re
ports how many letters of complaint they have received about
these cars, I think it would tell the shareholders a lot, tell
the consumers a lot, and maybe it would cut down further on
highway accidents.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

So that in essence you are asking

in addition to what we now do, to indicate the number of let
ters of complaint we received...
MR. ETRA:

That would be one alternative.

DEAN DAVIDSON:
MR. ETRA:

Yes.

...about the problem?

2.62

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Time for one more question.

Reed Parker.
MR. PARKER:

Just a short one.

On page 4 you have

indicated you are advocating that management be required to
change accounting firms, I think, every four years, is it?
MR. ETRA:
MR. PARKER:

Yes.
I am not an accountant, so maybe I can

ask this question easier.

It seems to me if I were the manager

of a company and I was quite nefarious, and I looked out at the
various accounting firms and said, "Aha— each one of those soand-so’s has got to get a whole new list of clients at the end
of every fourth year— boy, am I going to make them compete, to
see which one o f them will go the farthest to satisfy me and to
bend my earnings statements the way I want them.

"And I can

watch how they work over the four-year period before I have to
switch, and find out from my brothers which one of them gives
the most, and that’s the one I am going to hire!"
Wouldn't this have exactly the opposite...
MR. ETRA:

I would hope the American Institute of

Certified Public Accountants would have enough safeguards so
bending wouldn’t be possible.
MR. PARKER:

You force them to change every four

years.
MR. ETRA:
gestion.

I think this was an extreme type of sug

As stated in the suggestion, it would end certain

entangling alliances and would have the effect of requiring
the accounting firms to ask leading questions, which sometimes,
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because accounting firms are the long-term clients of manage
ment. they don’t ask.

Questions such as "Is there really oil

in the salad tank," or "What’s in your inventory?"
MR. PARKER:

Furthermore, I attempted to bring out

the fact that if I could change every four years, I could find
the one that wouldn’t even know where to find the salad-oil
tank in four years, whereas, the other one that’s been around
too long knows better.
MR. ETRA:

I would hope the certification of that

company would be in question.
DEAN EDWARDS:

In the light of your paper and the

remarks that you have made, I ’d like to ask, whose financial
statements are they, in your opinion, and who has the primary
responsibility for those statements, and, secondly, what are
the practical methods of accounting, if any, in the context of
your remarks?
MR. ETRA:
who participate
tants.

I think the liability extends to all those

in their preparation--both management and accoun

And I think we will have to wait and see what the Se

curities and Exchange Commission does in terms of the liability of
the attorney who is participating as well.

In terms of the

parameters, I think that’s stated in my statement of objectives
of accounting principles, which is that the accounting should
provide to the public an understandable presentation of a cor
poration's financial progress and social impact.
DEAN EDWARDS:

In answer to the first question, are
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you saying we, you and I, accountants?

Do you mean the internal

accountant in the firm or do you mean both the internal accoun
tant and the external auditor?
MR. ETRA:
auditor.

Both internal accountant and external

And I do concur with the opinion in the Continental

Vending case that accountants should not only be responsible
for adhering to generally accepted accounting principles but
should be held to a higher standard of fair presentation.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But in order to clarify this

for the record even further, Mr. Etra, the initial responsibil
ity for the preparation of the statement would be the internal
accountant’s responsibility, and then you are adding on to that
the participation of the external lawyer, the external accoun
tant, and so forth.

That was the thrust of your...

DEAN EDWARDS:
MR. ETRA:

That was the thrust of my question.

Yes for each stage of its preparation,

those who have participated in that stage should be liable, as
well as those personnel who find what went on in the other
stages should be responsible for those stages as well.

I don’t

think at any stage of the game, one individual, if he does have
information about what happened in internal accounting, should
be able to disclaim liability.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. ETRA:

Thank you very much.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Very well done.

Thank you.

Mr. Walter, of the US Financial Corporation?
MR. R. H. WALTER (US Financial Corporation):
you.

Thank
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Mr. Walter represents a company

which is one of the relatively few companies submitting a sep
arate presentation, for which we are quite grateful, and he has
come from California to do it.
MR. WALTER:

Thank you very much.

Well Mr. Chairman

and members of the Committee and guests, I appreciate this op
portunity but feel somewhat like the fish out of water.

But in

listening to the immediately prior discussion, I can’t start
with the basic judgment that all accountants and all business
men are dishonest.

I think we have to start with the basis

that all people are fundamentally honest and responsible, and
then try to catch the culprits that aren’t, but do it on an ob
jective basis and not a subjective basis, if we are all to sur
vive.

But in selection of accountants, I enjoyed that little

byplay between Dean Edwards and the prior speaker.
tell a little joke here if I may.

And I will

You talk about a board of

directors that was picking the accountants, and in general the
public accountants are picked not by management but rather by
the board, or by the shareholders, or recommended by the board
and then selected by the shareholders.
The story goes about the board of directors that was
considering a new accounting firm, and they had three firms vy
ing for this position or this task, and they called the first
one in and asked them a simple question, "What is two and two?"
He said, "Four."
"Dismissed!"
They called the next one in; the same thing occurred.
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The third one came in, and they said, "What is two and two?”
and he said, "What did you have in mind?"

So, I guess that’s

where he got the job!
I think we have many things that show that the obli
gation of management is to all of the shareholders and the in
vestors, whether they be creditor investors or whether they be
equity investors.

I think the auditor’s position, or the cer

tified public accountant’s position is to validate that that is
the true objective.

I think we have to start from a point in

order to determine where we will go, and so we state US Finan
cial’s position, and it is that it holds the view that the
present objectives of financial statements meet the require
ments of the various users to whom financial statements are
directed.
This view is predicated, however, upon full and fair
disclosure--and I really mean full and fair.

I mean more dis

closure, not less, and perhaps that’s by virtue of the detailed
footnote to the financial statement, and I would fully sub
scribe to the fact that if there is a question, then put it in
the footnote, and the judgment of the shareholders, investors,
will ultimately take care of that.
We do not believe that drastic changes in the account
ing rules and methods are dictated, but rather that continuing
modifications evolving to meet the changing needs of users of
financial statements are what is necessary.

It is our belief

that all business must operate using forecasts which are the
result of business planning.

Those forecasts are affirmations
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or commitments, if you will, of the managers who forecast.

And

incidentally, the only forecasts worth a damn are those made by
the line managers, not by some statistical branch of the firm
so those forecasts are affirmations of the managers who
forecast to perform as necessary to meet the business objectives
of those forecasts.
Such plans and forecasts must certainly change and
constantly change to meet the changing conditions over which a
company or its managers have little or no control— and, gener
ally, no control.

To supply planning and forecasting data to

users of financial statements would, in our opinion, be of
little use, and in fact would be self-serving to a point where
abuses would occur because of the degree of difference in the
manner in which people employ their mental processes in the
function of planning.

To get right down to the honesty of it,

you can then say honesty is a degree thing; morality is a degree
thing, or is measured by degrees; ethics are, somewhat, a fixed
standard.

So maybe what we should have is a statement of the

ethics plan that the business wants to follow, and I think that
should be management's statement, not that of the certified
public

accountant.
Our comments at these hearings today are done by

outline, which you have before you, and I have tried to cate
gorize the classes or types of users of financial statements
who use the statements for decision making.

We have the large

investor, and he, of course, does a pretty thorough investiga
tion and questions the footnotes and is privileged to ask for
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other questions to he answered.

We have the small investor,

and he is essentially the user who may not understand in detail
what all of this is about; certainly, he cannot understand the
accounting principles/rules.

In fact, we think we do sometimes,

but I am not sure that we do always, and I think those small
users need to rely on experts for their advice.

That could be

the broker; the investment banker; it could be some friend who
is skilled in the analysis of companies, and so forth.

They

should not just accept the word of mouth, unless they believe
in the person giving the advice.
So I raise the question, "Is that small investor
capable of understanding all of these things that we talk about
and the rules that we have to meet?”

And, if you want some

real fun, then try to figure out the amount of tax you are sup
posed to estimate and what you are supposed to pay and the man
ner in which you are supposed to do it.

That’s a manual, writ

ten like a dictionary, and you can find every kind of meaning
in it you want to look for.
We have the banking and lending institutions, and I
really believe they should make their own credit calls, their
own analyses and make their commitments based on their own re
search, not special reports made by certified public accountants.
I think it’s management’s job to provide them with the necessary
data that they need and validate that data if they are to become
a creditor, and I would shudder to think that a lender would
say "I make this loan because of your auditor’s certification.”
The institutional investor’s needs are for a longer

2.69

period of time; generally, he is the funded-debt type of lender,
or the debt with an equity consideration or kicker on it.
has a different criterion.

He

He must meet the management, he

must be very familiar with the day-to-day operations and the
decision making process of that management.
And, underwriters who go to the public, both for
equity sale and for private placement of funded debt or conver
tibles privately placed, must review management’s objectives,
their controls and their past performance.

They must also look

at the internal forecasting processes of managements and see
how closely they come to meeting their objectives or their
goals.

He must satisfy himself as to the need for that equity

which is being sold or for the debt placement.
Now the underwriting fee is directly related to the
risk that is inherent in making the offering to the public. He
is charging for it.

Let the underwriter put it on the line.

And, if he doesn’t believe in it, then he should not bring it
to the public.
We have the analysts, which is the sixth class.
There are different kinds of analysts, and they have different
kinds of needs.

W e have the independent analyst who needs to

be pretty careful because he sells his professional output to
others upon which they base their investment decision.

We

have the captive analyst who is captive to the brokerage house.
And on that one, I think anybody that accepts his recommenda
tion has to ask a further question, "How many shares of stock
does this firm have, how much short are they in the stock,
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what is their position, are they facing another underwriting at
a point downstream for the client whose stock they are recom
mending?"

I think that’s the one where you have to raise the

question, and I think that is not up to the accountant or even
management to make that decision.
And then you have the institutional investor, and
that is an in-house type of analysis which has to he based on
their own investigation.
Now in conclusion, on this phase, then, I think the
present form and content of financial statements adequately
serves each type of user’s needs as a bona fide point of de
parture for his own research.

It appears to us to be inadvis

able to supply data that each user of financial statements
needs for his own particular requirements.

There appears to

be no good reason that data should be supplied voluntarily by
professionals beyond the present requirements.

In other words,

I do not want accountants validating management’s forecasts
unless they are prepared to get on the hook and say, "Yes, we
agree with these assumptions and that, if you follow these
assumptions and you do what you forecast, then we will treat in
historical accounting the matters or the transactions in their
booking of profit and their effect on financial statements of
that company in the manner in which they were forecast."

In

that case, we are going to start five-year forecasts tomorrow
because we want to see the people committed.

If there is such

a commitment, then management can meet the schedule because
they know by what rules they play.

If there is no such commit
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ment that the assumptions are valid and will he followed, not
withstanding subsequent rule-change, then let’s not have the
forecasts.
Now there appears to be no good reason that data
should be supplied voluntarily by professionals beyond present
requirements.

This could create a further legal liability.

Each user of a financial statement should seek and obtain, if
possible, his own additional data as necessary to meet his
particular degree of risk inherent to the class of investment
which he will make.

I think the real estate industry is one

that is particularly vulnerable to a lack of standards.

Why?

Because it ’s an individual entrepreneur type of business where
individual creation, innovativeness, innovation, if you will,
of the kinds of transactions they get into creates the problem.
Let’s talk about the dimensions of that.
The real estate industry is one deserving some con
sideration as to some kinds of standards and rules fitting
particularly to it.

If you consider that the construction in

dustry in the United States is equal to about 10% of the gross
national product, and about half of that is in the shelter part,
or the housing part that I am primarily concerned with, then
you have 5% or fifty billion dollars as the share of the gross
national product per annum.

Currently the industry is frag

mented and this is the very reason that it needs lots of help.
The top three producers, last year— 1971 calendar year, that
is— would have produced about a 2 to 2½% share of market of the
fifty-billion market.

The auto industry, on the other hand,
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has General Motors with about 55% of that market.

General

Motors, Ford and Chrysler have more than 80% .
It is possible, in our belief, that over the next
five years, that a firm committed to the shelter industry or
the production of housing and its related needs, that relate
to the housing and filling of people’s need for living, will
probably hit a 5% share of market.
task of raising a lot of money.

That requires a very major

That 5% share of market re

lated to today’s economic norms, assuming no further inflation,
would mean two and a half billion dollars of volume; it would
mean that it would require the raising of over two hundred and
fifty million dollars per month by one firm for permanent fi
nancing of the users of their product--housing.
In order to do this job, it is vital that credibil
ity be brought to our industry because it is only through the
confidence of the investor that we can adequately raise or
approach the raising of the kind of money that is needed.

I

do not believe that government can continue to underwrite and
have special programs and do all of the other things that it’s
doing and still support housing to the extent that it has.

I

believe that it’s a challenge to the private sector to continue
to stress the raising of more of its own money, which is the
key commodity in housing.

In order to do that, we must have

rules and we must have the proper supporting of the accounting
profession to lend credibility to our firms’ activities if we
are to have the investor confidence to raise that money.
I want to come back to the forecasting process.

It
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requires constant updating and it is a perpetual process.

I

don't think it's something you do by quarters; I think it's
something that you amend, day to day, if you are operating
properly.

I think that forecasts are best used by senior man

agement to measure the timeliness and degree of performance of
subordinates.

And again, I think that the total use by the

investors vary so widely that it is impossible in one set of
financial statements to provide everything necessary to all
people; you can't be all things to all people.
I think that the publishing of forecasts which could
go off appreciably by influences beyond the control of manage
ment could eventually create disenchantment, thereby eroding
considerably the investor confidence and faith in business.

I

think publication of an official forecast could reveal corpor
ate strategy to competitors.

And you may say, "Well, it's

right socially that you should tell everybody else what you are
doing."

But I think if somebody has authored or innovated a

new plan or approach to an industry or new product they should
be privileged to enjoy the fruits of their innovativeness.
Now I think if these kinds of forecasts are required,
then the disclaimer would be so extensive to protect from legal
liability both management, corporate board and certified public
accountants, that they would have little value.

It would force

management to estimate on a conservative basis.

If you wanted

to be unscrupulous and you had a new company which was a ro
mance stock, let's call it, I suppose you might make a bullish
forecast and thereby profit, and thereby undo or outcompete
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I think history is the stuff business is made of;
it's the curve of performance of management.

And if you stay

at it long enough, the public will respect that and will re
ward you accordingly, based upon historical performance.
Now some general criticisms or suggestions.

I have

always searched and have had great fun with this, as Messrs.
Edwards, Gellein and Trueblood know.

I always say, "Define

'generally accepted accounting principles'."
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

We thought Frank took care of

you, on that!
MR. WALTER:

Well he did, almost.

It is an opinion.

And then we get down to the next thing, where you say in your
covering letter, "In our opinion, this fairly presents the po
sition of the company."

Well, why don't we add one more thing

and say, "In our opinion, under the present management..." and
then why not state that management, "We have viewed management's
business plans and considering the external environmental changes
and external influences, they have done well in the performance
of their business plans," again, "in our opinion."
I think the footnotes for financial statements
should not be just cold, canned, after-the-fact conclusions be
cause they often create more questions than they answer.

So

why not have footnotes state what the managers' business rea
sons were for that judgment on that particular deal that you
are going into in the footnote?
You say, "Well, that's glossing the lily."

Well
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fine--why cut the lily off at the stem?

Let it bloom and state

why it was, and state that it was the objective and whether it
has occurred.
Now I'd like to talk a little bit about the Account
ing Principles Board Rules.

There is nobody who could make a

rule which would be totally adequate, over-all.

And I know

that some of you gentlemen here at the head table are on that
Board, and we respect you.

But there is no way that the single

rule can be universal in its application to all types and kinds
of businesses.

And if you don't believe it, let's take APB 1 5 .

All right, we run a real estate investment trust, which is a
short term mortgage lending trust.

So here comes APB 15.

For

our original issue sixty-some million dollars was paid to us on
June twenty ninth.

It was based on a share of common stock and

a share of warrant, or a warrant for a common share, as a unit.
Well, under the rules, on a straight-debt indication, our earn
ings were a dollar and a half; but, under the rules, it would
mena seventy-five cents, because of the cut in the issue price
caused by the warrants.

And, now, that's being amended.

We passed a rule, as a board of trustees, that we would
pay out 100% of the earnings thereby obviating the problem of the
dilution by the warrant.

How can there be dilution when the pri

mary shareholder has received the benefit of all or 100% of the
earnings of that trust?
So now we come up with a two class system in an attempt
to modify that rule.

I submit that the rule was never intended

to apply to an R-E-I-T, and I think some of the rules should
be classified as to what industries or what kinds of business
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they do apply.

Sixteen was commented on at prior meet

ings, and I won’t comment on that.

I think that we lost some

thing in business when we literally were forced to issue only
one class of common stock for a pooling-of-interest kind of
merger.

I would submit, there could only be one real reason

for a merger and that’s not profit or assets perhaps, but
rather the management of the company being acquired.

Now it

could be an assets play, and there may be a case where manage
ment had adequate capability to employ those assets for profit
for shareholders.

I think that, on Eighteen, that’s one of my

methods, because, under the equity, one-line method of report
ing revenues from joint ventures--I’d like to take the extremely
ridiculous case and say that I form a corporation, and I enter
only joint ventures; therefore, my P&L would have a one-line
entry, "Net profit," or "Net earnings from joint ventures."
We went to the Securities and Exchange Commission a
year and a half ago because we were involved substantially in
joint ventures.

We asked that we be permitted to include our

share of revenues from joint ventures in our reserves reported
to shareholders, the reason being that we operate on our own
and we also operate through joint ventures.

And our net, bot

tom-line percentage of profits as related to gross revenues
jumped all over the place, depending upon whether the income
was on one line, from joint ventures, or wasn’t stated.
The Securities and Exchange Commission agreed that we
more adequately disclosed to the shareholders if we picked up
our shares of revenues.

So notwithstanding APB Eighteen, we
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have followed that practice, under special sanction from the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Again, we say that the real estate industry has great
needs.

The reason, again, is the uniqueness because of the

variety of transactions.

They are not Just manufacturing wid

gets; they are doing many things and each deal varies.

The

problem really is when to recognize or realize the income; be
cause of the great variety of transactions, it becomes extremely
difficult. I wish that we could find rules wherein we would
recognize profit when the economic risk truly passes.

Or

where we have "multi" kinds of transactions that we could do it
as suggested under your forerunner draft of the land develop
ment opinion.

When an activity is completed, then why should

we not recognize the profit?

If you are going to balance the

revenues and costs and the related income or losses therefrom,
then it would seem fair, to me, to recognize profits at the
point of completion of an activity.

That can cause lots of

complication on "What is cost, where are you going to put it."
But, assuming it’s an honest, forthright approach to it, the
deferment of costs is operationally bad, in our opinion, be
cause managers tend to lose track of what these deferments of
costs or deferred costs are, and it quite often can lead to
confusion.

So, we much prefer that all costs be written off

directly.
The allocation of deferred costs to future transac
tions or future profit reporting is mechanically difficult.
think there are tremendous challenges, and I think that we

I
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have to determine "When does form precede or superimpose itself
over substance, and when does substance overtake form," and I
say that there are times when you have a legally binding busi
ness judgment that should precede the old saw of substance that
the accountants use, and I wish we could find a new term for
that.
I would like to close this part of my presentation
by reading a quotation from Herman Bevis’ Corporate Financial
Reporting in a Competitive Economy.
The growth of the large corporation, however, has
been accompanied by the development of a remarkable
system of accounting and accountability. Its appar
ent objective has been to measure profitability and
to indicate performance, efficiency, and growth. It
is not at all farfetched to add that simultaneously
we have been developing a powerful instrument of
discipline, not only for the modern corporation,
but for large segments of Western society as well.
For when a man is obliged to make financial account
ings of his activities, the discipline becomes more
or less a part of his character and imposes on him
much higher ethical standards measured in terms of
social responsibility than if there were no reckon
ing. The highest ethical attainment is reached when
a man accepts this accountability as a challenge to
measure himself by his willingness to report fully
on the results of his own actions. Looked at in
this way, a practical observer of the corporate
scene can agree with the academicians that the ac
counting discipline works hand in hand with rising
ethical standards of the society.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much, Bob.

Now

let me start out with this kind of question, and I think it
follows upon where you left off.

When we are talking "objec

tives," we hope to be able to maintain our position that these
objectives should be overriding for the entire business commun
ity.

But the question I wanted to ask you is this--am I correct

in assuming that, in relation to your concern about the real
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estate industry, or any other particular industry, where you
talk about particular applications or unusual situations, that
you are really talking about rules and procedures which might
nonetheless fit into overriding objectives, or are you, rather,
saying that there must be a different set of objectives by
industry?
Do I make the question so complicated, you don’t
understand me?
MR. WALTER:

Yes, I think there are a set of rules

in financial reporting which can be overriding, but then I
think there are special cases, such as my REIT example of APB
Fifteen, which needs to be modified or appended to cover a
specific industry, as the exception, and I believe that those
rules should be modified for that particular business or indus
try when it occurs that there is a lacking in the overriding
rule.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well I thought that’s what you

were saying.
MR. WALTER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

And you aren’t the only witness

who is going to take that position.

It’s a quite valid position

that we obviously may not have recognized enough in the past.
I just wanted to be sure I had a clear understanding about the
level of your intention.
One other question.

Back in the early part of your

presentation, you talk about the different needs of the differ
ent users, of five or six of them...
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MR. WALTER:

Yes.

C H A I R M A N T R U E B L OOD:

ally, completely concur.

...of w h i c h I, at least p e r s o n 

The problem I have, however, is this

overriding and increasing legal concern or legal problem of
"information to one should be information to all.”

For example,

to pick up your example of the banker who needs a certain kind
of thing that maybe the small investor does not need, the prob
lem is— and, maybe Dave should comment on this— even though the
small investor doesn’t need it, is he not entitled to it?

This

kind of relates to Mr. Etra’s presentation, too.
MR. WALTER:

Yes, I think he is entitled to it. The

small shareholder, first of all, generally is not competent to
interpret.

It’s not my position to judge that, but I think you

would concede that point.

The tendency would be in the case of

forecasting, to place a blind faith in that, and thereby not
ask the appropriate questions on the basis for the forecast.
If he places blind faith in it, he would be hurt.

So here, we

are trying to protect...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Conceptually, you would take

the position that if, indeed, he did want it or had the fore
sight to ask for it, you would give it to him, as well as to
the banker or analyst?
MR. WALTER:

Yes, and I would go one step further.

I would have every analyst, whether he be one of the three
types of analysts that I alluded to or whether he would be
another type of analyst, whenever he puts out a report to a
given kind of client, also file that report with the Securities and
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Exchange Commission and that it he filed under the name of the
company that it covers.

And that way, the small shareholder

would likewise have that information available, if he so chose,
or he elects to get it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

In the same manner that one

issues an opinion, it goes to anybody asking for it?
MR. WALTER:

That’s right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
panel?

How about the rest of the

Do you have anything, Reed and Oscar?
MR. GELLEIN:

Yes, just one question, Bob.

When you

classified the users of financial statements, I notice you have
put in parenthesis over on Page Two, "for decisions.”

Are you

implying there are other users you acknowledge as having, let’s
say, a right to the information?

See, that goes back to the

first sentence...
MR. WALTER:
MR. GELLEIN:

Right.
...which says that the overriding ob

jective should lead to the requirements of the various users to
whom the financial statements are directed.
MR. WALTER:
MR. GELLEIN:

That’s right.
My question is really this— are these

the users, as you see it, to whom they are directed, the ones
listed beginning on Page Two?
MR. WALTER:

Yes they are, and I think that I could

include in these six categories predominantly all the users.
Now there might be other users.

I am not trying to eliminate

any, Mr. Gellein, but rather, state the difference in the needs
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of given users.
C H A I R M A N TRUEBLOOD:

I t h ink these six w o u l d fit the

classification we have come up with empirically, pretty well.
Sid, you had a question?
DEAN DAVIDSON:
of clarification.

Not so much a question as a matter

Did I understand you to say, in the early

part of your presentation, that if accountants would agree not
to change the rules of the game during the period of the fore
cast, that you would he in favor of forecasts?
MR. WALTER:

Well...

DEAN DAVIDSON:
MR. WALTER:

I wasn't sure.

I am not in favor of giving forecasts

to the public because of the great number of economic influ
ences and other influences that are government actions, for
instance, that are beyond management’s capability of compre
hending before they happen, and therefore, forecasts must
change.

I object to making forecasts public.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

I guess I did misunderstand you, be

cause I thought...
MR. WALTER:

Yes?

DEAN DAVIDSON:
MR. WALTER:

...you said...

I said...

DEAN DAVIDSON:

...as long as the accountants didn’t

change the ways of compiling the data...
MR. WALTER:
setting by management.

I think it’s a case of goal or objective
If we build a plan of action and we

make it public, all I am saying is that if there are to be
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forecasts, then let’s state the rules of the forecasting and
let’s live by those rules so that management can perform within
the parameters of those rules, under known conditions, or a
known set of standards because if you change the standards
then everybody is in trouble because you create a very massive
lack of credibility, which is so vital.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Yes.

But, are these accountants’

standards or standards of the government, with regard to the
setting of prices and things of that sort?
wasn’t clear about.

That’s what I

Accountants have some control over the

standards they use, but our influence with regard to setting
national economic policy probably isn’t all that great.
MR. WALTER:

Well the accountants have control over

their standards through the audit procedures and through the
APB’s in the past.

Let’s concede that.

But, let’s also con

cede that there should be adequate time before the effect of a
rule-change and that that rule-change should probably not be
on January 1, 1972, or June 30, 1972, but should be on the
next, the subsequent fiscal year of the company to which the
rule applies, provided that there is adequate lead time for
management to change the input and its business plans, because
I think it’s unfair to change the rules after the fact.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

But, under those circumstances you

would be in favor of publishing forecasts?
MR. WALTER:
casts.

I am never in favor of publishing fore

I am saying, if we have to have a rule, if we have to

publish forecasts, then let’s define the rules that we are
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going to live by.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Ah-ha.

C H A I R M A N TRUEBLOOD:

If I u n d e r s t a n d wha t Bob is say

ing, if we are going to have forecasts, then we must have sta
bility of rules so that the businessman can plan his business
transactions, in order to know how they are going to be re
flected in the statement...
MR. WALTER:

That’s right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
transactions.

...before he consummates his

Isn’t that your...

MR. WALTER:

The statement is only the record of per

formance of management, against business planning.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Anything further from the panel

Frank Weston?
MR. WESTON:

Judging from the comment at the top of

Page Three, you may be the only participant here to say the
present form and content of the statements are adequate; would
you then urge us to state objectives in terms of present prac
tice, specifically?
MR. WALTER:

I would start with present practice, as

my point of departure, and would not make drastic changes but
would rather, evolve the rules.
MR. WESTON:

What area, in what direction would you

urge us to lead the development of the rule making?
MR. WALTER:
footnotes.

I would increase the disclosure and

But, in increasing the amount of disclosure and

footnotes, I would want to have the business reasons for a
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particular dealing so that some objective standard is placed
upon the rule as well as a specific statement of the rules.
MR. WESTON:

But, to jump to a rather topical item,

what would your view be on reflecting more current values in
financial statements, as an objective?
MR. WALTER:

Well of course, in some industries,

such as the insurance industry, we can take current market
value of securities.
MR. WESTON:

I think of real estate and oil and gas,

to take two other examples.
MR. WALTER:

I like the cost method because it elimi

nates the problem of going to get an appraisal.

An appraisal

is kind of like generally accepted accounting principles; it's
an opinion of value.

But, if I am going to build a financial

statement on an opinion of value, then that's different than
my cost value.
MR. WESTON:

But isn't that opinion of current value

more helpful to investors than 1922 costs in terms of the ob
jectives and usefulness of the data?
MR. WALTER:

If you want to include an opinion of

current value in a footnote, then by all means, I would do it,
and I would articulate that it's based on a qualified appraisal
of "X..."
But I would not do it in a financial statement.

If

you have that kind of a company— everything at 1922 costs— then
you have several solutions.
purchase method...

They can sell their company by the
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MR. WESTON:

Not many around like that, though!

MR. WALTER:

I would like to find a few.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Let me expand upon Frank’s

question and ask for a clarification on your answer about fair
values.

You have made the statement, in relation to other

circumstances that you feel the answer is frequently "further
disclosure," by way of footnotes...
MR. WALTER:

Right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

...and yet we have been exhorted

here today by others that we should, as an objective, have in
mind the simplification and clarification of financial presenta
tions.

Now it seems to me, Bob, that it's really only the

quite sophisticated user who can convert a footnote into the
effect it would have on the financial statement.
Frank, and others here.

You can—

Let!s leave Aunt Jane out of it; let’s

go to some of the institutional investors.

Should they have

the burden of taking footnote data and convert it into the
table?
MR. WALTER:

I think if they are astute investors,

they will do exactly that and they will question management
and they will look at the book value.

I think that’s our

obligation, to make an investment decision that’s proper.

And

I would say that if you are ever going to come to current mar
ket value in statements, then they should be done on a pro
forma basis showing the related cost base in a parallel column.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think that’s a commonly held

view, based on the inputs to this time.
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MR. WALTER:

Right.

CH A I R M A N TRUEBLOOD:

It m a y b e an ope n p o s i t i o n as

to whether the supplemental data should be attested, but that’s
another question.

Anything else from the panel on Mr. Walter’s

presentation?
(No responses)
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you, sir, very much.

Thank you, too, for making the trip, and I appreciate it a
great deal.
Ernst & Ernst?
MR. RICHARD T. BAKER (Ernst & Ernst):

Good afternoon.

I believe we are the last ones on your program for today.
haps you have saved the tough ones for us.

Per

First of all, I am

Dick Baker, Manager Partner of Ernst & Ernst, and on my right,
we have Bob Mautz, and next to me we have Ray Groves, who are
both partners in our firm.
Our purpose in requesting permission to appear before
you, Mr. Chairman, is twofold.

First, we wish to express our

concern on a number of points related directly to the charge
of your Study Group, and second, we will urge the desirability
of further efforts of the same type.
As you know, we presented our views on the objectives
of accounting to your Study Group last January.

Those views

were influenced by an extensive survey of the thoughts and
experiences of executives within our firm and by the reported
results of their unsolicited discussions with clients, company
representatives, bankers, analysts, brokers, educators and
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others.

We distributed our statement widely among friends and

clients and have had a number of responses.

In addition, we

read many of the statements of others who have expressed their
views to you.
As we discussed these various ideas, we concluded
that our January statement might have been too brief and that
we had additonal ideas deserving of your consideration.

For

this reason we have prepared a second paper, which you also
have.

In preparing this second paper, we have obtained a

greater appreciation of the difficulty of your assignment and
of the problems which you and your Group face in trying to
develop a statement of objectives.
One of our concerns has to do with the manner of
stating the objectives of financial statements and of account
ing.

Broadly stated objectives may be indispensable by them

selves, but this is not enough;

the ultimate purpose of a

statement of objectives must be to influence practice.

Until

the impact of an objective on practice is clearly established,
its effectiveness as an objective is not known.

If the objec

tives are to be meaningful to the accounting profession and to
others, if they are to provide a guide to us in our practice,
they must be enunciated in such a way that their method of
implementation is unambiguous.

Unspecific objectives, subject

to varying interpretations, may be divisive rather than unify
ing.

The accounting profession, as you know, needs all the

unification it can get.
We hope that whatever report the Study Group renders
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will explain the implementation of the proposed objectives
sufficiently so that different readers will not read substan
tially different possibilities into them.

We

view change as

desirable and progress as essential, but the two should not
be confused.

Unless change is in the right direction, it is

antiprogressive.

Some statements have been made to your Group

advocating changes which have not yet been tested sufficiently
to warrant any indication of approval whatever, either for
the immediate future or for the long range.

As proposals,

they remain legitimate subjects of interest and candidates for
research attention, but one makes a mistake to urge them as
objectives.
A second concern, therefore, is that the natural
desire to be forward looking may lead the Study Group to advo
cate fundamental changes in accounting, if not now, then at
least in the long run.

Significant changes for which there is

not at this time any substantial body of evidence to show that
they are wanted by the majority of those concerned with finan
cial statements, and that on a cost-benefit basis are not use
ful, or that may not even be generally possible, should not be
included as objectives.
In the light of the quality of the Study Group and
its staff, our fears may well be unfounded, but we reaffirm
our expectations that any objectives calling for fundamental
changes will be supported by persuasive evidence of demand, of
need and of feasibility.
We may not have seen all the statements submitted to
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the Study Group, but those we have seen give less attention to
the interest and point of view of corporate management than we
believe is desirable.

We recognize that, in specific cases,

individual corporate managements have taken advantage of the
excessive permissiveness now present in generally accepted
accounting principles.

On the other hand, we have faith in the

honor and integrity of the great majority of corporate execu
tives.

We have no reason to think that they will favor weak or

other unsatisfactory accounting principles which can be utilized
to the advantage of the unscrupulous, and thus work to the dis
advantage of the honest majority.
In our view, it is imperative that corporate manage
ment’s interests and experience be included in stating the ob
jectives of financial statements as well as in the formulation
and implementation of accounting principles.

No other group

has the intimate knowledge of business problems, the understand
ing of competitive pressures or the awareness of the effect of
circumstances on the application of accounting principles.

No

group has a greater interest in full and fair presentation.
The suggestion that accountants, regulators and fi
nancial statement users should establish accounting principles
independently of the management which is then expected to
apply them is unsound and unworkable.

The written representa

tions to the Study Group which we had read lean strongly to
ward change; perhaps this is to be expected.

Those who want

something changed spend the energy and take the time to make
their wants known; those who find the status quo satisfactory
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are less inclined to express their views.

So one should not he

surprised to find a preponderance of views in favor of change-some of it, extreme change.
We find, in these papers, very little attempt to
describe the advantages or consider adequately the virtues of
what is now accepted practice.

The advantages of conventional

accounting and the difficulties of actually implementing the
recommended alternatives are given little attention.

The ad

vantages of the alternate methods and the criticisms of conven
tional accounting, on the other hand, have been emphasized out
of all proportion.
We trust that, in reaching its conclusions, the
Study Group will balance the evidence for and against some of
these issues more realistically than do the papers submitted
to the Study Group.
A final concern relates to the enthusiasm with which
the report of the Wheat Committee was received.

The Wheat Com

mittee report compared the work of your Study Group with that
of a constitutional convention supplying, and I quote, "a
chart of objectives and basic concepts which will enable the
day-to-day work of the Board to be more firmly grounded than
before."
If the recommendations of your Study Group are ac
cepted with the same uncritical eagerness as were the Wheat
proposals, you are not only the innovators of your proposals
but also the court of last resort, which is a very heavy re
sponsibility.

Our second position paper offers a proposal for
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a continuation of the very kind of work in which you have been
and are now engaged.

We think delineation of the objectives

of financial statements is a problem of such importance to so
many interests that it should be carried on.

We do not see

this recommendation as either critical of or conflicting seri
ously with the work of your Study Group.

The emergency which

some considered to exist at the time of your appointment has
at least partially been met by the Council'
s actions with re
spect to the Wheat Committee recommendations.

If your Study

Group enunciates a clear set of objectives for financial state
ments, to serve as a guide to the proposed Financial Accounting
Standards Board, the apparent crisis will appear to have been
passed.

But our profession should do more than meet crises.

We ought to look ahead.
The financial market is changing and will continue
to change.

A broader variety of interests than is represented

by your Study Group will make its wants, needs, suspicions and
fears known.
distorted one.

The view from any single vantage point may be a
We need to bring the full range of interest in

financial statements together for a thorough examination of
the uses of financial statements and of the relative rights
and responsibilities of preparers and reviewers and users.
Therefore, we recommend the creation of a continuing conference
on accounting objectives, to be established at a high level and
with a broad base of representation so that all the interests
in corporate financial reporting are assured a voice.

Such a

conference, with more time at its disposal and a broader charge
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than that given to your Study Group, could direct its attention
to resolving a variety of issues related to financial reporting,
although not directly involved in financial statement presenta
tion.
It would appear fitting if your Study Group, having
completed its assigned task, would include a recommendation
for the establishment of a continuing study of this nature.
Let me add one other concern that we share with
others, and I say this in a completely friendly and forthright
manner.

A document entitled "Information for Proprietors and

Others," treating a topic similar to the assignment of your
Study Group, was published earlier this year.

Among its five

authors are listed the Chairman of this Study Group and two of
the staff members.

The paper arrives at what appeared to be

definite conclusions, including the following, and I quote:
If the core statement-satellite report expects to
be developed to its fullest, the profession must move
toward economic or fair market values, away from histor
ical cost.
The paper is described as "prepared for the Tenth
International Congress of Accountants which will be held in
October, 1972."
Recent public statements by yourself, Mr. Chairman,
state that no conclusions have yet been reached and that essen
tial research is still in progress.

If one or more members of

the Study Group has already established a position on the ob
jectives of financial statements which will be reaffirmed in

.
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October, 1972, it would seem desirable that there be some ex
planation of the relationship between "Information for Propri
etors and Others" and the assignment of this Study Group.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you, Dick, very much for

another of your superb presentations.

I should be remiss if I

did not thank you publicly for the extensive, almost full time,
very good work of your man, Mr. Streit, who has been given to
us, really, to proceed with our work.
clarification.

I make only one point of

The document you are talking about was written

before this Group was organized.

It happens to feature some

of the things we are talking about, and I am sure that there is
no predisposition with those conclusions and that my personal
assurances will be accepted by the group.
MR. BAKER:
explanation.

Bob, I am delighted you have made this

We have encountered it several times and I under

stand it, then.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

The paper was prepared for the

Sydney International Congress, and I think it was submitted in
the fall of 1970 , something like that, or 1 9 7 1 , before we
were established.
MR. BAKER:

Great, great.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So be it.

Now I would like to

start out with the idea of a continuing conference on account
ing objectives, which I think to be excellent; I think it to
be necessary.

I am now speaking my personal point of view.

We have not come to any conclusions in this Group, and it is
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not on the agenda, but I note, Oscar, that that fits very
closely your suggestion to the Wheat Committee where you sug
gest an ongoing group to talk about objectives in relation to
whatever evolved from the Wheat Committee.
MR. GELLEIN:

I guess we thought about every five

years was often enough.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Would you care to comment on

that?
MR. GELLEIN:

No.

I will just say that we thought

about every five years you ought to do it.

The environment

around us changes fast enough that you ought to take a look at
it then.
MR. BAKER:

Oscar, if you don't have it scheduled,

instead of five years going by, fifteen go by.
MR. GELLEIN:

Dick, I take it you are concerned

about what our report might say.
through pretty clear to us.

I think the message comes

So let me start there.

your concerns relate to several factors.

I guess

One, that it would

create additional divisiveness, as I understand it.

The other

one is that it will deter us from the consideration of the
immediate problems.
Now let me speak to that, and ask a question on that
last point.

I see you take a pretty dim view of current-value

accounting in this paper.
casting cautiously.
stating them:

You say you've got to go into fore

I am not arguing these points--I am just

human resource accounting, be very cautious,

and so forth, on down the line.
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My question is, what are the immediate problems, in
your judgment, that need attention, that we as an objective
group can deal with?
MR. BAKER:

Well, Oscar, I ’d say first of all, the

unfinished business that the Accounting Principles Board has
is closely related.

I think much of that needs to be got on

with and I don’t think we want our firm misunderstood on this.
We think there are many things that need to be done and I think
the idea of having delineated objectives is an excellent idea.
I think it’s tough to do it without having some implementation
measures ready to make sure that we all are on the same side
of the street on it.

I think in our fuller paper we bring out

some further things that we think need to be studied.

I could

just for a minute fill in the gap— you know, companies work
very carefully in preparing the financial statements, and then
they have an accountant certify to them, and the responsibility
assumed by both the company and the accountant is very, very
serious.

It grows from this and I am trying to establish the

chain to the investor here.

Other people work on this, includ

ing people such as Reed Parker, and they do a great job.

But

as it filters down to where an investment decision is made,
this may involve a considerable number of people with various
degrees of skill, and there is no responsibility that falls
along with this advice as to what is a good investment and
what the stock is going to do.

There is no penalty for anyone

saying that such-and-such stock will make thirty dollars a
share next year, or five dollars a share, or they will lose
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money.

And I think that we would plead that there should be a

little better coordination of what the responsibilities of all
the people involved in getting from the company to the final
investor are, that these get enunciated and that the respons
ibilities be very clearly stated.
I think our paper, Oscar, goes into that, to some
extent.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Dick, as you spoke, I thought I

heard you say that one of your concerns was that the views and
interests of corporate management were not given, or might not
be given sufficient attention in the report.

But in setting

out the objectives of accounting and without meaning to deni
grate or belittle the importance of the views and interests of
corporate management, do you feel that the broad social inter
ests, the broad public interests should take precedence over
the interests of corporate management?

Let me give you an

illustration.
In talking about the forecasting question, several
of the speakers this morning and this afternoon have made the
point that forecasts might somehow destroy the competitive ad
vantage that a firm holds.

Well if it were felt that the pub

lication of forecasts might somehow lead to a better alloca
tion of resources even though it tended to weaken a special
market position, then the question is, ”Should this Group in
seeking objectives urge the publication of forecasts in this
broader social interest or should we be interested in preserv
ing the special position of corporate management?"
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MR. BAKER:

Well Sid, I'd say this is an area that I

think needs a great deal of study and I think not only do we
need the voices of professional accountants and financial ana
lysts and economists and others, I think we need to hear, in
great, great detail, the other voices such as management and
such as the various people from the public.

And I think when

ever we try to arrive at a final decision as to whether fore
casting information is good or bad, or whether you separate it
from feasibility studies, whether it's the same thing or not,
there's a lot of questions that need to be resolved.
As an example, our firm is presently engaged in mak
ing a study as to what we feel should be done on forecasting
and we plan to make that public when we get finished with it.
But we find, right now, that we have a great deal of different
voices within our own organization as to, first of all, whether
there should be forecast information and secondly, who should
do it and what role the outside accountant should play in this.
It's real tough, Sid.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

I agree.

I don't think the returns

are all in yet, by a long way, and there is much study that
has to be done but I think there does remain the question of
what should be the source of the overriding motion that would
control this Group, in suggesting objectives, whether it should
be the broad public interest or whether it should be something
else.
MR. BAKER:
MR. PARKER:

Well, Sid, there is...
To amplify Sidney's question concerning
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whether the management has it and the public doesn’t.
stands now, the management has it.

As it

Some of it gets to the

press; the financial analysts can get some more pieces of it.
So that to the extent we don’t have formal forecasting, or
some way to do it, we leave some extra advantage with the so
phisticated financial analysts, as compared to other groups,
and that is still another part of the problem.
MR. BAKER:

Reed, I appreciate that.

One of my asso

ciates, here, I think would like to be heard on that.

This is

Bob Mautz.
MR. ROBERT K. MAUTZ (Ernst & Ernst):

Sidney, we

don’t want to be aligned against social interests, obviously,
but I don’t think it’s all that clear.

One possibility in

the publication of forecasts is that management will become so
intent on making the forecast and coming as close as it can to
the forecast that total productivity will be lessened.

It’s

a very real possibility and one we hope you will take into
account when you decide this important matter.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

You should know, as I imagine

you do, although someone in the audience might not, that FEI
has also contracted for a major work on forecasting with
Carnegie-Mellon University, I believe.

I have four questions

lined up for the panel but may I use the prerogatives of the
Chair and ask you one of my own, first?
this continuing-concerns idea.

I am intrigued with

And I am wondering to what

extent that part of the Wheat proposal, which sets up an ad
visory board--I believe the rule is— well the suggestion is,
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of about twenty, I believe. ..
MR. BAKER:

Right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I believe with the proposed rule

that no more than 25% of that number can be from any one seg
ment of the economy.
MR. BAKER.

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Now to what extent, Dick, does

that help you in your concern which you have expressed many
times about representative representation across the business
and economic community?
MR. BAKER:

Well your suggestion, Bob, that this

Group might take into consideration objectives...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I am asking to what extent does

that alleviate your concern, not to the exclusion of a continu
ing conference.
MR. BAKER:

Not too much, basically.

I think they

are going to have their hands full if they fulfill the role
that's been...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. BAKER:

With the day-to-day stuff?

Right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So you are asking for a think

ing, conceptual, philosophical group, such as we hope we are...
MR. BAKER:

Right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. BAKER:

Right.

...on a continuing basis.
Bob, along that line, we want a

much broader group than as was represented on your Group.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But you do not know, yet, how
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broad the advisory group is going to be, do you?
MR. RAKER:

The financial...

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. BAKER:

No--the advisory council.

They said, "approximately twenty," and

said "no more than a fourth from any one section."
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So you are thinking "bigger and

broader."
MR. BAKER:

Well not necessarily bigger, I don't

think you necessarily need four or five from the same discip
line.

Perhaps it could be a group of twenty on up.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But with a significant diversi

fication of interests in the sense of discipline and activities?
MR. BAKER:

Very much so, yes sir.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Five would be too many from a

practicing profession.
MR. BAKER:

I think so.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. GELLEIN:

Okay.

Oscar?

I was just wondering if my inference

is correct, from Page 3 the last paragraph.

We have heard and

read a lot about the question of valid rights and information
and who has an appropriate interest in the financial state
ments of the company and the like, and I see here that you in
dicate that in your view it is the existing shareholder that
has the primary interest.

I don't want to broaden that out to

all possibilities but let's think of the potential buying in
vestor and let's compare the existing shareholder with the po
tential shareholder.

When a company lists its stock on the
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exchange, it makes it available to the public for good reason,
to create a market for its shares, creating an opportunity to
add to. its capital from time to time.

Now the existing share

holder’s decision with respect to a share of stock is "hold"
or "sell."

The potential buyer's in that market decision is

"reject" or "buy."

Now, my question is, do you view the "hold

or sell" decision as being more important that the "reject or
buy" decision in terms of stating objectives of financial state
ments and uses and needs?
MR. MAUTZ:

Well, Oscar, I don't think it's a ques

tion of which of those decisions is more difficult and more
vital; I think it's a question of the fact that democracy says
the man who has an interest has a vote, and the man who doesn't
have an interest doesn't get a vote.

We don't let people who

are not citizens of the country vote in our elections; they
don't have that kind of an interest.

The man who already has

a commitment to that company is in a different position to the
untold numbers of people who may have an interest some day but
don't now.
MR. GELLEIN:

This becomes awfully important now, be

cause it gets into the question of how much conservatism do
you have in financial statements, and this then helps you de
cide that question, you see— and before you can decide the
question of how much conservatism, it seems to me you have to
answer this question and it may lead to that determination.
MR. RAYMOND GROVES (Ernst & Ernst):

I don't follow

how the answer to the first question leads to the answer of
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how much conservatism.
MR. GELLEIN:

Well if you have to pit the interest of

one against the other in making all the estimates going into
the determination of financial statements, and we have those
areas where judgments and estimates have to he made, they can
he made within a range.

Now do I make it "this end of the

range" or "that end of the range," or right in the middle?
And neutrality

was one of the qualitative objectives stated

in Statement No. 4.
I guess my question is, "Does this restrict neutral
ity as an objective?"
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Dave wants to comment on this

point.
PROFESSOR HERWITZ:

I don’t want to interrupt hut I

didn’t want to leave the statement--Mr. Mautz wouldn’t either-without the other side being kept in mind.
is developing in the opposite direction:

I do think the law
that is, while it is

true that those who do not own stock will not he allowed to
vote, it does not follow that they are any less entitled to
consideration in the preparation of financial statements.

We

see developing under the aegis of the Securities and Exchange Com
mission in the litigated cases--and I am not predicting; I am
not a forecaster of legal interpretations; I ’d prefer to leave
that to the accountants if I possibly can--but, I think there
is little doubt at the moment that the court decisions are
at least moving toward finding the general integrity of the
marketplace as an overweening objective.

And if that becomes
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the critical factor, then the obligation to existing stockholders
will become simply part of the broader element of integrity of
the marketplace, which will treat the buyer or prospective
buyer in the same position as the potential seller or holder
of stock.
I just want us to keep that in mind, so we wouldn’t
feel that bridge has been entirely crossed.
MR. GROVES:

Assuming that the financial statements

were full of complete integrity then can we come to the con
clusion that the person who owns a part of that company has
the first call, for instance, in challenging how good a job
management did with the resources that they had available,
assuming we have this integrity?
PROFESSOR HERWITZ:

I think we are assuming that.

Well it seems to me that this

issue only arises when something has arguably gone wrong, or a
choice between the interests of existing shareholders and the
interests of others has to be made; the conservatism issue is
one often cited as an example of a case where the interests of
existing shareholders and prospective buyers may diverge.
far as "first call," the courts are open to everyone.

So

If you

are talking about possible responsibility or liability, there
is ample room in the courts, I am sorry to say, for plaintiffs
from both the stockholder and nonstockholder groups, so I am
not sure that’s a meaningful line.
MR. GROVES:

I am not talking about litigation.

am assuming we have integrity in the reporting.

I

Now, who owns

the company and who has the right to challenge decisions made
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in good conscience, not decisions made for any wrongdoing or
anything like that.

We don't reject neutrality nor embrace

conservatism.
PROFESSOR HERWITZ:

I think you are moving now into

the question of who could bring a shareholder suit for impro
priety

Oscar is talking about the makeup

of financial state

ments in the total picture of disclosure— and, on that issue,
there is no dichotomy; there, the question is whether, given
a responsibility to make reasonable and full disclosure, it runs
only to existing stockholders, and I just wanted to serve a
reminder of the evidence that it may well run to the totality
of the marketplace.

I think that's what;s on Oscar's mind.

MR. BAKER:
ask Oscar a question?

May I just reverse it for a second and
Oscar, do you think we are wrong when

we address our reports, now, to the shareholders and to the
board?
MR. GELLEIN:

No, no.

I think that's a circumstance

of the times but it seems to me that's quite different from
the question of establishing the needs and the uses and then
trying to meet them.

It seems to me, it's different from the

question of identifying the one to whom you address your re
port.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I would feel that there is no

argument about neutrality or integrity; that the issue is
raised only by the particular language of this particular sen
tence, where it says "first consideration, to existing share
holders," whereas the law, Mr. Etra and the public would regard
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themselves as equally involved, I doubt it would change any of
your conclusions or suggestions.
All right, now, Howie Wagner?
MR. WAGNER:
fic question.

I have a very short and rather a speci

Page 4 of your original presentation states

that "Our experience convinces us that the measurement of value
changes other than through transactions is not only difficult
but is in no more than an experimental state."

The thing that

caught my eye here is that you have apparently attempted to
make value measurements and I am wondering whether you can com
ment at any length on just what you have tried to do and what
the problems were in accomplishing your objective in these in
stances.
MR. BAKER:

Well I think we spell out a couple of

them in the second report, there.

We refer there, to the

Penn-Central situation where it was common knowledge on the
Street and in investment quarters that Penn-Central had over a
billion dollars in values— this was publicized.

I think we

spelled it out; I have forgotten the page it was on.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

You said, "a billion-two, as

compared with block offers of a hundred eighty-five million,"
I think.
MR. BAKER: Yes, something of that nature, and it's
conceivable, on a value type of thing that could have been per
haps reflected at the billion-two, on a value basis; two years
later it would be down to whatever it was--a hundred eighty
million, or whatever the number was--and we have this jockey
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ing of values.

I think all of you are familiar with the tre

mendous write-offs that we have--take RCA.

They had a tremend

ous write-off last year that would have been valued, on a fair
value basis, at a very high amount; this year, it's down to
"zero," so I think you'd have tremendous peaks and valleys
which make it very difficult to arrive at objective evaluations.
I don't know whether I got to your question.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WAGNER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WAGNER:

Yes.

Are you finished?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think the same point comes up

in one of the presentations scheduled for tomorrow by the
evaluations people— that the fair value approach depends upon
where you are in the life cycle and where you are in terms of
expectations.
MR. BAKER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

It's extremely difficult.

I

have these questions from the floor...
MR. WESTON:

Bob, ...--on page 13 of the second pa

per, there is a discussion of the usefulness of estimates of
value.

You describe toward the middle of the page--the new

projects, and so forth, which management enters into, feeling
they have value in excess of cost, and then later they are
written down.

There is an inference all through that page

that there is something wrong or nasty or unfortunate about
describing things as they are.

I just can't conceive that you
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intended the thrust of that page the way it reads.

In other

words, "Don't tell stockholders when we have an idea which we
believe is valuable, and then fails--don't bring them up and
drop them down."

That is really what happens.

Now, why shouldn't accounting describe that?
MR. BAKER:

Well Frank, in one other section we talk

about the oil leases in Alaska.
MR. WESTON:
MR. BAKER:

Oh?
And I think you’d be on that teeter-

totter if you were reflecting these all the time.
MR. WESTON:

That’s what’s happening.

not show what is really happening?

Why should we

Those are the economic

facts; that is economic reality— why hide that?
MR. BAKER:

Well first of all, I question whether

that really is "economic reality.”
MR. WESTON:
didn’t they?

People paid that cash for the leases,

That’s economic reality; and they wrote them off

subsequently.
MR. BAKER:
MR. WESTON:
MR. BAKER:
closed transaction.

And they wrote them off.
Right.
But on a lot of these you don’t have a
Take the Penn-Central.

That would have

been written up to two billion without a transaction on it.
MR. WESTON:

Well there is some question; I think

you used the one-billion figure without really investigating
where it came from or whether it was a valid figure.

But

assuming it was a valid figure, then I am not sure that it
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should not have been written at a billion.

The fact it came

out of some research report saying they’ve got a lot of valu
able real estate— I am questioning your use of the figure as a
valid figure, but assuming it were a valid figure--then what’s
wrong with showing the true estimate of value and subsequent
decline?
MR. BAKER:

Frankly, the real problem with it is be

ing sure that you have a realistic value.
MR. WESTON:

All right.

But if we could agree to

that, that the value were realistic, then would you agree that
it would be appropriate for investors who are buying and sell
ing through this period to have a fair shake?
MR. BAKER:

I would want to know how you got to that

value before I agreed.
MR. WESTON:

All right, I am stipulating that we can

get to those values saying that investors sitting back while
management tries something and failed, that investors who
bought and sold during that period are not being served well
by financial statements that don’t show those.
ing we have a value that is fair and reasonable.

I am stipulat
It seems to

me we have an inference here, that we should not attempt to
describe what’s going on.
MR. BAKER:

On a cost basis, Frank, the values are

reflected in the cost; the expenditures were reflected in the
balance sheet, and then when they decided to abandon the pro
ject, they were written out of there.
MR. WESTON:

I am saying, the cost, under these
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circumstances, isn't responsive to economic reality because
the value might have been much higher; as you say on page 1 3 ,
"Management thought the value was higher."
MR. BAKER:
are right on that.

Well but Frank, I question whether you
I believe that perhaps the cost might be

better than somebody’s...
MR. WESTON:

Well I am stipulating that the values

are appropriately determined to be reasonable.

My only point

is that isn't it better to have objectives of financial account
ing that call for showing economic reality, which is a nice
phrase underlying all these transactions, so that investors
coming in and out do get a fair shake, than not to disclose
that fact?
MR. BAKER:

Well, I don't agree with it.

MR. MAUTZ:

Frank, we hope most people don't read

that page like you did.
hardly disagree.

If we accept your stipulation, we can

But I hope people recognize what a whale of

a stipulation it is.

The point we try to make in that page is

that it's very difficult to keep up with all those changes in
value, or whatever you wish to call them, and to get them
recorded.

You know, if the stipulation is that that really

can be done, then we must come to your conclusion.
MR. WESTON:

Look at the last sentence in the third

paragraph.
MR. MAUTZ:

"What would be the effect of such write

ups and write-downs on the personal fortunes of investors and
upon the innovative nature of management, in general?"
we don't have your stipulation, you see!

Because
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Where you are dealing with marketing

securities then do you accept the notion of substituting current
market value for historic costs?
MR. MAUTZ:

We do accept the substitution but provide

for a supplementary data on that, Sidney, which gives you the
information.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have three questions from the

floor, which in all fairness must be dealt with, interesting as
this conversation is.

I believe I will know your answer to this

question, Dick, "What should be the relationship between account
ing and management in the development of accounting standards?"
Would you care to capsulize very briefly your point of view?
MR. BAKER:
ing relationship.

I think there should be a very close work

I think many of our accounting standards have

been devised over a period of time by management and in consul
tation with the outside accountants, and I think that their voices
should be heard, and I think other voices should be heard, also.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. BAKER:

So it's a joint responsibility.

Yes, and there are others involved, too.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

And that you would probably put

more emphasis on the management participation than some others have?
MR. BAKER:

I expect I would, yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Yes.

Next question, which is a

little bit involved; I think it’s a fair question; it is writ
ten in this way.

It says that your paper makes three points--

first, that historical cost financial statements present cur
rent values with reasonable accuracy; second, that we have no
techniques to determine current values with any degree of va
lidity; and third, it would be tremendously upsetting to financial
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of page 13.

The questioner says, "These statements seem to he

somewhat contradictory; if we can’t determine current values,
how do we know the historical costs are acceptably close?"
MR. BAKER:

I am not sure we said that they...

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I did not check back to the

paper.
MR. BAKER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think you did take that posi

tion with respect to price-level adjustments.

In any event--

did you not, Bob--was not it your paper saying, every ten
years ought to be enough, if at all...
MR. MAUTZ:

No.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

It’s not your paper--sorry.

Well, do you wish to comment on that?
MR. BAKER:

Yes, we do.

We do not take the position

that they necessarily are equal to fair value.
is a very, very elusive thing.

We think value

We don’t know whether they do

or whether they don't.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But you feel that the risks

and uncertainties of going the fair value route are reasonably
well known, and somewhat— I was going to say, "suspect."
That may be unfair.
MR. BAKER:

Yes.

May I put it in order, Bob?

We

certainly think that perhaps we should do some exploration
with value and get it in.

But let's take a look at it and

see what might happen if we tried to apply it realistically
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on some complicated companies.

I think that much of this has

to he done in order that we can say this is a good thing or
this is a poor thing.

With so many people talking about the

wonderful aspects of value, I think we need to get it over
into a pilot study and have extensive pilot studies before we
would jump the fence and be off the track.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Given the vehicle of the in

creased research, which is...
MR. BAKER:

Right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

...hoped for, under the Wheat

proposals, this is the kind of thing that could go in there
pretty quick?

Is that your position?

MR. BAKER:

Right, correct.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Now you have submitted excell

ent papers and lengthy papers, and you have waited a long time
to be heard.

I am just not going to be short about cut-off

time so if anybody on the panel wishes to extend it, and if
you are willing to stay...
MR. BAKER:

We are here.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
DEAN EDWARDS:
if I may.

Sid? Don?

I ’d like to ask a general question,

Have you and your colleagues considered whether or

not the current financial statements, as they are utilized in
practice today, are adequate in terms of communicating to the
user, or user groups, or if that series of statements should
be expanded, or...
MR. BAKER:

Well Don, I would say, very quickly that
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we can recognize that there is much need for improvement of
financial statements, and I think we are in real trouble the
minute we say, "Well, what we are doing is satisfactory and
adequate."

I think we've got to keep pressing and improving

the financial statements.

I don't think that any of us who

could ever feel that what we are doing is— this is "it," and
we have arrived with it.

So I think there is much improvement

that could he made in them.
Did I get to your question?
DEAN EDWARDS:

Yes, I think you did, but I would

extend it one step further, if time permits...
MR. BAKER:

Yes?

DEAN EDWARDS:

... and that is whether or not you

think the improvement can be accomplished within the current
framework of financial reporting or whether it should be ex
panded.

Now if it’s within the current framework, how might

it be improved in terms--in the context of your remarks of
establishing an institution for the standards board?
MR. BAKER:

Don, I am not sure; I am not ready to

say that all we need to do is get a motor tune-up on what we
are doing.

This is the reason why we think we want an ongoing

study, and w e ’d like to have value checked out and challenged,
and make sure what the strong points are, what the weak points
are.

We'd like to have other things, everything proposed for

financial statements, challenged— forecasting, whether it
ought to be in or should not be in, how much of it, whether
it's attested to so that I think that we don't have any quarrel
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at all on trying to reach out for further improvement.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

George?

PROFESSOR GEORGE H. SORTER (University of Chicago:
member, Accounting Objectives Study Group staff):

I would

like to make a personal comment if I may...
MR. BAKER:

Sure.

PROFESSOR SORTER:

...and I am not sure this is

shared by the Study Group, but my own personal view is that
questions of fair value, forecasting, and so forth, regardless
of my personal opinion, are not really properly "objectives"
in accounting.

We face this tremendous problem of distinguish

ing between objectives and implementation, and what I hope that
the Study Group will do is to show what the objectives in ac
counting are--discuss how some of these issues that are cur
rently in controversy relate to these objectives, and leave
the determination, whether they meet these objectives, to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board.

This Group should pre

sent a framework so that we can all talk the same language and
in fact, I think this is often overlooked.
It seems to me it's just as necessary to identify
objectives so that we can praise what is presently good as
well as damn what may be bad because without these objectives,
it seems to me, at least, we have no real framework to be able
to do that.
MR. BAKER:

George, just a word of caution.

it’s good to have objectives.

We go along with that.

I think
But

let's not set our objectives to such an extent, so far away
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from where we are now that the discontents with what we
are doing...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think I can assure you that,

within the Study Group and within its deliberations, we think
of objectives broadly, and hope they will not be constraining.
We keep concerning ourselves about the problems of implementa
tion.

We have no intention, at least presently— and I think

I can speak for the entire Group--of coming out with a new set
of rules which will turn the world over.
MR. BAKER:

Right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

It’s just not possible, and you

and I know that.
MR. BAKER:

Yes, Bob, that’s the reason we suggest

the ongoing aspect of it.

We don’t expect that from you people.

If you could do that, it would be fantastic.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

It would be great, if we could.

Anything else from the Study Group?
(No response)
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

If not, thank you very much,

and thank you, in the audience, very, very much.
(Whereupon, at two minutes before five o ’clock, the
session was concluded.)
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TUESDAY MORNING SESSION
May l6, 1972
The meeting reconvened in the Georgian Ballroom
at nine-fifteen o'clock, Chairman Trueblood presiding.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
hour.

We'll proceed because of the

Our modus operandi will be the same as yesterday.

Presenters, or witnesses, will be encouraged to limit their
remarks to 15 or 20 minutes.

We'll use the rest of the time,

which generally runs 40 or 45 minutes in total, for question
ing.

The procedure will be that observers from the floor will

not ask questions from the floor, but will rather write out their
questions and send them to the table here for handling.
Again I would point out those of our staff who are
in the room to help you with anything, including the delivery
of questions:

Mike Shannon standing in the back of the aisle;

Mrs. Beattie here in the front row; Marty Gans in the front
row; Bob Streit way in the back by the coffee; and Paul
Rosenfield down here.
So if you do have a question--and we encourage you
to ask questions of the witnesses while they are in place-just send them up with one of these people and they will be
handled as best we can.
Our first witness this morning is Larry Vance
representing the American Accounting Association.

Would you

explain, Larry, how you handled this in committee so that
everybody will understand?
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PROFESSOR LAWRENCE L. VANCE:

Yes.

The AAA has a fixed policy of promoting expressions
of this sort as the opinions of the Committee members, not as
official positions of the AAA.

Therefore this Committee

represents a sample of the AAA, and we think perhaps we reflect
in the majority opinion the prevailing view of academic
accountants, but we don't pretend that this is an official
endorsement of the position by the AAA as an organization.
The Committee operated, of course, by discussing
these problems and developing its report; it has one member
who dissented and if you have seen the report you can read
his dissent.

I will not propose to explain the dissent par

ticularly but if someone has a specific question about it,
I might be able to answer it.
Would you like me to go ahead with the report gen
erally?
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Go right ahead.

Good.

What the AAA Committee has done is to consider
what it thinks the most valuable improvement in accounting
practice might be, which it conceives to be the use of current
cost rather than historical costs.

They examined that proposi

tion in the light of the criteria that have been set up by
organizations over a period of years who evaluate the
quality of accounting information.

You will remember that the

AAA in 1966 issued a statement in which it set up certain
standards by which accounting information ought to be judged.
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Later on the AICPA did the same thing; incorporating pretty
well, I think, the ideas of the AAA and adding some of its own
The list of concepts and principles that the AICPA sponsored is,
first of all; relevance; second; understandability; third;
verifiability fourth; neutrality; fifth; timeliness; sixth;
comparability; and seventh; completeness.
Now what we have here is a very simple argument
based on a very simple syllogism; namely; that accounting
should be as useful as possible.
meets these criteria best.

It's most useful when it

We think current costs meet these

criteria better than historical costs and therefore recommend
their use.
I think the best thing I can do in the way of sum
marizing what we have said it to point out the relevance of
each of these things or the correspondence of each of these
things in connection with current costs.
The first item is relevance.

You are all aware of

course; that when people engage in business transactions; they
are thinking about the present.

If they are going to buy a

building; they are considering what the building is worth now
not what it cost 20 or 30 years ago.

We think other economic

decisions such as the purchase of stock in an enterprise which
owns the building; also will be improved if current information
about the reproducible cost of the building is given.

This, it

seems to us, is more relevant to the decision than the histori
cal cost of the building and therefore accounting might be more
relevant to its users in their decisions if it gave this kind of
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information rather than only historical cost information.
The second test, or criterion or standard for account
ing information is understandability. You notice that I'm using
the AICPA list.

This standard requires that information pre

sented bear upon or be reasonably expected to have an influence
upon the decisions that are to benefit from its use.

We think

that historical cost fails to give information which is more
relevant, because it's not recent, but also that such a presenta
tion tends to suggest to the uninitiated that the historical
cost information is adequate.

You have to be pretty unsophisti

cated to believe that, but in a complex world it's easy to be
come unsophisticated on a particular point when you have a very
complex, system to deal with.
The nearer you can get to the present in terms of
costs, of course, the closer would be the indication of what
the values are with which you are dealing, and therefore you
would be more nearly relevant to your decision with this kind of
information, we think, than with the older information.
Understandability has been suggested as one of the
criteria.

One thing to be noticed about this is that people

think in terms of current transactions, current price levels,
current costs, if you like.

Even those who are concerned to

recognize that the accounting data conventionally don't always
refer to the current price level are impeded in their efforts
to adjust them by such things as the complexity of the enter
prise which has a variety of assets purchased at different
price levels so that individual adjustments to the separate

3.5

parts are necessary. It would be more understandable if all
these bits of data could be brought to the same price or valua
tion basis which current cost of course would do.
I have the feeling--and the Committee had the feeling
--that even corporate managments in very large organizations
have some difficulty in this connection even though they have
access to the records because their assets are numerous and
widely spread and to make an adequate adjustment isn't something
that can be done easily and subjectively but has to be worked
out rather thoroughly on the basis of all the data.
I might remind you that a number of years ago in the
1950's when the AAA made a study of the effect of general price
level adjustments on statements, one of the companies which was
studied read the report and then cut its dividend.

directors

of that company had not realized that on a price level adjusted
basis they had been paying out more than their earnings in
dividends.

This can happen to management

as well as to the out

side investor.
Understandability, therefore, we think would be im
proved by bringing the data to a current level and a uniform
level on that basis.
Now verifiability is one of the characteristics that
most commentators think accounting ought to have.

It has been

emphasized vigorously over the years, and it perhaps is the
chief basis for support of historical cost.
eminently verifiable.

Historical cost is

The Committee as well as most accountants

are agreed that verifiability is an important characteristic of
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accounting which has to he preserved in view of the fact that
accountants serve a variety of customers, third parties are in
volved, the public interest is involved, and so on.
With regard to this quality of verifiability we ought
to notice that what we are proposing is adjustment to current
costs based on indexes which are not necessarily constructed by
the accountants, and in almost all cases would not be, but which
are the results of studies of government agencies and trade
associations and others who prepare market data.

If these in

dexes are used you eliminate the opportunity for personal bias
or for deliberate manipulation and you make the results verifi
able because anyone can take the same indexes and the same his
torical cost data and arrive at the same result.

We believe,

therefore, that current cost qualifies very well from the view
point of verifiability.
The fourth characteristic that the AICPA studies
suggested was neutrality and I think this corresponds pretty
well to what the AAA previously called freedom from bias.

It

means that accounting information should be prepared without
favoring the interests of any individual party or group likely
to be using it.
Now one way of serving the neutrality standard is to
include information that is as nearly current as possible since
persons with knowledge of the activities of the concern from the
inside will probably have a better knowledge of the current con
dition or the current costs or current value of the assets than
persons on the outside.

We are all aware, of course, of the take
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over activities of the last 20 years or so in which knowledge
able people were able to persuade stockholders to trade their
stock on a basis which perhaps the stockholders would not have
accepted if they had known what values really were represented
in their companies' assets.
prove the data

Current cost information would im

from the standpoint of neutrality in this connec

tion.
Timeliness is a characteristic also recommended by the
AICPA.

This quality, of course, is often thought of as equival

ent to promptness;

statements should be prepared expeditiously

and published as soon as possible.

It may, however, also be

interpreted as requiring that the methods or principles used be
designed to give information that is timely in the sense that it
is as nearly up to date as possible, as complete as possible,
including as much of the events that have affected the enterprise
as one can reasonably incorporate in the accounting data.

Cur

rent cost, of course, would bring things closer up to date than
historical cost and is therefore more timely in this sense.
Timeliness from the standpoint of the mechanical pro
duction of the statements, of course, is something that we have
to work out on the basis of the development of computer methods,
and so on, which enable us to process the data more quickly.
Comparability is our next characteristic.

This, of

course, has to do with such things as comparison of year-to-year
results of one firm and comparisons between different firms in
the same year, of course, including comparison of firms or
different character.

Of course, consistency in accounting
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methods is an element of this because uniform methods enable you
to measure things on the same basis in different years and be
tween different firms.
Uniformity of practices, therefore, is desirable; of
course, we're all aware of the effort to get this kind of thing
over the years.

If we went to current cost, we would, of course,

automatically bring a great deal of uniformity into the picture
because we'd eliminate the alternatives that have been
teristic of the use of historical costs.
lem

charac

For example, the prob

of inventory valuation would be automatically solved, and

you wouldn't have to worry about first-in-first-out or last-infirst-out because you would be on a current cost basis through
out.

By eliminating these alternative choices automatically,

comparability would be immediately improved.
The last characteristic was completeness and this term
suggest sufficiency or adequacy of the information provided.
For example, a statement that presents surplus without distinc
tion between retained earnings and paid-in capital would be
defective in this sense.

We suggest that a statement which pre

sents outdated historical cost is also incomplete in the sense
that it doesn’t give as much information about the events which
can be observed as can be given.

We can make the statements

more complete in the sense that they incorporate more of what
has happened from an economic viewpoint if we use current cost.
The report also includes some reference to traditional
ideas in accounting such as accrual, adequate disclosure, con
sistency, conservatism, the matching concept, and the concept of
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materiality.

We can comment on all these with regard to histori

cal cost and with regard to current costs.

Let me briefly men

tion just a few of them.
We have all long recognized that accrual accounting
is appropriate in any complex situation.

The characteristic of

this is to incorporate into the record as much of the economic
data as we can, in the sense that even though a transaction isn't
completed by settlement in cash, we nevertheless reflect its
effects in the statements.

Development of current cost data

would be simply another step in that direction, incorporating a
little more of what we are able to know about the transactions
and the economic events impinging on the firm and might be
looked upon as a kind of extension of the accrual method.
Adequate disclosure, of course, refers to the complete
ness of the statements; we can conceive of this in connection
with current costs as a matter of disclosing something that we
know, that we can reasonably

verify, which meets the other

criteria for accounting information, and which therefore give
a more adequate disclosure of the events that

have impinged on

the organization than if we stuck just to historical cost.
The traditional requirement of consistency, of course,
is designed to prevent misinterpretation of the statements
through bogus changes which reflect changes in methods rather
than changes in the economic events.

A good deal of the shift

ing about that we can get through the use of different account
ing methods would be eliminated by conversion to current cost
which would improve the area of consistency.
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Conservatism, of course, has been a traditional charac
teristic of accounting and although it’s less emphasized now
perhaps than it used to be, we still have some concern about
overoptimism.

People who issue financial statements are some

times encouraged, of course, to gild the lily a bit; therefore
we have to consider whether or not current costs give an oppor
tunity to move too far from the concept of conservatism.

Our

opinion is that conservatism should be replaced by such standards
as relevance, understandability, verifiability, neutrality,
timeliness, comparability, and completeness, rather than to stand
as a primary consideration for accounting by itself.
If you make it a consideration on its own, you tend to
encourage undervaluation, as everybody knows, and this always
affects somebody adversely.
Verifiability, it seems to me, is a much more impor
tant consideration than conservatism and we have already spoken
of the ability to maintain verifiability while using current
cost.
I might comment here at the moment, while I think of
it, that the fears that many people have about using so-called
value or fair value accounting should be laid aside and we
should be very careful to define what we are talking about;
that is, current cost in the sense of replacement cost or repro
duction cost

is to be calculated by means of objective or

general indexes, not on the basis of somebody’s opinion.

We

all remember the experience of the 19 20 ’s, of course, in this
connection.
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Another concept in accounting which has been discussed
a gread deal is the matching concept.

This is akin to the con

cept of accrual which tries to match better the revenues that
are obtainable from the activity of a particular period with the
costs that are attributable to it even though they may not have
been stttled in cash.

If we use current cost we can determine

what has happened to the enterprise in terms of increases in
values, of changes in price levels, or changes in economic
opportunities to use the assets--specific price levels, in
other words.

We can bring the matching process to a little

higher state of perfection by incorporating into the calculation
more of the events that have occurred than we do if we stop
short with historical cost data.
Finally, I'd like to make one other comment about
materiality.

Obviously, we can apply that concept in using

current cost just as we apply it in using historical cost.

If

a change from one current cost level to another is insignificant,
there's no reason why we should bother about it.

Certainly,

immaterial things don't need to be reported even though techni
cally we're presumed to be on a current cost basis.
I might also comment here that there's no reason
to assume that we're talking about current costs as a floor;
we're really talking about them as a ceiling.

If you have an

asset which has reproduction cost of a million dollars and you
cannot use it effectively to earn a return that would justify
a cost of a million dollars, you should expect to write it down
just as you would expect to write down a historical cost figure.
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I think that covers all the significant points that
the Committee is concerned about as far as the majority goes.
I don't intend to try to explain the position of our dissenter.
He sometimes, I think, attributes to the majority meaning that
they did not express or intend.

If you have some questions

about his remarks, I ’ll be delighted, of course, to try to
answer them.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much, Larry.

This initial question is in relation to current values, or re
placement values, or fair values, just using the words loosely.
In one of the papers that’s coming up this afternoon, the point
is made that current values run on a scale, the low point being
forced liquidation and then an upward slope in orderly disposal
to a highest value in a going concern situation.
We ended the conversation yesterday afternoon with
some despair about the illustration of Penn Central, in which
analysts, or what have you, have indicated that fair value of
real estate might have been something like $1.2 billion.

When

it came to getting rid of the stuff on the block, the price be
came $185 million.

So there was much concern expressed about

the practicability or the reliability or the verifiability, us
ing some of your terms, about this kind of technique.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Yes.

Well, I think this goes back

to the comment I made a while ago about the fact that you
shouldn’t take it as the one and only possible method in account
ing, but that you ought to look at the result in a particular
case.

If you have an asset which would be reproducible at $10
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million but it isn’t worth any more than a million, you should
ignore the $10 million and use the $1 million.
I don't have sufficient familiarity with the Penn
Central case to comment in detail on that, but I assume that in
some of these cases forced liquidation produces values quite
apart from what you might expect in an orderly use of the asset,
so that you have that problem in any case.

The use of current

cost neither disposes of it nor requires that you do anything
differently about it from what you would do with historical
cost.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So when you are talking fair

value or replacement cost, or what have you, you are assuming
a going concern?
PROFESSOR VANCE:
going concern.

Yes, ordinarily we would assume a

If we didn't have one, then we would certainly

want to make whatever writedowns were important.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Could you reach for an example

off the top of your head of an internal, ongoing accounting
situation in which a significantly different decision might
have been reached if fair values were being used?

You gave the

dividend example on price level adjustments but could you reach
for an example of an accounting decision which might be different,
given fair values, than

-- ?

PROFESSOR VANCE:

I have a little more trouble with

an internal decision than with an external decision.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Well, take an external decision.

I know of a particular case.

There's
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a large concern in California which once was a ranch and
after a while it discovered that the area of ranch land had a
lot of oil underneath it, so oil wells were drilled which began
to produce oil.
Over the years this ranch land was valued on a his
torical cost basis and I think the historical cost goes back to
something like 1890.

After a few decades, the treasurer of the

organization was concerned about this valuation.

He had read

the AAA report and asked for a little advice in connection with
perhaps emplementing it in this case.

Before it could be done,

somebody made a merger offer and the stockholders thought this
offer looked so good that they accepted it.

Nothing ever

happened about the adjustment of the assets and my own feeling
is that the stockholders really didn't know what their land was
worth.
MR. PARKER:

Mr. Vance, could I posit some things

here, and if we agree to them for the sake of argument, see how
the replacement cost technique would affect us?
Let’s suppose we have a very capital intensive company
and its got lots of 50-year fixed assets.

And let’s further

posit for the sake of argument that this company has nearly per
fect ability in the future to adjust the prices of its products
to cover whatever higher replacement costs it has to sustain.
And let’s lastly posit, just for the sake of argument, that the
only reward the investor can get from an investment in this
company are the dividends he receives and capital appreciation,
if it occurs.

And again, just for the sake of argument, let’s
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posit that the capital appreciation is going to he directly
commensurate or proportionate to the increase in dividends in
the future.
Now with a lot of 50-year fixed assets, I would assume
that even if we don’t know what kind of assets they are, if we
are basing this on replacement costs, there will have been con
siderable increase in those replacement costs compared to the
historical costs that would be on the balance sheet.

So we

would have, probably, quite a sizable writeup in those assets
to get them to replacement cost.
Is this going to help relevance, understandability, or
neutrality, to record on the balance sheet all these things
that don't affect any cash flow and don’t affect any current or
future ability to pay dividends to the stockholders?
And further, if you do write these assets up signifi
cantly, as it stands now I think most investors understand
enough about historical costs to know that they are not a very
good index of sale value, if you will, or liquidation value;
whereas, if you wrote them up and said that this is replacement
value, might not htere be some risk that the investor would
think that this is what they now represent as a liquidating
value?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I suppose that investors will

always be able to misinterpret the data one way or another.

We

should, of course, make it as clear as we can, with language
and otherwise.
I would say that the investor would have a better in-
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dication of what kind of capital he possesses and therefore a
better basis for judging whether the income that's being earned
is adequate.
MR. PARKER:

A better idea of the capital he possesses?

Would that indicate that you could sell all these plants for
this replacement cost value?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Not necessarily.

It might be that a

sales value would be something different, but it's a harder
thing to get hold of.

The Penn Central case is an issue in

point.
MR. PARKER:

Well, the Penn Central case, I think, has

been discussed at length.

Didn’t we have an indication, Bob,

that that $1 billion figure was a gross figure, ex the mortgages,
and that when they finally got the offer, it, of course, had to
be net for the equity?

So maybe the gross figure should have

been $700 million or $800 million but there were always $500
million or $600 million worth of mortgages sitting there.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I don’t think that distinction

was made in the discussion.
MR. PARKER:

I think it was in the newspapers however,

when the final offer was made.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Full disclosure might have been

helpful.
MR. PARKER:

Well, I think the disclosure was on the

balance sheet.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Presumably the investor is going to

make his decisions on the basis of whether he considers he’s

3.17

earning an adequate return on his investment.
he might do this with regard to the dividends.

Now, you said
He may do it

with reference to the stock quotations on the market.
ignore the accounting altogether.
MR. PARKER:

He may

That’s always possible.

Well, for the sake of argument we accepted

that he's got the dividend and the capital appreciation in the
future is going to be, for the sake of this argument, commensu
rate to the increase in dividends, and that the company has the
ability to increase or change the price of its product to cover
whatever increases there are in replacement costs, so it is
going to go on about the same in the future as it has in the
past.
PROFESSOR VANCE:
MR. PARKER:

Well, you can always argue that--

You may recognize the public utility

industry about this time.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

You can always argue that accounting

doesn’t really contribute anything to investor decisions, which
some people do; but in so far as accounting is going to give as
much information as it can and be as helpful as possible, I
think the current cost information would give the investors a
better idea of the value of the assets that are being used.
MR. PARKER:

A better idea of the value at which they

could be sold or liquidated?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

No, it doesn’t follow that they

could be sold or liquidated at that.
MR. PARKER:

At which they could produce income?

PROFESSOR VANCE:

No, at which they could reproduce
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the

assets.

You have got assets that would cost you this much

to buy right now.
MR. PARKER:

All it will tell him is how much it costs

to reproduce those assets.
PROFESSOR VANCE:
MR. PARKER:

That's right.

It doesn’t contribute any other relevance?

PROFESSOR VANCE:
future earnings.

That's right.

It doesn’t pretend to predict the

It doesn't pretend to predict the selling price

under forced or gradual liquidation.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WESTON:

Frank Weston.

I think this same point that Reed Parker

is raising is really a very important one.

Many of the papers

submitted to our group on this question of fair value do zero in
on property, plant, and equipment, and that’s basically what
Reed Parker is inquiring about.
What would the format of the Income statement be under
that kind of an approach?
question that Reed does:

And I guess I still have the same
How is the computation of earnings or

the disclosure of the changes in value useful or relevant to the
investor?

Could you give us a little more information as to how

you visualize the income statement to appear?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

We would visualize the income state

ment as showing the increases, if they were increases--they
might sometimes be decreases, I presume--from one value at the
beginning of the year to another value at the end.

These would

also be able to be divided between increases which had previously
been recorded that were realized as against those which had been
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recorded which were still unrealized.

The investor would then

have an indication of what changes in reproduction cost were in
volved, which presumably would give him better information about
the changing in basic values of the assets.
We all know, of course, that the value of an asset is
the present worth of its future net rents and all we can do in
accounting is to get as good a stand-in for that concept as we
can.
The Committee thinks that reproduction cost would do
that better than historical cost, not that it would do it
perfectly.

And then the income statement would be expanded to

include both the unrealized increases or decreases that result
from this process and the realized portions, which would leave
them the earnings currently based on current revenues, with de
duction for use of assets at current cost.

You wouldn’t have an

income figure then which incorporated without distinction,
capital gains, so to speak, and current earnings.
MR. WESTON:

There have also been observations that

in a changing economy it’s very seldom that a corporation, in
fact, replaces physically or in some cases even in terms of
utility, its present assets; and I gather from your comments
that that isn’t relevant or important in your approach to using
replacement cost.

You don’t infer that they will in fact re

place the assets.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

No, we don’t intend to infer that;

we do intend, I think, and some place state explicitly that
where the reproduction cost calculation is to be made, it should

3. 2 0

be made with regard to the utility or the function rather than
the physical embodiment of the assets.
MR. WESTON:

Well, that’s what disturbed me because

there seems to be a little conflict in your paper.

At one point

you say you will, in fact, replace the utility of the assets
but then your emphasis on the computation is on indices which
don’t purport to do that.

I wonder:

really believe should be used?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Which of those do you

They are quite different ideas.

My feeling about that is that the

choice of the index may be the thing that’s involved.

For ex

ample, if you have a stone building, and you’re not going to
replace the building with the same methods of construction-you're going to use steel instead--to get the same service, you
would use the index number or reproduction of that facility in
steel--whatever might be currently used.
So that instead of trying to refer to the physical re
production, you refer to the service involved, adapting your
self to techniques as they change.
MR. WESTON:

I can see you might have a problem if

the price difference between steel and stone, when you first
built your building, were quite different.

You would get a

very strange answer if you applied a steel price index to a
stone building.
MR. PARKER:

What would you do in the case of a public

utility where the obvious replacement or the next asset that
comes in is an atomic energy plant whose capital cost would be
much larger than a fossil fuel plant, but what you have on your
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books are fossil fuel plants?
DEAN DAVIDSON:

I guess you can't solve all your

problems by this approach.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I guess that’s the answer.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

It’s Howie Wagner’s turn here.

He's been waiting in line quite a while.
MR. WAGNER:

You mentioned that one of the advantages

of replacement cost through the use of indices would be the
elimination of bias and I think this is a very critical point.
This relates, obviously, to construction, but what about real
estate-land itself?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I would say thay you ought to have

indexes regarding real estate also.
MR. WAGNER:

Are there such indexes?

PROFESSOR VANCE:

The real estate people do collect

them and you will find information about the changing values for
industrial land or commercial building land in downtown areas
and various other areas.

It would have to be classified, of

course, so that you would get a fairly uniform sample of a
particular kind of real estate.

Since each plot of real estate

is unique, obviously it isn’t perfect, but I think you can talk
about the changes in cost of commercial buildings in midtown
Manhattan or commercial sites in midtown Manhattan realistically.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Interestingly enough, Howie, out

of one of our interviews which I presume you have seen, Marty
Weber, just back from the government, indicates that the Army
is using some commercially acceptable properties in Hawaii
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which are carried on the books of the government at $10,000 and
are worth in the commercial market $185 million.

They are build

ing an officers' club and he estimates the fair cost of each
night's room rental at $20,000.
Sid, did you want to--?
D E M DAVIDSON:

Just one brief question.

One of the topics that we're concerned with frequently
is the notion of stewardship--of how well the resources are
managed.

Which measure, even on Reed's 50-year-old plant, is

likely to give ua a better feeling about the effectiveness of
management in producing reasonable returns on their investment,
do you think, the historical cost one, or the current value one?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I don't think historical cost is

good for anything in stewardship except physical stewardship in
terms of what the management ought to be able to earn a reason
able return on.

They ought to be able to be able to earn a

reasonable return on current values and we have recommended re
placement values because of their verifiability, and so on.
Ideally, of course, there might be some other

more accurate

calculation of value that you would hold the management respon
sible for . A management that can return an adequate income on
historical cost and not on current cost obviously isn't doing as
well as most investors think they should.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have a question from the floor

indicating that you talked about current costs in the sense of
replacement values or fair values, not necessarily to the ex
clusion of, but at least you did not mention alternatives such as
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discounted cash flows or exit prices.
on that?

Is that deliberate?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

are ideal.

Would you care to comment

More or less.

Discounted cash flows

All of us who have had a course in economics remember

that the value of anything is the present value of its future
net rents.

The only difficulty is you can’t find the future net

rents except in a few contracts such as bonds where you have a
responsible borrower who can definitely pay you so much per year
for a specified period of time.
In regard to an asset such as a machine or a building
or a piece of land, we can’t get that information.

So while

we'd like to have it--and if we did have it, I suppose we could
do away with accounting and a lot of other things— we have to do
something different.
Exit prices are advocated particularly by a well-known
accountant in Australia.

It seems to me that they don’t meet

the standard of verifiability to the extent that accounting
ought to meet it, and therefore we can’t use them very success
fully; I think there's also an objection to it in the sense
that exit prices are not the basis for decisions to the extent
that you might assume.

People in organizations usually like to

keep the organization going and they like to be able to earn an
income from it.

There are cases on record in which the stock of

a corporation has sold for less per share than the amount of
cash in the corporation’s treasury because everybody knows that
the officers are not going to liquidate the corporation and pay
out the cash.

They are going to keep on going and the investors
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think they are going to keep on losing money.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Is it fair, in terms of Ray

Chambers' use of the word "exit values", to relate that to what
we might call a pounce value, a forced liquidation value?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Yes, I would think so.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
PROFESSOR VANCE:

That is fair?

And it seems to me that this repre

sents a concept of a market for the assets which isn't really
relevant to the use of the assets, for the most part.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So what you are talking about,

and continue to emphasize, is the concept of replacement or
fair value in the context of going, operating concerns?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Yes. Definitely.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Another question from the floor:

Intangible assets, such as patent rights, technical information,
good will, and so forth are often expensed currently under pre
sent historic cost accounting principles.

I don’t know that

that is a completely correct statement, but you get the idea.
To what extent

would your views change this notion about the

intangibles part of the balance sheet ?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

With regard to expensing them

currently, I don’t think these current cost ideas have any par
ticular Impact at all because that's a question of whether or
not you are going to retain an asset on the books or not.

If

you can have verifiable evidence that you have got an asset
and you are justified in retaining it presumably you are not
justified in writing it off arbitrarily.
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We might comment in addition in connection with this that
these assets are not ones that are amenable to a reproduction cost
technique.

You can't get an index that describes patents very well.

So what you have to do with these, I think, is to go as far as the
adjustment to a general price level change will permit and be satis
fied with that.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Did your Committee take any position--

I just don't recall your paper that well— about change in practice
with respect to intangibles generally?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

No, it didn't take any special position

at all.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. GELLEIN:

Oscar, I think, is next.

Larry, you quote early in your paper from

ASOBAT about accounting and its purpose, pointing out that it is
that process whereby information is put together to permit informed
judgments and decisions by users.
Now you then test historical cost and current cost against
the qualitative objectives in Statement 4 and conclude that histori
cal cost does not meet those objectives and that current cost does.
Now when we conducted our interviews, the sample wasn't
large, but we talked with very sophisticated users, and we really
encountered no enthusiasm for price level adjusted financial state
ments.

Now, of course, your solution does present price level

adjusted financial statements.

How do you explain the fact that

the users have no enthusiasm for it?
PROFESSOR VANCE:
perience, Oscar.

Well, I think I have had the same ex

For example, we had a Symposium on Financial

Accounting at the University of California one time in which a
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prominent financial analyst spoke.

He had no interest in price level

adjusted statements and I think the answer is that people who have
been successful with the existing system and aren't particularly
oriented to any other one tend to resist change to another one and
get along fine with the one they have got.

It's a matter of not

really wanting to adapt themselves to a new situation and feeling
satisfied with what they have been able to do in the past.
It’s still a little bit like social change.

People who

are getting along well under the current rules and regulations like
to keep on that way, and others who think they need a change, of
course, agitate for a change.
I don’t believe it’s anything more than a common human
tendency to stand with what you know and what you have been success
ful with.
MR. GELLEIN:

Well, then, how do you conclude its useful?

PROFESSOR VANCE:

Well, I have the feeling that maybe I

have a more objective view on it than some of these peope.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Is he asking for price level or specific

prices?
MR. GELLEIN:
DEAN DAVIDSON:
MR. GELLEIN:

It’s price level with specific indices.
Well, that’s not price level.
Well, it’s not general price level, but it’s

specific price level indices.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Well, all right, if you want to call that

a price level.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I thought, Larry, you were talking in

a broader sense of replacement costs or giving consideration to price
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level as distinguished from price level alone.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Well, I'd like to make another

comment here too, and that is that if you use specific price
indexes and make an adjustment, one thing you may incorporate
in your statements--and this goes hack to the question we had a
while ago about the form of the income statement--you can indic
ate how much of the change is attributable to a general price
level increase and how much also, then, represents change with
regard to this specific asset over and above the general price
level change.

So you can improve the information to that extent

also.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But the accretion in value in

the Hawaiian officers' club is not strictly a price level thing.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

It was certainly not due in any

large degree to the general price level changes, but to a
specific price situation.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But you would recognize that and

include that kind of an adjustment if you were a commercial
enterprise, would you?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Oh, yes.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Okay.

Definitely.
Howie Wagner, I think in

the specific terms of price level adjustment you did a major
experiment a few years ago and found that there were relatively
few decisions that would have been adjusted internally as a re
sult of that.
MR. WAGNER:

Well, as a matter of fact, we did this,

but found that there would be no decisions that had been made
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that would have been altered as a consequence of going just on
strictly a price level adjusting basis.

Of course, this doesn't

take into account all the replacement cost adjustments.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I can cite another instance.

A

study was made of Cummins Engine, was it not, and published in
the Accounting Review a number of years ago, and they found that
price level adjustments didn’t make much difference; the reason
they didn't was that the company had expanded so rapidly over
the last ten or fifteen years that almost 80 or 90 per cent of
their assets had recently been acquired so that you didn't have
much of a base that represented old outdated prices.

So, of

course, whether or not it's significant or important depends on
each individual case on the age of the assets of the particular
company and their particular fortunes.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think I have been ignoring Don

Edwards.
DEAN EDWARDS:

Larry, did you mean to imply that you

would use current value statements singularly in reporting or
would you use multiple column reporting?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

The original statement in 1966 sug

gested multiple column reporting, primarily, I think, because
we looked upon it as kind of a transitional situation.
current report doesn’t recommend that any longer.

The

It simply

suggests current costs.
DEAN EDWARDS:

One of the executives that Oscar re

ferred to that we interviewed was a former controller, but now
president, of a large company that had 800 fast food locations
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around the country and the specific question we asked him was
whether or not he would like to know the current value of those
locations as a measurement of return on investment.

His answer

was no.
Would you like to respond to that in any way?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Yes.

I think if I were in his posi

tion, I might feel the same way because with the lower valuation
in a period of inflation you get a higher return.

He wouldn't

look quite as good if he reported the current values and the
same income.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

One more question from the floor

and then I think we'll move on.

As a defense contractor per

forming cost reimbursement type contracts for the U.S. Govern
ment, I believe the questioner says, I would have difficulty
using current values in billing the government.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I'm sure the government might be

reluctant, but the government presumably ought to pay you based
on current reproduction costs; otherwise it's stealing part of
your

assets.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have another one here if you

will give me a minute.
MR. WESTON:

While you’re reading it, I might ask

whether you have any experience in anyone applying this par
ticular technique to any corporation?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

Unfortunately not.

We'd like a

volunteer if we can get one.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

The gist of this question which
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is rather long and involved is the difficulty of determining
current values in an incipient or developing situation, such
as, let us say, the new town aspects of Reston, Virginia, and
that sort of thing, and I suppose it goes hack to my sloping
evaluation kind of thing.

What would he your position there,

that it’s a matter of reexamination year by year?

That is, if

you flop, it goes down, and if you really take off, it goes up.
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I think in that case you will have

specific assets, such as land and buildings.

You presumably

ought to he able to get indexes which would indicate what
current reproduction costs would he, what you would have to pay
to get similar land, what you would have to pay to build similar
buildings, and you would use those.

If your estimates of what

you can do or your decisions or your designs are bad, so that
people don’t respond to your enterprise, it might be that you
couldn’t use current costs properly because you have made com
mitments which destroy the values for your particular assets.
But in general, without regard to a concern about
whether or not you have missed the boat somehow in your own
promotions, presumably the indexes ought to indicate the values
you are using, for which you ought to be responsible, and on
which you ought to be able to earn a return.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But, then an anticipated success

followed by an unexpected failure would give you a degree of
volatility in your income accounts that we do not now have
necessarily.
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PROFESSOR VANCE:

If you were using current costs and

costs were going up but you were failing because of your own
policies or administration, it might be that you would have
values reported going up for a while and then you recognized
your own failures and wrote them down.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

And you say that those ups and

downs should indeed be recognized as they go up and down?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I think those represent the best in

formation you can get about what’s happening.
MR. WESTON: Along the lines of that last question, we
talked yesterday about the Alaska oil leases and there was some
discussion of the large amounts expended and the fact that
values seem to be going up and down based on ecology and costs
and future price levels, and so on.

Would that be an example,

along the lines of the last question, where you would look to
reproduction cost or replacement cost in terms of what you could
buy it for today and that those changes also would run through
the statements?
PROFESSOR VANCE:

I would think so.

In a volatile

situation you will simply have more vigorous fluctuations but
I think the investor is entitled to know these.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much, Larry.

We appreciate all of the cooperation we have had, consistently,
from the AAA.
Next is Arthur Andersen.

George, will you introduce

yourself?
MR. GEORGE CATLETT:

My name is George Catlett and
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I'm accompanied by Norman Olson.

W e 're partners in Arthur

Andersen & Co.
Norman and I appreciate having this opportunity this
morning to present the views of our firm to your Study Group.
The time available will not permit us to do anything other than
give you some very brief comments.

We do have in preparation

in our firm a comprehensive document setting forth our conclus
ions and our reasoning in more detail and we plan to submit this
to your Study Group as soon as it is completed.
Norm will now give you a brief summary of our views
and then we can go to the question period.
MR. NORMAN O . OLSON:

It seems to us that perhaps the

difficulty we have enountered in searching for agreement on
objectives may be due in part to trying to cut through the
layers of networks of concepts, postulates, principles, conven
tions, and methods; but if we can get underneath all of that,
it seems to us that the idea--the basic idea— is a simple one
even though its implementation may be very difficult.
Without defining our terms for the present, aren’t
financial statements intended to provide some information on
two fundamental questions?

And those are:

How much wealth

does the company have and how successful is it likely to be in
producing additional wealth in the future?
There are a number of general considerations and fac
tors that we feel were helpful in leading us to our particular
conclusions as to the objectives.

There isn’t time to run

through all of these but I would like to mention Just two which
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I think are particularly significant.
First of all; it seems to us that financial statements
should aid the investor and others in appraising the future.
The statements are intended to present a picture that is true
of the present and information about what has happened in the
past concerning business enterprises.

Yet almost all economic

decisions made from that information are oriented to the future.
Therefore; financial statements should present information that
is as useful as possible to investors; creditors; and others in
assessing the future prospects of a business--the basis for all
economic decisions.
And second, we feel that it is important that the
accounting function be segregated from the investor or user
function.

The evaluations and interpretations made by investors,

based in part on information provided by financial statements;
should not be allowed to affect or to be introduced directly in
to those statements.

And we believe that failure to observe

this segregation of functions in the past may have introduced
a circularity that has reduced the usefulness of financial in
formation at times and has resulted in confusion in the resolu
tion of individual problems,and perhaps even in a growing con
fusion; for example; over the responsibility for financial fore
casts.
Segregation of these functions demands that a careful
distinction be made between presenting financial information
and predicting the future; as you all know, that is not always
a clear line.

While financial statements should be presented
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in a manner that will assist as much as possible in assessing
the future and its risks, the role of accounting or financial
statements is not to predict or to interpret the future.

That’s

the function of the investor.
The statement user has the responsibility for predic
tions and reaching decisions.

Accountants should not attempt

to relieve the statement user of this responsibility.

Other

wise, accountants and not the investor should be entitled to
the rewards of risk taking.
And we see it now, auditors are almost being charged
or considered responsible for the quality of investments, versus
the quality of financial reports.
Well, we feel those are two basic considerations to
bear in mind, not only in reaching agreement on objectives, but
perhaps also in individual decisions as to the selection of
accounting practices and presentation of information.
In our view, the overall purpose of financial state
ments is to communicate information concerning the nature and
the value of the economic resources of a business enterprise
and the interests on the part of creditors and the rights of
the owners in those resources and the changes in the nature and
value of those resources from period to period.
We recognize that the term "economic resources” has
been defined in various ways and we might ultimately settle on a
different term for that reason.

But for our purpose, we have

defined "economic resources”--and this definition has been used
by others--as those elements of wealth which possess three basic
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characteristics; namely

utility, scarcity, and exchangeability.

The term "exchangeability" as used here is not in
tended to suggest that an economic resource is necessarily
immediately marketable nor that it is being held for immediate
sale by a business.

It does mean, however, that an economic

resource is separable from the business as a whole and that it
has value in and of itself.

This will be a difficult distinc

tion to make for the identification of economic resources from
other elements of wealth but we believe that it would provide a
useful thrust and an emphasis and if these views were adopted,
of course, this identification would become a major concern in
the accounting process.
Now, this definition of economic resources would tend
to exclude from the balance sheet a myriad of unidentifiable
intangibles or attributes of a business that may give it an
advantage over others in a competitive system and hence enable
the business to achieve profits beyond the pure cost of money.
These intangibles and attributes include a whole range of ele
ments from the quality of management to the quality of product
and human resources, but these attributes lack the basic charac
teristics
as a whole.

of exchangeability or separability from the business
And these attributes or unidentifiable intangibles,

may be extremely valuable--much more valuable than the economic
resources, in many cases; they may arise through deliberate
effort or fortuitous accident; but information about their
quality and potential value is conveyed primarily by information
on earnings rather than through direct measurement in the bal-
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ance sheet.

And in a sense, adopting this view, at least, the

conversion of the intangible wealth or intangible attributes of
a business into economic resources is what constitutes the earn
ings process.
Now, under this definition the balance sheet would
also generally exclude categories of deferred charges not
directly identified with economic resources and particularly
when deferment is based solely on the expectation of matching
such deferred amounts against future revenues.

Economic re

sources may arise in the future from such expenditures and this
fact also will be reflected in earnings.
Now, we have talked about value of economic resources.
We feel that it's important to distinguish those values from
the value of the business as a whole; our view of the objectives
of financial statements does not embrace reporting market value
information about the equity of owners in the business.

To

attempt to present the current value of the equities of owners
would be to attempt to value the business as a whole; and to
repeat, that is an investor function.

To reflect in the finan

cial statements the investors' decisions would

introduce this

hopeless circularity of which I spoke earlier.
I believe that agreement on this point, one way or
another, is crucial to a meaningful statement of objectives.
Well, you noticed, I'm sure, that we used the term
"value" of economic resources--a fighting word, as we have
observed.

Let me emphasize that it is not our purpose to en

courage a radical and sudden departure from existing practice
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in the area of financial reports.

Rather, we would like to

encourage a redirection of attitudes and to establish goals,
even though those goals may never be completely obtainable.

In

this way solutions to accounting problems can be sought in a
cohesive manner directed toward common goals.
Our statement of purpose does not contemplate a whole
sale abandonment of the transaction oriented cost approach.
Transactions translate values into costs that under many circum
stances will be a continuing, dependable, and reliable means of
conveying value information about economic resources.

I doubt,

for example, that the value approach would justify extensive,
frequent writeups of plant and equipment.

In fact, under the

value approach we might have more writedowns than under the cost
matching emphasis.

And, actually, the value approach, when

combined with a hard economic resource test for the admission of
assets to the balance sheet, may result in more prudent financial
information in many cases than that which flows from our present
concepts.
We also feel that the value objective is sensible and
not really a radical one because we believe that this objective
is intuitively held now by a wide range of users of financial
statements, including business managements.

I think many of us,

as accountants who prepare statements, intuitively feel that
value is what this game’s all about.

Much of our literature, of

course, has denied value as an objective.

We speak of depreci

ation as a process of allocation and not valuation.

But the

resolution of day-to-day problems in accounting belies the liter
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ature.

There is, for example, a continuous concern among audi

tors in practice today with one aspect of value, and that is:
Is the asset at least worth its carrying value?

Is its carry

ing value recoverable from future operations?
Businessmen,

accountants, and knowledgeable users

consider many balance sheets to be almost worthless in the
sense of conveying useful information.

And why is this true?

Because they don’t regard the information as indicative of the
value of the assets.
Now isn’t this attitude really a subtle acknowledge
ment of what our objectives are, or should be?
The value of an economic resource at any time is the
price it commands in exchange.

It may be indicated by an

initial cost, by a cost to reproduce, by a market price, or by
reference to value of other economic resources that provide
comparable services, and so on.

And the question of the most

appropriate value to use in various circumstances will involve
very difficult areas of judgment, but we feel these difficulties
must be faced eventually if financial statements are to be made
more relevant and useful.
Under this concept, earnings should be considered
a result of the measurement of economic resources and periodic
earnings would be determined by the change in the owner’s equity
shown by comparative balance sheets, other than changes, of
course, that result from distributions or additional invest
ments from owners.
Perhaps more than any other statement, the statement

3.39

of income is used in assessing the future prospects of a busi
ness.

Thus we believe it is important to highlight, for

example, the impact of fixed expenses as an aid in evaluating
the future with respect to volume fluctuations, to point out
major gains or losses of an unusual nature, whether from regu
lar operations or not, which may not occur frequently, and
major expenditures made strictly for the purpose of creating
future income benefits, such as for general research and de
velopment and major advertising, and designed to create in
tangibles, which in our view should be charged off as incurred.
In addition, major holding gains or losses should be segregated
from operating results.
Well, the approach we are advocating and an evaluation
of how it might lead to greater progress in improving financial
reports may be better understood by a very brief review of two
key issues that may be the source of some of our difficulties.
There is, we believe, a confusion of cost as an ob
jective rather than a method.

And in looking back over the

literature, it seemed to me that in the early part of this
century cost was becoming regarded as a means by which informa
tion on value was conveyed.

Cost was simply a dependable ob

jective method to provide information on value.

But the think

ing gradually changed so that as accountants, in ever-increasing
numbers, we proclaimed that we had nothing to do with values.
Thus, while cost was originally considered as a means of con
veying value information, it has now tended to become an ob
jective or an end in itself.

In the evolution, as you know,

utility regulation, Supreme Court decisions which defined income
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under the separability concept, the implementation of the
Securities Acts, all have tended to elevate cost

to the level

of objective as opposed to a method of conveying value informa
tion.
And coincident with this solidifying of cost as an
objective rather than a method of providing value information
was the introduction of sort of a reverse approach to accounting
measurement.

The profession in the United States, as you re

call, in the early 1930 's began to suggest that balance sheets
were not too useful and that asset valuations were not practical.
The income account was emphasized as all important.

This

approach seemed to assume that earnings could be measured in a
vacuum; that increases in wealth could be measured without
measuring the wealth itself.
This emphasis and subsequent developments in the
profession led to this broad and intricate network of methods
and rules, all designed, in effect, to enforce the basic con
cept

of allocation or matching of costs with revenues.

Thus

a major thrust of accounting in the last 35 years has been to
measure earnings and plug the balance sheet with debits and
credits as a result of the matching process rather than to
measure the assets or the economic resources and obligations
designating the net change in earnings.

There are a number of

examples of that that we could go into.
But this combination, we believe, of cost as an ob
jective and reverse measurement is loading balance sheets to
where they are little more than fluffy dreams of the future--
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preoperating costs, development costs, advertising costs, general
R&D, and so on--on the basis that these expenditures will be
matched against future revenu.es even though they attach to no
economic resource in which there can be a viable equity and
certainly can have little meaning in any computation, for example,
of debt-equity ratios.
Also as a result--and I think this is important--of a
too rigid attachment to the cost matching approach, accountants
have often resisted writedowns, for example, in plant and equip
ment for loss in value so long as they are in use.

The major

criticism, for example, as I recall, of Penn Central's accounting
on the part of the ICC is that they had written down some rail
road property and thereby relieved future income statements of
depreciation charges.
So that the value approach actually is likely to re
sult in more prudent financial statements in many cases than the
cost approach and I think that it is important to remember that
when we talk about current costs, current values, fair values,
and so on, it isn't strictly a writeup process at all.
The objectives of financial statements, as we see them
and which we have summarized briefly here, should lead account
ants, we believe, to address themselves to current problems in
a different fashion.

Agreement on objectives will not necess

arily make accounting any easier; it may make it more difficult
but it should help assure meaningful and coordinated solutions.
Any useful objective should provide us, as accountants,
with a basis for making choices.

Whenever alternative account-
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ing principles or procedures are being evaluated, there is a
need to refer to the purpose of the accounting process.

If

value is selected as the goal, the basis for making choices
exists.

The accounting alternative believed to have the capa

bility of producing the closest approximation of the best indi
cator of value should be preferred even if based essentially on
cost data, given, of course, compliance with supplementary test
of feasibility and objectivity.
We believe that if there were agreement that the goal
of accounting is to provide information on values and that even
the cost approach is intended to do this, more meaningful solu
tions would be reached and perhaps some of the inadequacies
in present financial reports would begin to disappear.

The

focus of the measurement process would be clarified and earning
would again come to be regarded as the result of the measure
ment of assets and liabilities and not vice versa.

And

whether many adjustments to cost are made or not, we really
need a simple acknowledgment of the goal that, as we have
previously stated, is even now intuitively felt, probably, by
the majority of us.
Second, if agreement can be reached that the assets
presented in the balance sheet should be limited to economic
resources, as we have defined them, and should be presented on
the basis of the most reasonably relevant value information
available, progress could be achieved in dealing with many
subjects, such as those relating to intangibles and deferred
charges, even though the distinctions would be extremely
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difficult.
But whether you agree with our view on those types of
assets or not; we are sure that you will acknowledge that agree
ment on this issue; the criterion of asset admission is essen
tial.
Third, the delineation of the accounting and investor
function, we think, can also eliminate many confusions.
Regardless of the difficulties of measurement which
may he encountered; mere acceptance of the objectives and goals
could result in all of us working toward a common goal.

Then

we would have less rhetoric over uniformity and detailed rules
and the exaggerated emphasis on the elimination of alternatives
would he avoided.
MR. CATLETT:

I might just make one general comment.

I think part of the problem is what we are thinking about even
when we talk about objectives.

To me, what is so badly needed

by the accounting profession is a compass and a North Pole to
head toward.

I think the accounting profession has constantly

been running up a bunch of blind alleys.

I think we have been

reaching ad hoc decisions on problems without any general guid
ance.

And the way I like to think about it is:

In establish

ing objectives; we are trying to find a North Pole; we’re trying
to set our compass on that Pole which is our objective.
never get to the North Pole; but that’s maybe
The key question is:
sistent, coordinated basis?

We may

almost irrelevant.

Where are we heading on a con

This can change from time to time

but at any one point in time we ought to know where we’re
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going; the accounting profession, in my view, has not known
that and that is why we need objectives and that, of course, is
why your Study Group is in existence.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
Norm.

Thank you very much, George and

I'm going to break in just a minute before we start the

questioning.
Dick Cyert was unable to be with us yesterday because
of commencement at his university.

Dick is an economist.

He's

presently Dean of the Graduate School of Industrial Administra
tion at Carnegie.

He is the incoming President of Carnegie-Mellon

University in Pittsburgh and we're happy that he is going to
have two full days with us even though we missed him yesterday.
Now, for a first question, Norm or George, I perhaps
missed some refinements as you went along but you state that
income should be predictive or income should be stated in such
a way that it can be a predictive tool.
Now, my question is:

If you indeed advocate that all

expenditures made for noneconomic resource assets--and I presume
that to be the intangibles such as human capital, R&D, and so
on--if you advocate that they should be expensed, then aren't
you impeding or impairing in some way the predictive qualities
of the residual income?
MR. OLSON:
ways, Bob.

Well, I suppose you could argue it both

I don't believe so because I believe that the

accountant can't predict the values of expenditures for in
tangibles; it is solely dependent on earnings.

And I don't see

how any kind of capitalization can possibly help the investor--
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I also think that all of

the amortization techniques I have seen on that type of thing
are completely arbitrary.

They are not tied to any life at all.

I do think that in this kind of an approach to in
tangibles, and with the heavy emphasis on expenditures for in
tangibles these days in technology and other ways, that further
disclosures than the mere segregation in the income statement
are necessary.

We are suggesting, for example--I didn't get

into this in our notes--that perhaps there should be a statement
of intangibles, particularly with companies heavily oriented in
that direction, which could show not only expenditures on an
annual basis but on a cumulative basis and maybe provide some
information for the user on the amount of earnings being dedi
cated to future economic resources.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have a second question also,

this one from the floor, which relates to the same general sub
ject.

But I guess you did say, apart from a listing of intan

gibles as a supplemental statement, that there should be a
further clarification within reported results of the nature of
expenditures so that the residual income would b e , in a sense,
explained with the ups and downs of that kind of expenditure.
Is that right?
MR. OLSON:

That's right.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think that's an answer to this

question.
MR. CATLETT:

I think we could say, Bob, that in this

area the objective would be to disclose in the most meaningful
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Of

course, there may be many different ways of doing that and more
study and consideration should well be given to that; but there
should be maximum disclosure in a manner that would be as use
ful as possible.
MR. GELLEIN:

I 'm sure I will have to read your paper

to fully understand all of its implications, and I look forward
to doing that, but I wonder if we could take a simple situation
and see what it entails, using your notion of economic resources,
finding

this North Star, and heading toward it.
Let's take a simple case of a manufacturing concern

that puts direct materials into the manufacturing process,
applies some direct labor to it, and the product is part way
down toward being finished.

Now, how would you see the applica

tion of your notion to the determination of the value of that
product, that inventory--work in process or finished goods,
whichever it may be?
This of course, gets at the question of:

What is

income?
MR. OLSON:

I want to emphasize again that our major

point on value is to regard our cost process as a value in
formant.

We have a section in the area of inventories.

are some difficult questions there.

There

Basically, in most situa

tions of goods manufactured to stock or goods held for resale,
the present practice of FIFO or average cost conveys meaningful
information.

The risks of sale in that the part of the earnings

process that's involved in the selling effort are so great that
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valuing it at selling price is not justified.
I think that this approach, however, might give us a
different answer on goods custom-manufactured under specific
order where the selling risks and the credit risks have been
evaluated before the earnings process.

There should be no rea

son under those circumstances to delay profit recognition or to
value finished custom-made goods at cost; those ought to be
valued at realizable values.
LIFO valuation would disappear, for example, and this
is where we feel that adopting the value attitude would tend to
point us toward coordinated solutions.
MR. GELLEIN:

It seems to me that you are just re

defining the realization concept.
MR. CATLETT:
MR. PARKER:

Exactly.
Would an example of this be a DC-10 aero

plane which has been ordered?

Is that a custom type of manu

facturing?
MR. CATLETT:

When you get over into big items and

long construction contracts pretty much made to order--either
specifically to order or generally to order--you probably go to
percentage of completion.

That is what is being done now in

some cases, of course.
MR. PARKER:

Could I ask Norman a question in terms of

the factory that makes the widgets that you were talking about?
How does your value approach work there
MR. OLSON:

As we mentioned briefly, and which we dis

cussed quite extensively in our study, the concerns in the area
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of fixed assets or plant and equipment and buildings these days
should not be, or probably should not be, with undervaluation.
I think that we need to be far more concerned, perhaps, as
accountants than we have been with whether or not our depreci
ation formulas are adequate.

Someone asked a question this

morning about a 50-year life asset.

The kind of technological

changes that are occurring today and the kind of changes that
are occurring socially and in markets makes you wonder whether
anything should be depreciated over 50 years.
Hotels or buildings which are being depreciated over
40 years may be hard to justify.
bubbles in ten years.

We may be living in plastic

I think the emphasis in plant and equip

ment should be on whether or not the assets are overstated and
I think that’s what the result could be from a solid value
approach to accounting.
MR. PARKER:

Suppose we take a steel company today.

There it is with all its assets in place, some of them old,
some of them new--more of them new than old.

How do you, then,

as the accountant or auditor, go at tackling the question of
what kind of depreciation charge should be made.
MR. CATLETT:

I agree with you that you can't

generalize on things like that.

I think you would have to

study it.
We are suggesting a change.

Norm and I suspect that

we might have about as many writedowns as writeups if you really
did what ought to be done today in a lot of cases.

When you

look at all the special charges that have been running through
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that a lot of that is underdepreciation in the past.
MR. PARKER:

What kind of tests or what kind of

rationale would you run through in trying to decide, either in
general or using the steel plant as an example if that's help
ful?
MR. OLSON:

Of course, in auditing we run through a

lot of these tests now.
the assets are there.

We all intuitively worry about whether
You look at the profitability, whether

the plant is generating a profit.

You ask questions about

innovations, about plans for replacement, to determine, first
of all, whether the assets are worth what they are now carried
at.
I think if you get into a situation where you have
got a healthy plant turning out a gread product and good pro
fits that's fully depreciated we ought to stop and establish
some reasonable value on it so we can get a legitimate depreci
ation charge.

That's the kind of an effort that now is gener

ally not made on the basis that the costs have been matched and
allocated against profits.

I think the value attitude would in

those extreme cases restore the plant and equipment under some
formula and it probably would be under some depreciated re
placement cost kind of basis.
MR. CATLETT:

Let me give you a concrete example;

some people in the room will recognize it.
Several years ago our firm was auditing a meat pack
ing plant.

They had a large plant that was not very successful
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in its current operation.

They had a labor contract with very

high termination pay; the termination pay requirements were so
large that they couldn't afford to shut it down.

They offered

to give it to the city, or anybody else who would take it for
nothing, literally, and take over the labor contract; nobody
would take it for nothing.
This company wrote it down substantially.

We certified

it and several prominent accountants jumped all over us under
the logic that as long as it was in operation we did not have
the right to write it down because we were relieving future
income statements of the depreciation charge, when the darned
thing wasn’t worth anything.
That is what we are talking about, changing that
emphasis away from matching depreciation with revenues just
because

you are using it.

They offered to give it away to

anybody who would take it and there wasn’t a single taker.

I

think under those conditions the value was zero and it should
have been written down.

I don’t care whether they were operat

ing it or not.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Let me pick up Reed’s question

about the steel plant in a different context.
I know what your answer will be.

I kind of think

Given this steel plant such

as we have all over the place in the South Side in Chicago,
whether it be new or old, it is a polluter.
illegal or prospectively illegal.

This is presently

That plant is not going to be

operable within our time span in the same manner as your glass
bubble.
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I presume your theory would he that, with or without
present statute, even though the plant is presently operational,
that required rejection of the facility should he presently
recognized.
MR. OLSON:

Yes, it should he a consideration in the

valuation and depreciation practices applied to that plant.
I ’m not familiar with the steel industry at all there, with
that particular problem or how imminent it is, Bob,but given
those facts, this is true.
I gather the auto industry faces the same problem in
meeting the ignition standards of a number of states.

Certainly

it's a consideration that managements and accountants should
take into account in depreciation practice.
DEAN CYERT:

Do you think that your theory holds

equally well in a period of falling prices?

One thing that

worries me is that current conditions are influencing thought
in this area to the point where we’re sort of deluding ourselves
and thinking we’re getting at the truth and what we are really
doing is reacting to the situation.
For example, suppose in a period of falling prices
the firm has positive earnings, as we would now define it, hut
not great enough to make up for the loss of current value.
Would you say that it could he accurate to say that that firm
is making a loss or has zero earnings?
In other words, think through your position under
opposite conditions.
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MR. OLSON:

There’s no question that the value ap

proach cuts both ways, up and down, and I would reemphasize
again that I think the value approach, if administered with
integrity may produce more writedowns than it will writeups,
even under today's conditions.
DEAN CYERT:

Don’t you think that’s misleading?

I

mean that, in a sense, one of the things we are trying to
measure is the performance of a particular system of machines
and managers, and those machines and managers may be performing
well, but something else is happening in the society which is
affecting the particular values.
What is it that we are really trying to measure?

Are

we really trying just to reflect what society is saying in
general or are we trying to measure the particular enterprise?
MR. CATLETT:

To me, we're trying to reflect the facts

and, of course, there's a gread deal of judgment in this area
you’re talking about.
range trends.

You have short-range trends and long-

I think you have got to analyze each case and

use your judgment.
There may be areas such as a series of computers that
are going to be obsoleted by another series of computers.

You

can have things like steel mills that may get to the point
where you can't even operate them any more.

It just seems to

me that you have to evaluate all these factors; you are not
going to be writing plants up and down every month and that
sort of thing.

You have got to take more long-range factors

into consideration.
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But if you have a high degree of evidence that in five
years it's not going to be worth anything, you have got to take it
into account; that's more in line with what we are talking
about than plants goi
n g up and down.
And when you get over into marketable securities,
such as a thousand shares of General Motors, and you go to
market value, that's a lot different than a steel mill, I think.
You would tend to go up and down more there, I think.
DEAN CYERT:

It seems to me there you are contradict

ing one of the points that you made earlier, when argued that it
wasn't the accountant’s function to begin to predict the future,
because now you are predicting the future in terms of trying to
value this particular asset.
MR. OLSON:

Let me go back to your earlier question.

I'm not sure that I grasped the thrust of it, but, basically,
the income statement would separate holding gains and losses.
And I would envision that if you did have a writeup for example,
in plant and equipment, you would then have a higher charge
against operations for depreciation.

Similarly, if you should

have a writedown, you would have a lower charge against opera
tions.

The operating results would still be carved out separ

ately albeit they would reflect from a depreciation standpoint
any changes in value.
I think this touches a little bit on the question
that someone

asked Larry Vance earlier and maybe this is also

partially what you are driving at.

As far as accountability is

concerned, it's difficult for me to say how you can establish
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any real accountability insofar as management is concerned unless
you charge them with some reasonable measure of value of the
resources they take over.

A management, for example, that takes

over a company that’s got a $200 million unrecorded profit in
marketable securities can show profits of $100 million
be lose $100 million.

and may

There is no accountability without it--no

real accountability, it seems to me, without that approach.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
question, Dick, as to whether

Aren’t you really asking the
the change in value resulting

from falling price levels would be reflected as a holding loss
in this valuation process?
DEAN CYERT:

Yes.

MR. CATLETT:

I think you would but some things might

be reflected faster than others by the nature of them.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So you would tend to hold operat

ing results separate and therefore you would have a continuing
thing.
Sid Davidson is next, I believe, if you still wish to
ask a question.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Yes.

Well you know, it's all right

for you practitioners to be visionary in this regard but we
academics have to be concerned with the problems of implementa
tion.
I ’m kind of worried about whether this system would
envisage the continuation of unit property records and what
would be the clues.

If the answer to that is yes, what would

be the clue for change in the valuation attached to units of
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property and who would make this revaluation?
I think I ’m wholeheartedly in accord with your ob
jectives but I'm not quite clear how w e ’d move in that direction.
MR. CATLETT:

I think there are two aspects of this.

One is, we have to first decide whether it’s desirable to move
in this direction.

That’s the first question.

We are concerned

about implementation also but you do have to first decide whether
you want to go in a certain direction; and if it isn’t desirable,
it doesn’t make any difference about the implementation.

We at

least, have concluded that it’s desirable to go in this direc
tion where there are significant departures.
In a lot of areas of plant and equipment and inven
tories and things the departure wouldn't be sufficient to do it;
but you are talking about the cases where it would be.

And

wherever there are significant departures, either up or down,
based on all the facts, adjustments would be made.
We aren’t going to be able, as you well know, to sit
here this morning and say exactly how we're going to do all this
vast array of things.

You have got thousands and thousands of

companies and hundreds of industries and a great variety of
circumstances and we feel that it's feasible to approach the
facts in each case and use your judgment as long as we know
what w e ’re trying to accomplish.
At times you might use price-level indexes; at times
you'd use other things.

I don't think, myself, that it's

possible to have any one approach to valuation when you have got
such a huge variety of circumstances.

I think if we know what
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we are trying to accomplish, then you probably would end up us
ing eight or ten or twelve different approaches and overriding
your whole thing is your evaluation of the facts anyhow.
Whether a computer that’s not in use is going to be
obsoleted three or four or five years from now becomes a highly
judgmental matter.

But you do have to use judgment and manage

ments have to all the time; auditors are forced to and that’s
why we have a profession.

If it was easy, all w e ’d need to be

is bookkeepers.
D E M DAVIDSON:

Yes, but I guess you might run into

the attitude that the use of values of economic resources as a
means of controlling our recordkeeping is desirable, if attainable.
MR. CATLETT:

Right, and we should do it to the extent

it’s attainable.
DEAN DAVIDSON:
MR. CATLETT:

Sure.
W e ’re setting objectives here and we ’re

assuming that we are going to take steps in that direction on a
controlled basis to the extent feasible and practical and if we
can figure out where we want to go, maybe we’ll address our
selves more to arriving at techniques and ways and means of
getting there.
The trouble with the conversations so far

is that

they haven’t even decided they want to go in that direction and
therefore they haven’t even seriously considered the problem;
I just won’t accept the fact that it’s impossible to do if it’s
a good idea to do it.
MR. PARKER:

I just wanted to follow Sidney’s question

a little bit; I think it’s a good one.
You said a little while ago that if you had a plant
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that was all written off and was still obviously humming along,
producing fine profit at good margins, there ought to be some
way to write that plant back up and start depreciating

again;

and I suppose there would be the converse.
But just at about what point do you think you begin to
cut in?

Would you say somewhere between minus two percent rate

of return and a plus ten percent rate of return we leave the
valuation alone and flow on the depreciation like we used to;
get outside those parameters, and we think it’s enough to
trigger valuation.

Would you apply that kind of a technique?

MR. OLSON:

Well, I really think, Reed, it’s pretty

impossible to generalize in that kind of an area.
those kinds of judgments now, every day.

W e ’re making

There’s a lot of in

stinct there; there’s a lot that goes with knowing the company
and knowing its product and knowing its plans.

And I have

sensed from years of experience in this field that if you know
your client, you get a pretty good feel as to whether they are
being too short or too long on their depreciation lives.
It’s a very, very judgmental area and I don’t think
it’s possible to reduce it to any precise formula.
MR. GELLEIN:

I was going to ask a little different

sort of question of George and Norm.

It will take a long time

to get to the North Star, I suspect.
MR. CATLETT:

You may never get there.

MR. GELLEIN:

My question really is this, George, that

this becomes a very long-range goal and of course generations
of investors and other users may come and go before we attain
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those long-range goals.

Do you have any views that you could

express now that would help us set the mid-range goals and the
short-range goals within that framework?
MR. CATLETT:
point.

That's great, I think it is an important

I want to comment and maybe Norm will too.
We aren’t talking about short-range, middle-range,

long-range or anything else.

When you put a compass on the

North Star, you don't have degrees of getting there.

What we

need to decide is where we want to go and we may never reach the
ultimate in all respects but it ought to guide us tomorrow, next
week, next month, on every decision we make.
And the point is, as we take our steps, tomorrow the
first step— it’s like everything the accounting profession ad
dresses itself to in this area.

If we’ve decided where we want

to go, we ought to say which of the alternative solutions best
goes in the direction we want to go; this will apply every day
and to every decision.
That’s the point.

It isn’t any question of steps or

anything else.
As far as I ’m concerned, the main justification I
have felt, for the equity method of accounting--this isn’t what
the opinion says--but in my own mind the main justification for
equity accounting

was that it was a step closer to value ac

counting and that’s all.

We do it because it’s controlled.

You can audit some numbers and so forth.
value than cost is.
other things.

But it’s closer to

And I think you can say that of a lot of
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If you can agree on goals of this type--whether it's
this goal or some other goal--there ought to he guides in every
single decision.

We don’t mean a whole big framework of account

ing theory; this may be four or five things.
those down and agreed on them, you say:
alternatives best meets the goal?
cide.

If you have laid

Which one of the four

That won’t be so hard to de

And that settles it and you don’t spend two or three

years arguing

about it.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So the short-range, long-range

dichotomy comes more on the implementation side than on the
statement of goals or objectives.
MR. CATLETT:
MR. OLSON:

It guides every step.
I think it could affect the individual

decisions, and I would be opposed to designating any period of
transition.

I think when you are talking goals and objectives,

the profession, in particular, is always in a state of transition.
MR. WESTON:

I was interested in your exclusion*

basically, from your definition of economic resources of many
intangibles.

If your goal is to measure wealth of entities and

your three criteria are utility, scarcity, and exchangeability*
I guess it’s the latter one which causes the problem.

Did you

eliminate things like trade names and good will and some of the
things that make some of our large corporations very valuable in
the sense of economic wealth these days?

Did you eliminate those

because of the difficulty of measurement?
MR. OLSON:

Yes, in general, Frank.

The concept of

exchangeability and separability is a difficult one and the
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distinctions will be difficult; I don’t know that you can just
say that R&D is all one.

There are different types and I think

there could be different answers under different circumstances
if we want to get into that.
Basically, as I said or tried to say, the intangible
attributes that you really cannot provide information about as
to value in the balance sheet may be more valuable than the
economic resources in which there can be viable equity and
which are more or less bankable and have some meaning in the
balance sheet.
The point is that we feel that the only information
we can provide the investor and other users about the elements
of wealth that do not meet the standards of an economic

re

source is to provide him the best information we can about earn
ings.

Earnings and profits are what indicate the existence of

those attributes.
Then it becomes the investor’s function to place a
value on those when he values the business as a whole in the
marketplace.

This is why we feel it’s important not to inter

ject those into the balance sheet because we don’t feel you can
really convey any meaningful information on the cost basis, or
any other basis, as to their value.
Now, that may be true of some economic resources too,
at times.
MR. CATLETT:

Another way of saying that, Frank, is

that the cost of many of these things has nothing to do with
the value, as you know.

There’s no relationship between cost
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and value when you get into the intangible area.

You might

spend $1,000 and find something worth one million.
And in many companies, as you know, the marketing or
ganization, the research organization, the management ability,
and all those things are really the most valuable thing that the
company may have but you can’t put dollar signs on those things.
MR. WESTON:
conceptually.

Well, I ’m a little disturbed, I guess

Reed’s plant which is turning out widgets at a

great profit rate may be a terrible plant, overvalued and very
inefficient, and the reason they are making money is because they
have some very valuable intangibles which aren’t on the balance
sheet; your financial statements, therefore, not only don’t show
the proper wealth of the entity, they are misleading in at least
two major areas.
MR. OLSON:

We feel that the profits speak for them

selves with the investor, Frank, and tell the investor about the
existence of the intangibles.
MR. WESTON:

I know, but your articulated statement,

the balance sheet, shows assets that aren't contributing to
those earnings and does not show the principal assets which con
tribute to them.
MR. CATLETT:

Yes, but I would ask you what you would

do because the cost has got absolutely nothing to do with the
value of what you are talking about.

Are you talking about

capitalizing the market value of the stock and putting it on the
balance sheet?
MR. WESTON:

Oh, no.

I ’m saying that each of the
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economic resources of an entity, if you go to the value route,
should he in the balance sheet.

To pick out the ones that are

exchangeable or separable, as your idea does, may get an en
tirely misleading and wrong answer which supports earnings with
values that aren't there and doesn’t show the real values that
are there.
MR. CATLETT:

Yes, but the value, Frank, of good will,

management research, marketing, and all that sort of thing has
nothing to do with the cost expenditures anyhow...
MR. WESTON:
MR. CATLETT:

Exactly!
....and the only way you could put

that on would be to capitalize the earnings and put the market
value of the stock on the balance sheet and everybody would
show a normal rate of return; that's the circular reasoning
that Norm talked about, which couldn't serve anybody.
MR. WESTON:

But that is, in fact, showing the wealth

of that entity which I thought was your primary goal.
MR. CATLETT:

No, it is not our goal because we are

not trying to equate the balance sheet with the market value
of the stock.
MR. WESTON:
MR. CATLETT:

No.

I know.

And otherwise, there's no way of getting

it on anyhow unless you put the market value of the stock on.
MR. WESTON:
thing else.

The market value of the stock is some

That's in the marketplace.

But the assets and the

wealth of the entity do include these intangibles which you are
excluding from the balance sheet.
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MR. CATLETT:
MR. WESTON:

We think they have no place there.
The trade name, the proprietary drug

abilities, the contracts with executives, and so on are, in fact,
resources; they are wealth.

But they wouldn't be in the balance

sheet, as I gather your value proposal.
MR. CATLETT:
place there.

Right.

We don’t think they have any

They are valuable.

In fact, in a company like IBM

they may be more valuable than what is there; but we don’t think
it’s the purpose of financial statements to capitalize that.
MR. WESTON:

I ’m troubled by the approach that you

have selected--relatively speaking, to value the resource is
easy.

You say those will be in the balance sheet; the difficult

ones won’t.

And my point is that you end up with a hodgepodge

which maybe is really meaningless.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I think this exchange pretty

largely takes care of one of the questions from the floor and
we must finish up and have a short break here.

The same point

was made from the floor, that if cost is a reasonable proxy or
an initial indication of value in the case of fixed assets, why
is it not in the case of intangibles?
But it seems to me from your earlier presentation
that this leads into another question from the floor, which in
effect says:

Are you stating that where the degree of subjec

tivity and uncertainty is large, we must rely on extended dis
closure as in the manner of listing of intangibles, and so on?
Is that your suggestion?
MR. OLSON:

I think that’s partly right.

More pre-
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cisely, I would say we have tried to define assets, using the
term "economic resources," as those which do possess some value
not completely dependent on the fortunes of the particular
company involved.

But we would add that there may be some items

that meet the test of economic resource--and we discussed this
some in our study--for which just out of sheer immeasurability,
certain patterns, for example, no useful information as to value,
whether on cost or any other basis, can be conveyed in the bal
ance sheet.

I think with those elements of wealth all account

ants can do is provide information on profits and then the in
vestor places a value on it.
Getting back to your point just briefly, Frank, take
the illustration of a public accounting firm; many of us are
familiar with them.

I suppose that, certainly, the real wealth

of Arthur Young or Arthur Andersen has to be in the competence
of its people.

But isn't it the translation of the competence

of its people into assets that constitutes the earnings process?
And could you really help a banker or help

a partner in a firm

by trying to show him what the costs of recruiting and training
are in the balance sheet and then amortize this over some turn
over figure?
I think every partner in the firm and every banker
would take it off to get at the facts.

The profits, or the

success, or the growth of the firm speaks for the wealth of its
people and I don’t think there is any other way for accountants
to convey that information.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much, Norm and
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George.

We do look forward very much to your presentation in

the next several weeks and I know it will be extremely helpful.
I want also to publicly thank your firm for the very
valuable services of Mike Shannon on a full-time basis.

He's

been a great help and has made a significant contribution to the
work of this group.

Thank you.

We're going to proceed with the Financial Executive
Institute, represented by J. O . Edwards.
Would you indicate the nature of your committee struc
ture, J.O.?
MR. J. 0. EDWARDS:

We have a Corporate Reporting

Committee of which I'm the Chairman; the Corporate Reporting
Committee deals in the accounting issues that the APB deals in
and has its

contacts with members and subcommittees of the

Accounting Principles Board.
I'm very pleased to be here this morning and the
Financial Executives Institute does indeed welcome the oppor
tunity to offer its views to your Study Group.

Your endeavor

is one of equal importance with that of the Wheat Committee
and in some respects

is more fundamental.

One might even spec

ulate that had all of us had from the beginning a common under
standing

of the purposes and objectives of financial statements,

the formation of the Wheat Committee might not have been neces
sary.
Be that as it may, financial executives everywhere
will have a vital interest in your findings since we will have
to place into effect, be responsible for, and, hopefully, be
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lieve in whatever you recommend.

Further, we are probably

about as weary as you must be of the lack of agreement on the
conceptual framework which must

be present if we are to resolve

some important but controversial accounting issues such as
leasing, research and development, extraordinary items, market
able securities, and extractive industries, to name a few.

We

hope this will be the major thrust of your efforts, as noted in
the written statement we filed with you in February, and we
acknowledge an obligation to do everything possible to help you
in this task.
I will attempt only to highlight our preliminary
statement and perhaps give it a more up-to-date perspective.
First, we support the objectives contained in AccountPrinciples Board Statement No. 4, that the emphasis on general
purpose information in accounting is based on the presumption
that the information needs of a significant number of users are
similar and that the acceptance of one approach requires the re
jection of other approaches.

We hope you will agree with the

validity of this presumption while recognizing the additional
need for special purpose statements.

Resolution of this ques

tion is critical if we are to agree on the identity of the pri
mary users.

F. E. I. believes that the primary users are stock

holders, existing or prospective, and creditors, and that the
published financial data that can be most useful to these users
should be that which flows naturally from accounting data needed
by the management to operate the business.

Accordingly, F. E.

I. believes that the primary purpose of financial statements of
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a business enterprise are to discharge management's obligation
to report on how it has used the resources of the business in
its profit-directed activities and whether it has operated
successfully or unsuccessfully.

You may call that stewardship

if you wish, but we frankly do not know of a better place to
start in providing the investing public with meaningful and
useful information for the assessment of past performance.
Whatever we may do to supplement existing reporting
procedures, we hope nothing will be done to deny users the kind
of basic and objective performance data which to us should rank
highest on the scale of usefulness.

For the present, we do not

believe that the desirability of retaining the basic financial
statements as the core of corporate financial reporting will be
seriously challenged.

We do not mean to imply that your study

will not result in substantive proposals, but rather that these
proposals will be in the area of supplementing, expanding and
modifying the existing system of presenting financial informa
tion.

Fundamental changes in accounting must of necessity be

evolutionary if we are to avoid chaos in reporting.

Accordingly,

we believe that cooperative efforts should continuously assess
the desirability of developing new systems of accumulating, us
ing, and reporting financial accounting data.
Now, admittedly, financial executives are cautious
about embracing reporting innovations.
users should be also.

We believe CPAs

and

We are trained to ask why, especially

how, and, above all, to seek justifications.

Financial manage

ment has serious responsibilities to both its corporate manage
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ment and to all users of financial statements.

Responsibility

engenders a reluctance to accept sweeping changes that have not
been tested.

We submit there is room, indeed, an important

need, for honest dissent, a need to withhold acceptance, and a
need to maintain the continuity of existing systems until new
proposals can meet the criteria of practical application and
general acceptance.

The profits and other data reported in

published financial statements are critical to the reporting
unit and to its stockholder owners.

Management’s objectives and

strategies for years to come are based on its reporting methods
and accounting policies.

Management resists changes in state

ment content and accounting procedures advocated by those not in
the firing line that can substantially affect reported earnings.
As your Study Group fully appreciates, accounting and
financial reporting are not subject to natural laws and rela
tionships similar to those which must be observed to obtain the
correct solution to a problem in the physical sciences.

Account

ing employs basic philosophical principles, theorems, and postu
lates which, when applied with judgment, produce a system de
signed to classify, to measure, and to account for the multitude
of events and transactions which occur day-to-day throughout
business operations.
and judgment.

Accounting cannot operate without estimates

There can be no fair presentation of operating

results in financial reporting without experience and a know
ledge of the facts, the underlying circumstances and the sub
stance of the transactions, as well as an understanding of the
philosophies, plans, and objectives of the business.

Accordingly,
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any proposal to change or displace existing practice must he
challenged until the impact of the proposed change can be evalu
ated.
It is for these reasons that we support the steward
ship and historical cost concepts.
We believe F. E. I. reflects the attitude of its mem
bers in a commitment to the concept of full disclosure of finan
cial information whenever such data would be meaningful, have
a material bearing on the results reported, and not be mislead
ing to the investing public.

Our commitment, however, recog

nizes that the term "full disclosure” has not been adequately
defined and that the achievement of the concept requires the
assistance of all interested parties.

We suggest that continu

ing demands for additional information can be self-defeating in
that meaningful information becomes hidden in a mountain of
minutiae and that this may be a poor substitute for responsible
efforts to identify financial reporting objectives.
In our opinion, management will react quite favorably
to proposals to improve financial reports when the need for the
change and the methods of applying it in practice are reason
ably demonstrated.

Some proposals and changes appear to man

agement to lessen the professional responsibility of financial
officers and public accounting firms.

Your Study Group has a

great opportunity to make substantial contributions to the
identification and understanding

of objectives and to facili

tate the establishment of guidelines for improving accounting
and financial reporting so that reports become more understand
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able to the lay reader as well as the professional.

And we are

confident your study will also consider the balance between the
need for change and the effects of material changes on credi
bility.
In this connection we urge the Study Group to consider
current and past accounting research efforts provided by various
organizations, including the Financial Executives Research
Foundation studies on "Financial Reporting by Diversified Comp
anies;" "The Effects of Circumstances on the Application of
Accounting Principles;" "The Concept of Current Value Reporting;"
"The Concept of Materiality;" "The Feasibility and Legal Impli
cation of Publishing Earnings Forecasts and Other Future Events;"
and others which have a bearing on the areas covered in your
public hearings.
With respect to publishing earnings forecasts, F.E.I.
believes that the prevailing management view probably is that
the degree of accuracy required for reporting such data to the
public has not yet been achieved.

Business forecasts and oper

ating budgets are important tools that management uses in plan
ning and administering the business; they are guidelines toward
a common goal; they enable management by exception, in that they
are primarily road maps which permit management to act and react
to unforeseen or uncontrollable events which would otherwise have
a more serious impact on operations.

Aside from the complex

questions regarding the validity of the underlying assumptions,
the competitive disadvantages of disclosing operating plans and
strategies, legal liabilities, et cetera, there are serious res
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ervations as to the usefulness of these data in estimating fu
ture values and stock market prices.
With respect to the applicability of historical cost
versus current values in financial reports, F . E. I. believes
that historical cost accounting has generally been adequate in
the past as the basic method of measurement.

We do, however,

recognize that alternative bases for valuation must be reported
whenever such information is meaningful and material to the us
ers of financial statements.

Given the present state of devel

opment of alternatives, historical cost accounting is now the
best available method for primary use in statements.

We are

studying the feasibility of using alternative methods in the
light of stockholder needs and management's legal and ethical
responsibilities for full disclosure.
Our Research Foundation has contracted, as you know,
with Booz, Allen & Hamilton to conduct a study which is designed
to develop a total understanding of the businessman's viewpoint
of corporate reporting in term s of the purpose and objectives
of financial statements.

The study will include

consideration

of the uses, needs and rights of users for various types of
information and the implications of providing such additional
information as is currently being advocated by various interested
parties.

The primary emphasis in the FERF

Study is on the

views of preparers of financial statements; whereas we realize
your research has given attention primarily to financial state
ment users.

Thus, our study will, we hope, complement rather

than parallel the work of your Study Group.
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In another important area, we believe that the ques
tion of the degree to which corporate financial statements can
validly support attempts to compare the operating results and
performance of different companies is highly relevant to this
Study Group's efforts.

The subject of intercompany comparisons

has long been debated without definitive results to date.

Our

position is that the consistent application of accounting
principles and related disclosures thereto provide the user
with the best known means to compare the financial statements
of a particular business enterprise over time.

Even here, com

parability is so affectd by changes in business operations that
results have to be restated and analyzed in depth to understand
the degrees of comparability between years.
There are no accounting principles or rules which can
provide any assurance with regard to attempts to compare differ
ent companies.

Regardless of the existence of "Uniform Account"

systems and the desire for easy comparisons of the financial
statements of different companies, we believe that such compari
sons are not really feasible because no two companies are
comparable.

We suggest that financial analysts and others re

cognize that accounting can only record facts that have occurred
within a company and can only be comparable to those of other
companies if the facts are comparable.

Appropriate reliance

has to be placed on nonaccounting information and professional
judgment to supplement evaluation of reported financial results.
In closing I would like to refer to your Study Group
charter and attempt to summarize our answers to the key ques
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tions you are asking yourselves:
First, who needs financial statements?
Our answer is that there are many diverse users who
need financial statements but in order to resolve accounting
controversy we must come to grips with the fact there are pri
mary and secondary users and that general purpose statements
should be oriented to the requirements of stockholder owners,
existing and prospective, including their advisors, as well as
creditors.

Requirements of special users can be served by

special statements.
Second, what information do they need?
They need information that will help them evaluate
how well the management has utilized the resources committed
to its deployment and the success, or lack thereof, of its
profit-oriented endeavors.

The quality of the information

should have as many desirable characteristics as possible, not
the least of which are objectivity, verifiability, and under
standability. These requirements heavily favor historical costs
over value although supplemental value information may in time
assume a larger role.
Third, how much of the needed information can be pro
vided by accounting?
This may be the most important question of any for it
forces us to face up to the limitations as well as the capabili
ties of accounting.
part.

Cur answer must be only a relatively limited

There may be another word that should be added when we

speak of the purposes and objectives of financial statements and
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that word is "potentialities.”

Given the existing state of the

art, what potential do financial statements have to prompt in
vestors to buy or sell?

We know you understand, as we do, that

the investment decision is a mix of many assumptions and im
ponderables but the frailty of the underlying assumptions is
often so great as to suggest that we should eschew any report
ing system that purports to provide high-level quantification
of the decision for the investor as the leading or primary goal
of financial statements.
Fourth, what framework is required to provide the
needed information?
The framework required is the existing series of
statements, including the income statement, balance sheet,
shareholder equity, and flow of funds statements. The frame
work should continue to be anchored in historical costs and
completed transactions.
Value determination, forecasts, and long-range pro
jections must have a secondary role and should be approached
with caution.

Segment reporting should be employed to the

extent it is meaningful.
As a final observation, let me say candidly that in
the beginning F. E. I. members were concerned that your Study
objectives might be too all-encompassing.

But now I think we

realize that you had to start out with a broad scope to make
certain that no improvement opportunities are overlooked.
Since the main purpose of your Study is to "refine the objec
tives of financial statements,” we hope our comments will help
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you come forth with a more commonly understood and agreed to
blueprint for the resolution of accounting controversy.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much, J. O ., and

we certainly do appreciate your considerable help on the re
search side.

You have not only completed but have in process

a number of major pieces of research which fit directly, or at
least closely, to our interests, and your giving them to us on
an "advanced" basis, as it were, has been extremely helpful and
will save us a great deal of time.
I 'd like to tackle first the question of disclosure.
It’s my recollection in the early part of the paper that you put
considerable emphasis on disclosure, not as a substitute, but
as a help towards the information process.

You gave some con

cern about its tendency to lead to minutiae, but particularly
in relation to our conversations yesterday--and I believe you
were not here-MR. EDWARDS:

No, I was not.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

There were two questions which

sort of recurred, or were inferred by some of the witnesses,
both relating explicitly

to the disclosure problem.

One is:

What is the real, true, fair line in the disclosure of compet
itive data?

I mean, how do you establish amongst yourselves

what cannot be disclosed for proprietary reasons and should be
disclosed for the good of the potential or actual investor?
The second question is very closely related.

In terms

of corporate information, what is a private good and what is a
public good--"good" in the sense of "right to know"?

Would you
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care to comment on that?
MR. EDWARDS:

Yes.

The first question is:

What can

be disclosed without harm to the business?
As you know, or probably know,

the F. E. I. position

is that we should encourage segment reporting.

We should in

all cases report where there are different business lines with
different elements of risk and, in effect, different types of
business.

But we also say that the competitive question, the

matter of potential disadvantage, is a significant one, and
that in the last analysis this has to be reserved to the judg
ment of the managment because they in the last analysis are
responsible for anything that might harm the enterprise to the
advantage of competition.
Maybe we have a tendency to overwork this but it is a
valid, very critical point, I think, and we don't really have
any way to provide any guidelines other than that it is a
matter of judgment.
more of it.

W e ’re encouraging more of it.

We see

I think the trend is to make more segment disclos

ure; but I don't think there is any question that there is
proprietary information and I don't just mean secret processes
either.

Management may have knowledge of things that the com

petition doesn't have and in order for them to discharge their
responsibility, if it means not disclosing it, then they have
to hold it back.
The second question refers to the corporate informa
tion, that is the contrast between the public need as opposed
to the--
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CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

The public right as opposed to

the private need.
MR. EDWARDS:
a right and a need.

I think that we see a difference between

I think we see the right as being those who

are owners or prospective owners.

The need are those who have

reasons other than investment objectives.
But we think that the requirements for those mentioned
in my comments, the secondary group, have to be subordinated to
the requirements of those who have the right and the obligation
and the responsibility as owners of the business.
And so you walk a tight line here, but nevertheless,
I think that the primary thrust of what we do in this field of
objectives of accounting statements has to be those who have
the right.

I think if we make an effort to roll all those into

one set of objectives and standards, then I think we are maybe
going to cause
got.

a little more confusion than we have already

I guess when it comes into the area of need, as business

men, we feel that we should all be coming forward in this area
to disclose everything that we think is meaningful that can be
disclosed but we realize also that there is a role of govern
ment in this from time to time, and as we go along, and that
much of the secondary need for information will inevitably be
defined by government.

We're not sure that's all bad, if it is

that way.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

It's not particularly applicable

to the industry in which you are currently involved but as re
ported in The New York Times this morning, Don Etra, of the
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Nader Group, took a strong position in relation to the automo
bile industry that, whereas it is customary to report only
significant lawsuits, there really should be an ongoing report
ing to the public of warranty claims or performance complaints,
and that sort of thing, which is going a very far way from what
has been customary on the industry side.
MR. EDWARDS:
as you know.

True.

I ’m not in the motors business,

But if there is a need, and a real need, it would

seem to me that would come from some government-requested or
government-encouraged directive.

If the warranties don’t have

a material impact on the financial picture of the motor compan
ies, then I think that would contribute minutiae.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

J. O ., I ’d like to go back to page 3

of your prepared document, where you expressed the view that
the primary purpose of financial statements is to report on how
management has used the resources entrusted to them; of course,
because we are quantitatively oriented, I suppose we have to
place a valuation upon those resources and it is with regard to
that valuation that I would like to inquire.
Assume we have two firms set up in two different lines
of business five years ago.

Both invested the same number of

dollars in their resources and both have the same expected
service life, but in the one case conditions have changed and
reproduction costs or current values of those resources have
gone down substantially and in the other case conditions have
changed and reproduction costs or current value of those re
resources have gone up very much.
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Both of these companies in Year 6 report the same
income--the same dollar income--based upon our conventional
methods, and we relate that to their resources and they both
seem to show the same rate of return.

Do you think both man

agements have performed as effectively in Year 6?
MR. EDWARDS:

I guess I'd have to know why, in the

case you gave, Sid, the reproduction cost in one case went
down and in the other case it went up.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Technological advancements.

I guess

it’s true that it takes less capital investment per kilowatt
hour of electric power generated today than it ever has in his
tory, despite rising prices, whereas probably to turn out a
gallon of gasoline requires rather more capital expenditure than
it did before.
MR. EDWARDS:

Given the example, I guess you are say

ing that if one of them didn’t keep up with technology, and re
invest in the five-year period-DEAN DAVIDSON:

No, just the cost of providing capa

city has gone down in one field and it’s gone up in the other.
MR. EDWARDS:

Oh, those are different types of in

dustries.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Oh, yes.

Right!

They are in differ

ent industries.
MR. EDWARDS:

I think that’s kind of an unusual situ

ation but if you have that occur in a five-year time frame,
then I think that this is one of those area where people like
Mr. Parker over here are going to know what’s going on in this
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case where the industry did not keep up in the technology and
I think that information is going to he made available.
Now, the Aunt Janes--there isn’t any way they can-DEAN DAVIDSON:

But, J. O., I ’m going to what you de

scribe as the primary purpose, and that is management’s obliga
tion to report on how it has used the resources; if the value
of the resources in one area has gone down, and the value in the
other has gone up, does management have an obligation to relate
to the numerator of earnings that denominator of the resources
entrusted to them in value terms?
MR. EDWARDS:

I really don’t think so, Sid.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Can I just go one step further?

And then I ’ll get to you, Reed.
Isn't there another piece of this?

It’s probably

wrapped up in Sid's question but on that same page you take the
position that stewardship is your primary responsibility.
Whether the change in value comes from the technological mis
use or imaginative use, does not stewardship also contemplate
a reporting on changing values?
MR. EDWARDS:

I think, as we said in our comments

here, it’s conceivable that some time in the future it could
involve both some kind of reporting on changing values as well
as what has happened to the cost basis of the resources commit
ted to the management.

To clarify a bit, as an investor, if I

had to choose— and I ’m not suggesting you should have to choose-maybe at some point in time the investor can get both, but if
you give me my choice as to which I would want in all cases as
my leading set of data, I would take what’s been done with the
mix of costs that have gone into the business over that past
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five years.
I'm not suggesting that reproduction cost value, or
price level adjusted statements might not have some value to an
investor.

I ’m questioning the need for that kind of thing to

supplant historical costs; I ’m assuming that one of them has
to be the leading system and that’s why I think we come out
where we do on values.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

If you were operating in Brazil,

would you take a different position?
MR. EDWARDS:
MR. PARKER:

Yes, I think we would.
Mr. Edwards, noting your statement on

page 12, where you say that accounting can only record facts
that have occurred within a company and can only be comparable
to those of other companies if the facts are exactly comparable-in an early part of your statement you indicated that you felt
the primary purpose or use of these financial statements ought
to be to serve the stockholder or the creditor.

I think we

have an ample presentation from other papers, including that of
the Analysts Federation, that one of the primary needs of the
stockholder-user is information that will aid in the compari
son of one company with another.

You say they can’t be compared,

except on identical facts, but this is what the investor has to
spend most of his time trying to do, and, of course, he does, in
fact, compare dividend payments.
rates of change in earnings.

He does, in fact, compare

And to the extent those reflect

different kinds of accounting policies, even for transactions
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that aren't exactly the same, hut are anywhere near close to
being the same, doesn’t this insistence that you mustn't have,
or you shouldn't look for, fairly comparable accounting policies,
coem in conflict with a basic investor need?
We take, well known examples like the investment tax
credit, move to the famous one of the computers that sometimes
have five year lives for one company and ten years for another,
accelerated versus straight line depreciation, where you are
using, maybe, identical lives, but quite different methods,
these have quite enormous impact,
Or take another one, the DC-10 versus 747;

One com

pany writes off the research and development as incurred and the
other writes it off over the production life of the plane.
Do you really feel that companies have a right, if
they are really going to serve the stockholder, to insist that
there's no reason for comparability of accounting techniques
unless you have exactly comparable facts?
MR. EDWARDS:

I don't know.

The word "exactly” may

be an overstatement of our views on this subject but I think
that what we are suggesting is that there has to be some kind
of a rule of reason and that the thought that uniformity is
going to give the investor a clearer determination of what he
can do with the data and how he can compare one company with
another, unless he understands what facts and circumstances
this uniform accounting system has been applied to, is going
to do him more harm than it will good.

It's going to mislead

him because he's going to think somthing is comparable that's
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not comparable.
I think we make a distinction between comparability
and uniformity.

Certainly there must be comparison and there

should be every effort made to eliminate undesirable and unjus
tifiable alternatives; but, then, I think, as our research pro
ject headed by Bob Mautz--I think he was here yesterday, was he
not? ...
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. EDWARDS:

This morning as well, for a while.

...indicates that we feel that uniform

accounting systems are not the end-all because I just don’t be
lieve uniform accounting systems where they have been applied,
have done that much for the investor.
MR. PARKER:

Yes, but, of course, uniformity and

flexibility have been argued for a long time and obviously the
outer extreme of either one is not going to work.
MR EDWARDS:

Right.

MR. PARKER:

W e ’d agree on that so w e ’re always going

to be faced finally with:

In what part of the spectrum ought

one to reach one way or the other?
And I ’d be interested in your view.

As it’s said here

in the paper--"exactly comparable"--that you'd be way off on the
right hand end, complete flexibility.

How much tradeoff ought

you be willing to go through to help this stockholder that you
are working for?
MR. EDWARDS:

I think what we really were intending to

imply here is that you can’t take the information on the two
companies and make an intelligent judgment that the facts indi
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cate that you should sell one or buy the other, based on that
information alone, unless you have determined that the facts
underlying the information are the same.
MR. PARKER:

Well, take the examples I used.

Is the

DC-10 close enough to the 747 to insist on comparable accounting
of research and development costs?
MR. EDWARDS:

I believe that the first one you men

tioned was the investment tax credit.
MR. PARKER:
MR. EDWARDS:

Yes.
I ’m not at all sure.

Here is a case

where, in the airline industry, a different kind of accounting
for the investment tax credit might have caused us to suggest
that maybe uniformity of the investment tax credit isn’t worth
all that.
MR. PARKER:
MR. EDWARDS:

You think it is not worth that?
I think it is very possible that it

might not be.
MR. PARKER:

I think there are a good many represen

tatives of stockholders who strongly disagree.
MR. EDWARDS:

Well, for example, when the investment

credit peaks so much in the airlines industry, I ’m not at all
certain that the investor wouldn't have been better served by
letting it come in as below-the-line income item.

If you be

lieve in flowthrough anyway, which I do, then I ’m not at all
certain that wouldn't have been a much better depiction of the
facts than an arbitray spreading.
MR. PARKER:

Well, if you believe in flow through,
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then if it’s all right for the airline, why is it not all right
for others?
MR. EDWARDS:

Because the airline business is not the

steel business, and there are differences.

I think you have

to know the business, and I'm sure you appreciate that, when
you compare them, because you do make a distinction in the
business.

You have got to know what business your are dealing

with in the first instance and then you have got to make dis
tinctions between companies within that business even within
the same industry.
MR. PARKER:

Well, I would gather that on any one of

the examples I gave, you would feel that any insistence on
something approaching comparable policy wouldn't be justified.
MR. EDWARDS:

Well, no.

I think we are on the record

for supporting elimination of undesirable alternatives.
Give me your next example;

I don't want you to

generalize on the basis of just the investment tac credit.
What was the next one?
MR. PARKER:

The DC-10 and the 747, accelerated ver

sus straight-line depreciation, and as much as 100 percent
difference in lives of assets that, at least when they come off
the manufacturing line, are identical.
MR. EDWARDS:

Because of failure to predict obsoles

cence— is that it?
MR. PARKER:

I don't know why IBM uses five years and

the leasing company uses ten years on the same machine.
MR. EDWARDS:

I think we're really talking about a
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period there rather than a concept.
concept of depreciation.

You are talking about the

I think there are certain cases where

the accelerated method is more appropriate and other cases
where the straight-line is more appropriate.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

The extension of this conversa

tion relates to the Arthur Andersen

presentation this morning

on value, as distinguished from depreciation, for the sake of
a systematic amortization which leads to a question from the
floor which I must recognize.
The question is asked that you said you would rather
evaluate a company at cost than value.

If you were buying an

oil production company, would you rather have the cost of the
oil and gas reserves or the value of those reserves as a con
sideration in your purchase negotiations?
MR. EDWARDS:

I wouldn't hesitate to be the first to

say that I would want to know the value before I purchased it
but I'm not sure that that is true concerning
is buying shares in major companies.

an investor who

For example, I clearly

want the cost basis on those companies for my day-to-day share
decisions knowing what I know about how you can go all over the
board on value estimates on reserves, rather than an annual
estimate of the value of the reserves of the company.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But if in your operation of the

company you need to know the value of those reserves, approxi
mate as it may be, then why shouldn't the buyer and seller of
your stock have some indication of the estimate of the value
of those reserves, however approximate?
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MR. EDWARDS:

API has just completed a study in which

they have gone through--maybe some of you have seen it--the
problems of estimating reserves and the problems in estimating
values of the reserves and I think that their problems are over
whelming.

Frankly, we have reserves we can’t put a value on,

one that we believe in, even to operate the company internally.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

No question about that.

Arthur Andersen people very clearly took the position:

The
We have

to decide on the objective, and the implementation is very diffi
cult and we all have that problem in a lot of areas outside your
company.
MR. EDWARDS:

Well, I don’t want to be in the position

of rebutting them because they don’t have an opportunity to rebut
me; but I have trouble with the idea of an objective that w e ’re
all going to move to, because it almost sounds like we’re right
back where we were, in that we still want to go somewhere, but
we're not altogether in agreement where that is.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Okay, Oscar.

One more question

and then we must go on.
MR. GELLEIN:

It seems, J. O ., these days more and

more one sees in the press figures where managements of compan
ies are estimating their earnings six months ahead, four months
ahead, or a year ahead.

Although I have no research, it just

seems to me, as I have been watching the papers, I have seen more
of this than ever before.
In the light of your statement, then, on page 8, which
in effect says that the prevailing management view is that the

3.88

degree of accuracy required for reporting such data to the
public has not been achieved, does your Committee view this
development with alarm?
MR. EDWARDS:

Some of us do.

I think that you have to

look at the industry; you have to look at the period, the time
of year when the publication of the forecast is made.

If it’s

made on the 1st of July, it's more reliable than if it's made on
October 1 of the prior year.
We don’t have any criticism of those companies who
wish to make the forecast and wish to publish it if they have
confidence in it, but some of our members have been burned
pretty bad on forecasts and have had all kinds of legal problems
and class action suits; so the weight of the evidence, we think,
comes down that forecasting of one or even two years of profits
in the first place has limited meaning and in the second place
it’s going to tend to be kind of a self-executing thing, if
w e ’re not careful.
W e ’ve got a project on it.
going to come out.

I don’t know where we are

I think you can sense where I come out on it

but maybe the rest of the F. E. I. won’t.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

That’s a forecast.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
MR. WAGNER:

Okay, Howie.

Well, I,d like to close this part of the

meeting off by saying that, while I ’m a member of the Objectives
Study Group and a member of the AICPA, I am also a

member of

the F. E. I., as you know, J.O., and I personally have been very
pleased with what I regard to be a very enlightened attitude by
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the membership of the F. E. I., as evidenced by our discussions
this morning.
The F. E. I. has been spending a great deal of time in
attempting

to get at the problems of fair value accounting,

the problems or the advantages of forecasting and disaggregation.
Their interests and their concerns, really, are not too differ
ent from those of the group who are in the practice of public
accounting or, for that matter, many of our user groups.

Their

concerns--and they are also the concerns of many of the public
accounting firms represented here this morning--are that we
approach these things through evolution, as opposed to revolu
tion, and I personally am very pleased with the presentation
this morning and wish to express my appreciation for all the
work the F. E. I. is doing.

I would close with the expression

that I hope that we will continue to be able to work in harness
and very closely together to solve the common problems which
face accounting in general.
MR. EDWARDS:

That certainly is going to be our ob

jective.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
share your views.

Thank you, Howie, and we all

Thank you, J. O .

Robert Morris Associates?

Will you introduce your

selves?
MR. CHARLES McGARRAUGH:

Very happy to.

I ’m Charles

McGarraugh, Vice President of Northwesten Bank of Minneapolis,
Chairman of the Committee of the Robert Morris Associates in
volved with relationships with the accountants.
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And at my left is Dale Freed, a Vice President of the
Manufacturers Hanover, Manager of the Time-Life office here in
New York City, and past-Chairman of the same committee.
Robert Morris Associates is a group of bankers en
gaged in lending money to businesses.

It includes a membership

of 1300 banks and 5000 individual members.

We probably loan as

much as 80 percent of all the money loaned to businesses.

We

consider ourselves vitally interested in this Study Group.
We rely on and have relied on for many years and worked
with auditing reports and that is why we're here today.

Our

emphasis may be a little bit different from some of the other
previous members in that we not only deal with those companies
who are reporting to the SEC or whose stock is listed on any of
a number of the exchanges, but we also deal with all the multi
tude of other business entities who use audit reports, and al
though no statistics were available for me, one manager of one
of the large accounting firms suggested that as much as 70 per
cent of the reports issued out of their office on a nationwide
basis were reports that were

issued for companies other than

those companies reporting to the SEC or to stock exchanges.
I would like to say that this Committee should keep
this in mind as they regard the emphasis of their vaious princi
ples; that there are a great multitude of users who are not
really represented by stockholders per se--family companies,
proprieterships, partnerships, and all the rest of these things-where it is important to have your financial reporting just as
accurate as in any other particular case.
Our emphasis today is going to be on three forms.
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We would like to discuss your role--and I'm talking about the
CPA, as an independent, objective attestor, with a strong plea
for more qualitative, subjective judgment; our view as to your
primary responsibility; and then, in a very dangerous area, I
might add, our impressions of your professionalism.
Going to the first of these three areas rapidly, we
think that as an independent, objective attestor, your primary
responsibility should be to recognize that you not only do, as
one man said this morning, bookkeeping things of adding up
dollars and cents, but you must make qualitative judgments,
involving, oftentimes, subjective evaluations.
You do a really remarkably good job in the current
assets section of your balance sheets.

Your whole discussion

this morning--I wasn’t here yesterday--went around the valuation
of the other assets, the fixed assets, the buildings and equip
ment, the franchises, intangibles, and mineral resources.

I ’m

glad to see your whole discussion has been largely aimed that
way; that is, what is the proper way to evaluate these particu
lar important parts of a balance sheet.
I think it is important.

It involves not only methods

of evaluating shares of stock, but the quality of the evaluation
of all these various assets cannot help but have an effect on
the quality of the income statement as it goes down through the
assets.
We think, as bankers, that we’re not really, particu
larly, overly interested in the commercial loaning end with the
earnings per share concept, and we think a lot of sins have
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been committed in the desire to keep the earning per share on
a relatively even growth pattern over a period of years.
are interested in the profitability of the business.
interested in the return in relation to net sales.

We

We are
We're cer

tainly interested in the return as a percentage of the beginning
net worth.
But the earnings per share concept, although I'm sure
it makes a great deal of difference to the stock analyst, is
not particularly important to us.

As a matter of fact, this is

one of the things, we think, that has tended to distort some of
the statements we have seen.
Then going on rapidly to the next item, the primary
responsibility of the audit report, and who is it for--I was
glad to see Mr. Edwards indicate that he thought the reports
were for the stockholders and creditors.

I agree that, cer

tainly, the stockholders and the creditors are the ones that
you are making the reports for.

And then he also went on to

indicate that the problems of comparability are one of the
things that you have to attack.
The comparability factor is important to us.

As you

probably know, the Robert Morris Associates issues a study of
comparative values and related percentages in various industries,
and to the extent that this comparability is distorted by the
multiplicity of generally accepted accounting principles applied
in different ways--for example the computer industy of the airframe industry-comparability tends to lose its value, and com
parability has to be a way of judging what values and what in
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vestments to make.
We would like to go on and suggest that you, as the
accountant, should recognize the fact that you are responsible
to the user and that there are other things besides just the
statements that are of value to the users; we would like to
think that the internal control is part of your function and
some information that you could pass on to us.
particularly interested

We are not

in the nitty-gritty of the financial

housekeeping within a business organization; but if you have
found in the course of your audit that the internal control pro
cedures are so sloppy as to require the need for more stringent
accounting procedures, this is an important fact in our evalua
tion of the credibility of the management.
It may be dangerous, but we think forecasting is some
thing that you ought to recognize as a responsibility of the
independent accountant.

This does not mean that you have to

draw up the forecast, because I t h ink this is beyond your com
petence; but it does mean that you can provide the proper format
for forecasts.

It does mean that you can and should examine

the reasonableness of the assumptions that are made.
You are in a peculiarly important place to do just
that which neither the bankers nor the stockholders can do be
cause you can sit down with the management and you can talk to
management and say:

How did you arrive at this particular

assumption and why are you believing this?

Was this something

that you hoped to do or is it something that you expect to do?
Does it represent a sales goal or is it really, truly the way
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you look at it?
And if you put it in a forecast, believe me, this
will do away with just the kind of an interim kind of report
you are getting today where we are going to make so much in the
first quarter and the second quarter, and w e ’re going to make
$1.50--and then in the fourth quarter they all of a sudden have
a loss of about $1.50 a share.

I don’t think this thing would

be nearly as prevalent with a more informed and careful fore
cast and going on that line at the beginning and saying:
fellows.

Look,

This is what we expect to do in the coming year.
How often should it be changed?

It should be changed any

time during the year that there is a material change and it has to be
changed, probably, in the same sort of interim report that they do on
a quarterly basis.
This is something that we think you can do.
Another thing that was mentioned just briefly this
morning is that the impact of consumerism today--and I didn’t
hear the man from Nader yesterday--and the impact of the social
and ecological responsibilities on business, whether it happens
to be banking, accounting, or any kind of business, cannot be
ignored.

And it certainly represents a very challenging oppor

tunity to the accountants as to:

How do you reflect this in

the statements?
I liked your example on the steel plant in the south
part of Chicago.

There’s also an impact on a steel plant in

Duluth, Minnesota which is being shut down because of pollution.
This impact, the costs of these sorts of things, I
don’t think have been reflected adequately yet on balance sheets.
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One other item that I put in the paper--which, by the
way, is a summation of the feeling of a lot of the bankers all
over the country--was that maybe in the future you accountants
are going to have to do something about managerial competency
and look at it in some sort of evaluation.

I don’t think you

are ready to do it yet, and the only reason I think, that it
may come in the future is in this respect:

As businesses in

crease in their complexity and as the top management gets fur
ther and further away from the investors and the creditors, it’s
harder and harder to get there and properly review the mana
gerial competency other than as reflected in the operating
statement in itself and this is not always adequate.
So this is something you may want to look at.

I

wouldn’t challenge you with that request yet.
I don't know whether I mentioned it before, but I do
want to mention it, that we believe in the profession of ac
countancy.

We believe that you have a fine organization.

We

are quite certain that you have good, comprehensive entrance
requirements.

As a matter of fact, many years ago I was un

able to pass them, so they must be pretty good.
We also believe that your ongoing programs--and I
understand you just instituted another ongoing program for a
training of people on the staff--are important to the people in
maintaining their professional stance.
W e ’re not entirely sure, because of lack of knowledge,
how effective your testing and the policing of your membership
has been.

We do know that we have seen enough instances, as
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you have, that are unpleasant--enough suits and enough instances
that make us wonder what sort of a policing you are doing, and
it’s possible that more publicity as to those efforts would tend
to improve your profession, tend to make it have a higher stand
ard of adequacy.

Believe me, if there’s any one group that de

pends on the accounting profession heavily, it’s the banking
group.

We do need you.

W e ’d like to work with you, and we want

and expect to continue to get good results.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you, Charlie.

Does Dale

wish to speak?
MR. McGARRAUGH: Do you want to add something, Dale?
MR. DALE Y. FREED:
RMA group.
another.

No.

Charlie speaks for our whole

Each of us would differ a little bit on one point or
This isn’t a subject as to which you can get unanimity

of opinion on; but Charlie's position paper does represent a
consensus.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

Well, we find in our Group that

it’s quite difficult to get unanimity as well.
That was a very gracious presentation, a very good
presentation.

It’s very refreshing to find those who would

push us further and further on the matter of internal control,
management audits, social responsibility and so on, because so
many of our inputs have tended in the other direction, being
fearful that some of us may be trying to go too far too fast.
May I start out on the forecasting issue, on which
you took quite a strong position?

The input record for these

hearings has been relatively low on a push in the direction of
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cash information, in the sense of forward cash flows, past cash
flows, expected cash requirements; whereas I think the members
of the Group would agree with me that our interview process
generally around the circuit with users has put much more em
phasis on that than is evident from some of the input that is
being given us today.
I would think you would have an unusual interest in
that.
MR. McGARRAUGH:

There’s no question but the cash

flow is our source of information as to the way a loan is going
to get repaid.

It’s very important.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

So when you are talking fore

casts, you are not talking only earnings forecasts or projected
balance sheets?
MR. McGARRAUGH:

They can be in both forms, as you

know, and the forecast of the earnings is an important picture
to us, because it’s not only the cash aspect of the statement
that has validity.

Sure, it gives you the opportunity to indi

cate where the source of cash is going to be in order to pay
off a loan, but on the other hand, if this happens to be a term
loan, the continued forecast of profitability can materially
affect the future flow of cash.

Yes, to the extent that we are

interested in cash flow, on the short run it’s very important
but the profitability forecast is too, to give us a measure of
comfort.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
to you.

Let me introduce Andy Reinhart

Some of you saw him yesterday.

He's Vice President of
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the North American Operations of Singer.

He has been troubled

with the stockholders meetings or some such proceedings.
Any other questions from the Group?
ready?

Sid, are you

Andy?
MR. REINHART:

I ’d like to talk a little about the

forecasting part.
For example, if you took a relatively large, diversi
fied company operating in a number of different industries and
in many countries throughout the world, what kind of support
would you anticipate in the annual report for a forecast which
might be made up of, perhaps, hundreds of assumptions in dif
ferent areas?
MR. McGARRAUGH:

You pose the most difficult question,

I agree, because you have to have an inordinate number of assump
tions.

If you are going to cover all the foreign operations,

all the different product lines, and all the different situa
tions; and I really can't answer that question, because I don't
know.

I don't know what you do in that kind of a situation.
MR. RHEINHART:

I would also like to ask you about

the competency of people to make forecasts.

We have a lot of

trouble making forecasts ourselves sometimes, supposedly know
ing about our own business.

I would seriously question your

feeling that independent public accountants would be good at
making forecasts for us.

What would happen where we had a

difference of opinion with accountants with regard to a forecast
When we talk about certifying to something which has
already happened, we don't really

have a lot of disagreement
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over that.

We may have some disagreement over accounting prac

tices or various methods of doing something but at least it's a
fact that we can discuss and usually come to agreement about.
But suppose, for example, that I were to say:

I think our sales

are going to be ten percent higher this year than last year and
our accountant said: No, I think it’s only going to be five per
cent.

What do you do in this instance?

How would you express

both opinions?
MR. McGARRAUGH:
things you said.

Well, let me answer one of the first

I did not mean to imply that the accountant

would prepare the forecast.
competence.

I do not think that's within his

I do think that many businesses do an excellent

job in forecasting and where you do have results that are
materially different from that forecasted, you can identify some
outside pressures that couldn’t reasonably be foreseen; this is
all right, as long as you have identified as you go along.
As far as a disagreement between you and an accountant
on a forecast, I do not think that the form of attestation on a
forecast from a firm of accountants would be the same form of
attestation as would be on the part of a certificate of past
performance because I think it’s different.

But I do think that

an accountant has a particular place that he can look at this
thing and say:

These are reasonable.

If they are so unreasonable that he wants to make an
exception in a footnote, that’s fine.
them down there, and he says:

But otherwise, he lists

These are the forecasts and in

our opinion they are reasonable.
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Between 5 and 10 you’re not going to get any argument
but if you put in 100 percent because it’s what you would like
to have happen and you have only had 10 percent over a period of
years and you have no new products, he ought to put a footnote
in there.
MR. REINHART:

What kind of detail would you antici

pate that the accountant would go through in order to verify
the forecast?

I mean, I ’m kind of worried myself about our bill,

I suppose.
MR. FREED:

Let me talk to the general subject a little

bit if I could just postpone your latest specific question.
We work with forecasts a lot in our bank, as most
large banks do.

We, as a matter of practice, require forecasts

on every term loan for the length of the term loan and this, of
course, involves us with a lot of diversified, multi-national
companies.

We start with a forecast in whatever form it is

presented, and if I can just digress a moment, the RMA’s posi
tion on the role of accountants here, first, is the methodology.
It’s surprising to me, but there a number of major
companies that submit forecasts that don’t hang together.

They

don’t provide for enough fixed assets to produce the volume that
they expect to sell in 1974 . They don’t provide enough dollars
to provide the inventory necessary to support that volume a
couple of years out.

They omit one little item or another.

I

still find it difficult to believe, but it's true.
This is an area where accountants should certainly
provide expertise very easily, just on the mechanical side.
As to the degree of involvement in the assumptions--
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I don’t know.

Maybe Charlie and I differ a little on this.

What I ’d like to see is the assumptions set forth first because
all w e ’re really talking about is:

If these things come to pass

then the results will be what you see on the following page
with the emphasis, therefore, on the assumptions, and I think
the user, certainly in the banking business--the user has to
apply his own judgment in appraising the validity of those
assumptions.
As to the degree of detail that the forecast should
include, when we are dealing with diversified companies, we
almost always identify those areas that generate the most cash
and ask for details on that segment of the business.

We de-

emphasize the international operations even though we recognize
that by and large they are generating more and more profit.
The availability of cash from those operations is subject to a
little more doubt.

We would hesitate to structure a term loan

dependent on the availability of cash from foreign earnings.
So obviously, it’s a judgment matter but we will
almost always go behind the company forecast into a couple of
the principal operating divisions.
You asked how detailed the audit would be of the fore
cast.

Well, certainly it should be detailed enough to review

all the mechanics and to make sure that there are no structural
problems in the methodology.

As to how far an accountant should

go in reviewing the assumptions, I agree with a comment that
Mr. Wagner made a little while ago; w e ’re dealing here in evolu
tion, and not revolution.

I don’t think that forecasting is
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new to accountants.

I think that they cannot judge the value

of inventory without satisfying themselves that Singer sewing
machines are going to sell next year.
If you go into a new Friden computer, maybe if you
have 10,000 of those in a warehouse some place they should do
a little forecasting as to the salability of that product before
attesting to the value of the inventory.

I think they are already

doing this.
So maybe what we are suggesting is that they go just
a little hit farther and admit to the user of the financial
statements that they are in fact doing a lot of future-oriented
work in doing their present auditing.
MR. REINHART:

In your own forecasting, what would

you consider to he a margin of error?

I mean, would you he

happy if you were within ten percent, or 25 percent?

What

would you consider to he a reasonable projection of a company.
Let's say that we were projecting we were going to make $1 a
share this year?

That's not our projection, by the way.

Would you change that if you thought it was going to
go b elow 90¢ or above $1.10?
MR. FREED:

I couldn't answer that.

I think it has

to depend entirely on the industry and the sensitivity to econ
omic trends.
What we do in our own hank is estimate high, low and
medium forecasts, again emphasizing cash.
In a company such as yours, you have earnings that
you hope you will attain next year, hut if something unforeseen
comes along and those earnings are not generated, you have, you
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know, half a dozen or a dozen alternate plans of raising money;
and as Charlie was saying, w e ’re very interested in the earnings,
but as a component of the cash flow.

We look very carefully at the

flexibility, the alternatives that are available to the chief
financial officer, in making loans because we don’t expect his
earnings forecast to be accurate.
it is just exactly accurate.
short?

It’s just a stroke of luck if

But what can he do if it falls

He can generate cash in a number of other ways.
MR. REINHART:

Did you say that it’s a stroke of luck

if the forecast is accurate?

But you would like it to be pub

lished?
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Dale Freed has really commented a bit

upon the questions I wanted to ask, but let me ask, maybe to
clarify in my own mind the point, two specific questions which
are really related to Andy’s first two questions.
Of what use do you think an income statement of a
firm turning out a multiplicity of products in a large number
of countries spread throughout the world, and showing only a
single income figure,--of what use is that single figure?

Or

would you rather have it broken down by types of products or
countries in which that income was generated?
MR. FREED:

There’s no doubt in my mind that it’s more

meaningful to have the kind of detail that you suggested in the
alternative.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Might the forecast follow the same

procedure that you use in reporting income, then, in terms of
such division?
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MR. FREED:

Yes.

As I suggested before, I would put

much more emphasis on domestic earnings generating ability, as
opposed to foreign.
DEAN DAVIDSON:

Well, the second question, which again,

relates to this--you touched upon it briefly when you spoke of
inventories, but, of course, much of the discussion this morning
has related to capital assets, to plant assets, and in your
statement you say that you think the accountant, in looking at
the assumptions and forecasts, should pass upon the reasonable
ness of those assumptions as well as upon the mechanical de
tails--does the accountant face that problem now in passing up
on the reasonableness of the assumptions with regard to continued
use of plant facilities?
That is, can you see any difference between the kind
of discussions that might go on between the accountant and the
financial management of the firm with regard to continued use
of depreciable facilities?

Would that discussion in your

opinion, differ from the kind of discussion that would go on
about the reasonableness of assumptions on the forecast?
MR. FREED:

I think they are very close, as I men

tioned before, I think it’s just a question of evolution,
rather than a different subject that we are talking about, and
I certainly recognize the difficulty in either event.
RCA was in the computer business right up until the
minute they decided they weren’t going to be in it, so you had
a plant that was worth X dollars as a component in a continuing
business one day, and the next day--I don’t know.

Was it worth
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anything?

Certainly the value was radically less.
The same kind of rationale, the same kind of analysis,

has to go into effect whether you are valuing that plant on a
balance sheet or in relation to a forecast.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I have a question from the floor

that fits directly into this, Dale; and then Oscar wants to
talk.
The question from the floor came before you mentioned
RCA, but it has to do with precisely that kind of thing, in the
sense both of the introduction of new products, like a 370 re
placing a 360 on the IBM line, being superimposed, or the elimi
nation of a product line in the matter of RCA.
The question is:

Given knowledge of management--pre

sumably, knowledge by their public accountants--where does the
responsibility fall, and what is the timing for such announce
ments?

I suspect the bankers are apt to be in on that kind of

thing, too.
MR. FREED: I wish we were more often than we are.
MR. McGARRAUGH:

You pose a very, very difficult pro

blem, and I don’t know how to answer that, because sometimes we
wonder h ow long management has known what they are going to do
prior to the announcement date.
sudden, unpleasant surprise.

Sometimes it comes to us as a

Sometimes we have some warning on

it.
I would say that as a matter of practice the announce
ment should be made to all parties at the same time.

There’s

certainly a responsibility to the public as well as to the banker

3.106

and I have to admit at times we may know ahead of time; we like
that, but that may not be right.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

But assuming you are a creditor,

conceptually would you think you should know ahead of the public?
MR. McGARRAUGH:

No, I don't think so.

I think this

is one thing we have to start facing, bankers and accountants
and everybody else, that the individual has some rights, and
these rights have been neglected in the past as evidenced by
the prevalence of the suits that are coming, and as I mentioned
before, the consumerism that's a little bit rampant.

The in

dividual is a lot smarter than you think he is, and he's a lot
more aware of what's going on; he's going to demand his rights
and you better face it.

And that includes us as well as you.

CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

First

Oscar, then Frank, and then

I have one from the floor.
MR. GELLEIN:

On page 3 you observe that perhaps over

emphasis on earnings per share as an indication of performance
has had an adverse effect on the balance sheet.

We have heard

from others here from time to time, too, that perhaps, as some
one said many years ago, a resurgence of the balance sheet is
needed.

Would you comment on the general way inwhich you think

it might be desirable to reorient the balance sheet?
MR. McGARRAUGH:

I think all your discussions have

been trying to arrive at, and I don't know if you can define it-economic value, fair value, current value--some value that re
presents--it's a cliche--"the facts."
If you have got the facts on the balance sheet this
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has got to improve your income accounts because, after all, they
are a factor of the income statement.
Two comments seem to be relevant here, and one of
them is:

Was it in 1968, that a large number of companies went

from accelerated to straightline depreciation?

And in every

case, of course, their earnings improved and in some cases very
markedly.

I submit there wasn’t any change in the economic

vitality of the business but their earnings per share, in some
cases, doubled.
Now that ploy seems to have worn off so in the state
ments we see going through now, occasionally, there are a lot
of people going from LIFO to FIFO and all of a sudden we have
got better earnings.
I don’t think that company is a bit different than
it was before; these are the things w e ’re talking about.
MR. WESTON:

This question relates to forecasts.

prepared paper by theF. E. I.

The

stated their view that business

does not yet have the ability to make forecasts which have the
degree of accuracy required for reporting to the public; we
touched on that briefly although we didn’t get a chance to
ask them why they believed that.
You advised us that most major lenders insist on fore
casts.

But there seems to be a conflict here as to the validity

or the usefulness of forecasts in terms of lending and the
public.

Could you give us some observations as to how accurate

or how useful the forecasts are that you do receive and whether
they might also be useful to investors?

3.108

MR. McGARRAUGH:

I'd like Dale to second me on this,

but the forecasts that we get are very useful to us.

We are

finding that in the banking business now more and more we are
running into term loans, and term loans have to involve a view
into the future, both as to cash flows and profitability.
We recognize the limitations.
forces can change them.

We recognize that other

And I understand, I think, the financial

executive’s reluctance to go to forecasting because what you
are dealing with is the unsophisticated man who is going to sue
you because you said you were going to do something and you
just didn't do it.

I think you have to recognize that you are

going to run into that sort of problem and deal with it. But as
long as the forecast has been done in good faith, on good assump
tions, I think that you will prevail in court.

Eventually it

will resolve that a forecast is a legitimate part of the
enterprise accounting.
little knowledge.

But it will take a little while and a

You can neither protect the public from its

ignorance nor can you ignore that it is, maybe, in many cases,
smarter than you think.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

One final question, which comes

from the floor, and I ’m sure you have given it a good bit of
thought.
It’s clear that some banks continue to make at least
certain kinds of loans based on unaudited statements as dis
tinguished from audited statements.

The question is, in terms

of the activity of this Group establishing objectives from
which standards would ultimately flow:

Should we make any
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distinction in our thinking between those two kinds of busi
nesses and two kinds of end products.
MR. McGARRAUGH:

I ’m sorry.

nature of your question, Bob.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

I don’t understand the

I ’m sorry.
Well, the question, as I read it,

as it was written from the floor, is:

let's make the distinc

tion between the small company, which may come to some banks
with unaudited statements, as distinguished from the larger,
traded company which deals only with audited statements.
The question is:

Should there be any difference in

standards or content of those statements because of the nature
of the business or because of the lack of attestation?
. MR. McGARRAUGH:
way:

I guess I have to answer it this

The emphasis that we may put on a statement that comes to

us and the reliance that we may put on a statement that comes
to us, whether it’s audited or unaudited, makes a difference.
We may even do this:

Go out and do our own auditing with our

own people to get more knowledge.

But other than that, I don’t

want to respond to it, except that there’s a difference in the
reliance that we might put on those kinds of statements.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:

It’s only in reliance.

That is,

you interpret it and regard it in exactly the same way for your
loaning purposes except with respect to reliance?
MR. McGARRAUGH:

Yes, but, you see, that’s the whole

guts of it.
CHAIRMAN TRUEBLOOD:
Thank you very much.

A good answer.
W e ’ll break for lunch.

We will
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return promptly at two o'clock.
(Whereupon at twelve twenty-five o'clock the meeting was adjourned
for luncheon.)

